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INTRODUCTION 
WHY WOULD A DISSERTATION DISCUSS ABOUT ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE IN 2018? 
This was the first question that I asked myself before approaching this project. Beyond 
any theoretical implication or personal interest, why is this subject of vital importance 
right now? The answer was clearer than I thought: looking at the news was enough to 
understand how, today, the world is changing faster than ever, and crises, upheavals and 
great opportunities as well appear constantly both for organizations and people. It felt 
important to understand how this extreme volatility could be harnessed, understood, and 
what was needed to properly navigate these tumultuous waters.  
The case of Maschio Gaspardo is just one of the many examples that sparked my 
interest in this topic: in 2013, the company entered an explosive growth phase which was 
in contrast with the trend that other firms in Italy were facing due to the recession, yet a 
negative conjuncture driven by the crisis of the Russian rouble and a downturn in the 
agricultural machinery sector suddenly turned the indebtedness the firm incurred into to 
boost its growth in a serious burden (Busaro, 2015). In 2015, due to this situation and the 
financial tension the firm was undergoing, the founder of the organization took his life 
(Mandurino, 2015). Even after this immense tragedy though, the firm was able to trudge 
through the ordeal and after a resizing and a plan to restore its debt (Nicoletti, 2015). The 
margins improved, and the financial situation began stabilizing (Paolini, 2016), and in 
2018 the predicament was finally history, with the group aiming for a more sustainable 
but constant growth (Sandre, 2018).  
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Resilience deals with this kind of situations: it contains shocks, crises and 
perturbances, it helps in overcoming them, in maintaining functioning while under duress, 
and in a world where trends like the Internet or globalization can abruptly shift the 
performance of an organization (Hamel & Valikangas, 2003), as the illustrated case 
demonstrates, it is the key to achieve continued success. And to prevent these tragedies.  
Furthermore, given how ascents and downfalls for organizations can happen in a 
matter of weeks instead of multiple years as in the past (Busaro, 2015), long term 
adaptation seems to be less suitable than organizational resilience, which is more dynamic 
and fitting for defusing crises before they occur (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010). The 
topic though is extremely challenging, given how difficult to formalize and capture it is. 
It is a multi-faceted construct, sometimes even counterintuitive, dealing with 
competences and risks that encompass all the aspects of an organization, and it is so 
ingrained with tacit aspects that scholars might find its study complex and daunting. But 
it is the key for our future.  
Consequently, this dissertation attempts to shed some light on the subject, with the 
purpose of highlighting the relevant theory on the matter, the connections between the 
multiple themes resilience deals with and some means to quantify resilience to give 
practitioners a sketch of their performance in this dimension. Furthermore, the thesis 
attempts to verify empirically the existence of some constructs that were formulated in 
the theory, to understand their implications and the real impact they could have in both 
management science and practice. One of the goals is to show that organizational 
resilience is a “normal” capability, something that mindful managers put in place simply 
by focusing on the aspects that are important for their business and that improve the 
capacity of facing untoward events without losing track of what can damage this capacity 
or make the firm brittle toward disruptions. It does so through the following chapters: 
CHAPTER 1. Here the different fields that discussed resilience are treated, starting from 
semantic definitions. The seminal papers on the theme are analysed, highlighting the 
connections with adaptation to novel situations, the influence of strategy and how this 
capability can be developed at multiple levels in the organization (in individuals, groups 
or systems). The relevant management literature is reviewed to account for crises that 
depend on external factors (Meyer, 1982; Staw et al. 1981) and internal factors (Perrow, 
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1984). The contribution from theory that frames resilience as reliability and from crisis 
management literature is brought forward to understand how the construct plays a role 
both during crises and before their appearance in organizations that aren’t allowed to fail 
even once (Roberts, 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Boin & 
Hart, 2010). The findings are then generalized for normal organizations, showing how 
mindfulness allows to shape action so that errors are understood and prevented, and 
performance is sheltered. The next review is concerned with studies on individual 
resilience, to understand how it impacts organizations and how it shelters from 
maladaptive behaviours while favouring positive outcomes (Luthans, 2002a; Masten, 
2001). The closeness of the findings with mindfulness is highlighted, as well as the 
parallels of the development of individual resilience and organizational resilience. In 
particular, the aspect of how the construct lies on the interplay between risk and protective 
factors is detailed, showing that the typical, common development of adaptive methods 
in complex systems can lead to being able to face competently great adversities and risky 
environments (Masten, 2014). This part also stresses how work performance improves 
after this capacity is developed in individuals. Then, both to study the construct at an 
organization level and to move the findings of the High Reliability Organizations research 
thread from an operational level to a strategic perspective, paragraph 1.5 shows the 
difference between risk reduction and prevention and the ability to respond to unexpected 
threats and shifts in the environments (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Hamel & Valikangas, 
2003). Lastly, the theme is brought to a system level through the analysis of the literature 
on supply chain resilience, which considers how the capability is enhanced both through 
pre-emptive risk management (Craighead et al., 2007) and a deep understanding of its 
fallibility, and the need for preparedness toward low-probability, high-impact events 
(Pettit et al., 2010). This topic is focused on as it provides consistent evidence on how 
resilience improves results in business-as-usual periods and shelters from lower bound 
variability, on how it can be developed in multiple ways and how it relates with resource 
building. 
The chapter closes with an attempt to merge the multiple fields of research in a 
comprehensive definition, while explaining the theoretical background for the definitions 
of static resilience (Rose et al., 2013) and coping range (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010) 
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that are used in the analyses from Chapter 3 and 4 and framing the construct as something 
more than a dynamic capability as intended by Teece (2007). 
CHAPTER 2. This part aims to understand the methods that have been developed thus 
far to quantify the construct, and how this approach can benefit organizations as it helps 
the demonstration of progresses and the connections between protective factors and 
competitiveness (Stephenson, 2010). The insight provided by instruments that measure 
Individual and Regional Economic Performance resilience are presented (Rose et al., 
2004; Rose, 2013; Garmestani et al., 2006; Mallak, 1998, Mallak & Yildiz 2016). Then 
the topic moves on the available scales for organizational resilience, how it can be inferred 
from Return on Equity (RoE in the remainder of the dissertation) dynamics and its 
volatility (Markman & Venzin, 2014), how to quantify the aspects that promote resilience 
and how to aggregate them in measurable indexes (McManus, 2008; Stephenson, 2010) 
and the limits and advantages of these approaches. The analysis tries to highlight how 
resilience primarily impacts the resource base of an organization. The last part highlights 
which doubts these scales raised and the other concerns that weren’t solved in Chapter 1, 
in particular the lack of a connection between risk and protective factors in the reviewed 
methodologies and possible new ways to interpret the findings from these evaluations. 
The possibility of splitting protective factors in elements that activate only during crises 
and aspects that shelter against negative events even during ordinary administration is 
first presented here. 
CHAPTER 3. Starting from the questions proposed in the previous chapter, this part of 
the dissertation uses the qualitative case study methodology from Yin (2009) to develop 
definitions, propositions, research questions and methodologies to verify the following 
ideas. Is there a common pattern to how protective factors counteract risks in different 
firms? Are there any priorities? What prevents disruptions in business as usual times, or 
allows organizations not to experience any crisis, and what enables responses and 
adaptation after an untoward event occurs? When does a firm really risk being 
overwhelmed by a situation, getting close to a complete loss of function? Is it due to 
single events, or to the stacking of odds that overcome the response mechanisms of the 
organization? These inquiries are checked through case studies as they are the most 
suitable tool to capture qualitative data and answer how and why questions, while having 
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little control on the research environment and attempting to study contemporary events. 
The chapter explains the reasons behind the case choices, which involved medium sized 
firms in the North East Italy Construction and Furniture sectors, the formal propositions 
and the adopted field procedures. These included a survey based on the Resilient 
Organisations Benchmarking Tool (2014) that allowed to understand beforehand the 
firms’ dynamics, and a subsequent semi-structured interview with key personnel to verify 
the collected data and thoroughly analyse the situation while addressing each research 
inquiry.  
CHAPTER 4. Naturally, this part describes and analyses the four cases that were chosen 
for the study, explaining the facts through the studied theory and triangulating the data 
both through the survey, the interviews and the match with pre-determined expected case 
studies. Two cases were performed per sector, one looking for a firm that didn’t witness 
a crisis during the last ten years and one concerned with firms that featured a drop in 
performance and a successive recovery. The analysis then focuses on understanding the 
findings from the comparison of these cases. The results were positive, both confirming 
previous theory and the validity of the employed tools while also pointing toward 
evidence of the existence of the proposed constructs, showing that there appears to be a 
pattern between typical operational risks and contextual protective factors and low 
probability, high consequence risks that require the presence of generic protective factors. 
Furthermore, the concept of how resilience can be developed through multiple means is 
reinforced, and the strong contextuality of the elements of resilience is confirmed. The 
last part explains the study limitations, its conclusions and some research proposals for 
the future. 
CHAPTER 5. This final part summarizes all the findings from the thesis through the 
theoretical and managerial implications that emerged. 
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 1. CHAPTER 1 
RESILIENCE: THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter’s main purpose is answering the following question and its associated 
corollaries. What is organizational resilience? What is its meaning and relationship with 
other definitions of resilience? Which factors influence it? Can it be developed?  
 
To address all these issues, the core literature on this field of research and the most recent 
developments will be explored, starting from spurious definitions to reach and discuss the 
most acclaimed approaches currently predominant in the literature. 
As reported by Williams et al. (2017), the concept of resilience has been studied across 
different fields with various meanings, making it difficult in management science to build 
a unique theoretical construct. For this reason, this thesis will explore the different 
meanings currently associated with resilience, checking for similarities with the 
definitions for its organizational counterpart and trying to understand the facets that 
different semantic approaches have highlighted thus far.  
The English word “Resilience” identifies “the quality of being able to return quickly to a 
previous good condition after problems” (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2018) or “The 
capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness” (Oxford Online Dictionary, 
2018), and derives from the Latin verb resilio which means “Bouncing back, returning 
quickly” (Castiglioni & Mariotti, 1976). In materials science, resilience is the ability of a 
material to absorb energy when it is deformed elastically, in ecology Holling (1973) 
defined it as a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change 
and disturbance while maintaining the same relationships between populations or state 
variables. The definition has been tailored on individuals in psychology (Luthans, 2002), 
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but supply chain engineering and crisis management literature have tied it to systems and 
networks as well (Jüttner & Maklan, 2010; Seville et al., 2008).  
The variety of definitions in different fields is mirrored in management sciences as well, 
therefore to follow how the concept has developed over forty years of research and how 
different authors fit this construct in their theory, the following paragraphs will attempt 
to summarize the various perspectives, allowing the reader to grasp the nuances of this 
word. Some attributes however can already be highlighted thanks to the definitions that 
have already been mentioned:  
 Resilience appears to deal with shocks, crises, perturbances in systems and with the 
consequent ability of this system to maintain its foundation; 
 It’s a composite concept that benefits from different literature fields, mostly due to its 
multi-level effects (on individuals, organizations and networks/complex systems) that 
can be grasped only through perspectives that range from psychological analysis to 
regional economics; 
 Given the plurality of conceptualizations and the links with soft organizational aspects 
such as culture (Roberts, 1990), collective sense-making (Weick & Roberts, 1993) 
and dynamic capabilities (Battisti & Deakins, 2015), its measurement so far has 
proven difficult. 
The latest literature reviews on this subject, as well as the contribution from Ann Masten 
(2014), have tried to merge the different meanings attributed to resilience through the 
following statements.  
 Annarelli & Nonino (2016, page 3) described organizational resilience as “… the 
organization’s capability to face disruptions and unexpected events in advance thanks 
to the strategic awareness and a linked operational management of internal and 
external shocks…” proceeding then in the differentiation of static and dynamic 
resilience; 
 Williams et al. (2017, page 742) proposed resilience as “the process by which an actor 
(i.e., individual, organization or community) builds and uses its capability 
endowments to interact with the environment in a way that positively adjusts and 
maintains functioning prior to, during and following adversity”; 
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 Masten (2014, page 10) argued that resilience is “the capacity of a dynamic system to 
adapt successfully to disturbances that threaten system function, viability, or 
development”. 
But, to fully understand the syntheses from these authors, the dissertation moves to the 
analysis of the most prominent articles and discussions on the topic, starting from when 
the resilience theme first appeared in management literature in Meyer’s and Staw’s 
seminal articles. 
1.2 Early Contributions in Management Science 
In an environment that wasn’t as complex as today’s globalized world, Meyer (1982) 
studied the effect of a doctors’ strike in San Francisco that occurred in 1975. His goal was 
to understand how the environment, and specifically “jolts” (transient, difficult to foresee 
and disruptive events that affect an organization but rarely threaten its survival), could 
trigger different adaptive responses from different organizations, and the reasons for 
which this occurred.  
The author examined these answers to the threat and was surprised in noticing that all of 
them were counterintuitive: Memorial Hospital, that was usually deemed a static, 
profitable and efficient organization weathered the storm through the suffering of losses 
and a consumption of financial slack; Community Hospital, with its less formalized 
structure that often led to financial losses, laid off some employees and worked efficiently 
to the point where it turned profitable during the period, whereas General Hospital was 
able to foresee the event three weeks earlier and limited its reaction to some personnel 
reallocation, facing the strike in a “business as usual” fashion. Other hospitals had similar 
ways of reacting.  
Linnenluecke (2015) highlighted how this paper drew from the “variation-selection-
retention” mechanism and organization evolutionary literatures, thus it’s not surprising 
that its main concern was understanding and describing the adaptation methods, rather 
than framing them as resilient responses. Meyer (1982) in fact described “resiliency” as 
a mean of adapting that aims at absorbing jolts’ impacts and loosening couplings between 
the organizations and their environment, to reduce deviation and create first order change, 
an approach that was opposed to “retention” which engendered second-order change by 
modifying theories of action in the organization. 
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What really contributed to the future research stream on resilience however was the 
identification of some factors that affected adaptation, as in later research they were found 
to influence organizational resilience: pursued strategy, ideologies, adopted structure and 
slack resources.  
According to Meyer’s (1982) analysis, the hospitals which pursued a broader strategy and 
relied on diversification often featured a closer surveillance of their enacted market 
niches, which allowed for faster perception of external stimuli and improved the response 
to the jolt, a perspective that was confirmed by research from Urcioli et al. (2014) and, at 
an industry level, from Garmestani et al. (2006) and Rose et al. (2013). The effects of 
ideologies, such as culture and shared perceptions of reality and their impact on how 
organizations cope with threats and difficulty was elaborated upon in the High Reliability 
Organizations literature (Roberts, 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001; Weick et al. 1999) as well as in successive papers on organizational resilience 
(Gittel et al., 2006) and psychology oriented works (Masten, 2014). The same applies to 
adopted structure, although in some papers the focus is more on supply chains rather than 
single organizations (f.e. in Jüttner & Maklan, 2011), and for slack resources (f.e. in 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Gittel et al., 2006; Sheffi & Rice, 2005). 
In his paper, Meyer (1982) specified that formalized jobs and centralized decisions were 
associated with less forewarning; that organization ideologies fostering strategic 
reorientation and organizational change, as well as participation and pluralism in decision 
making were more likely to affect the adaptation style of a firm than the amount of 
available slack resources and finally that hospitals which relied on single strategies, had 
conventional approaches and took more vigorous stances to respond to the jolt required 
longer periods to return to normal efficiency rates. Moreover, learning was emphasized 
as an important tool to improve performance during the aftermath of a jolt, and the 
sedimentation of changes and reaffirmation of the underlying values of an organization 
was more likely with adaptive ideologies and in pluralist (Clegg et al., 2006) 
organizations.  
These aspects would be further elaborated in an article from Hamel & Valikangas (2003), 
but even in this seminal work Meyer (1982) concluded that when labeled as crises, 
environmental jolts could infuse organizations with energy, legitimizing unorthodox acts 
and destabilizing power structures, leading to positive change and performance 
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improvements. The last theme that emerged was that adaptation dealt more with 
qualitative aspects and social norms, rather than quantitative aspects (such as 
organizational structure and slack resources), and that for these reasons in tranquil times 
it could be difficult to study and measure, an aspect that once again was further 
investigated in the following works (Markman & Venzin, 2014; Lee et al., 2013; Somers, 
2009).  
Meyer’s work wasn’t, however, the only foundation for future work on resilience. The 
article on threat-rigidity effects from Staw et al. (1981), albeit not directly addressing the 
definition of the concept, addressed aspects of responses to threats that would become a 
cornerstone for research in this field (Linnenluecke, 2015).  
Stemming from the same ground as Meyer’s article, this paper takes a different approach 
beginning from the definition of crisis: here it’s considered as a major threat to system 
survival, with little time to react and for which the system is ill-structured to respond. 
Two main themes emerge: first, there’s a similarity with Meyer’s jolts as these crises are 
deemed difficult to foresee, but the perspective turns different given their much broader 
scope. The situations addressed by Staw et al. (1981) are much more pressing, dealing 
with corporate collapses which can be viewed, according to the authors, as failures to 
alter response in the face of environmental change. 
Second, the definition deals with a “system”, not specifically with an organization. This 
seminal paper addresses the multi-level aspect of adaptability, which is studied at 
individual, group and system level, with each layer influencing the others. The findings 
from these authors are summarized below: 
 Individuals: when placed in a threat situation, an individual’s most well-learned or 
dominant response may be emitted, even if it’s inappropriate to the context. Some 
physiological mechanisms are responsible for this as stress leads to primitive forms 
of reaction in human beings and even visual stimuli are more difficult to discern in 
such situation. However, under duress, performance increases if the optimal response 
is meant to be standardized; 
 Groups: a threat tends to consolidate the influence of current leaders if properly 
addressed, whereas failure weakens their position. Rivalry between groups 
strengthens intragroup ties, while failure erodes them. These considerations will later 
be explored in further research (Walker et al., 2014; Seville et al., 2008) which would 
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highlight how breaking “silos” of thought in networks is important during crises to 
avoid the fragmentation of objectives and the emergence of conflicting goals, that can 
hinder system integrity. The authors (Staw et al., 1981) also verified that threats can 
lead to groupthink and uniformities in decision making, which further increase threat-
rigidity, and that this occurs more frequently in situations where more vertical control 
is exercised, when the threat is external and when the likelihood of success is high 
(leadership tends to be loosened if there’s a threat of failure); 
 Systems: organizations attempt to cope with sources of adversity by adjusting their 
internal structure or taking actions to enhance their position in the environment (i.e., 
they adapt). This study however shows that a threat to the vital part of an entity leads 
to rigidity, but in situations where the environment radically changes, flexibility and 
adaptation are the best options. This is in part explained by the constraints that occur 
during a crisis (time, resources) which may force a system to rely on past knowledge 
and methodologies and because, according to the authors, in a threatening situation, 
decisions are taken at higher levels as it’s assumed that these figures deviate less from 
organization’s values. This last statement would be thoroughly addressed by the high 
reliability organizations literature (Perrow, 1984; Weick & Roberts, 1993; Weick & 
al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) which would advocate for the need of “on the 
field” decision-making to properly assess situations and to respond with expertise 
shaped through organization’s values. 
Staw et al. (1981) concluded their scrutiny by identifying a few more themes that would 
become a staple in resilience literature: first, the tension between centralization and 
pulverization of decision making (further explored by Roberts, 1990; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001; Barnett & Pratt, 2000; Boin & Hart, 2010), as during a crisis weak links, especially 
communication ones, tend to dissolve whereas strong bonds are strengthened, further 
increasing the risk of the creation of decision-making silos that act independently with 
more remote areas of the system thriving on their own and severing contacts with the 
core. Second, the reduction of information inputs, and thus the broadness of available 
responses, under duress, as attention shifts from assessing the situation and the new 
environment to controlling inter-system relationships. An historic example can be found 
in the political behavior of Diocletian, Roman emperor between the years 284-305 A.D. 
(Palazzo & Bergese, 2001). After numerous civil wars, which were crises that threatened 
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the “organization”, separate parts of the Empire began thriving on their own. Diocletian 
acknowledged this by appointing four governors for each of these areas, but instead of 
studying the causes of the crises, which were related to many socio-cultural factors, most 
of his reign was centered on accruing decisional power in the hand of the Emperor and 
his bureaucracy while reducing it in the Senate and the army. As a result, almost no benefit 
came to the Empire from these policies, and the causes of the crises kept undermining the 
Empire until its fall.  
Threat-rigidity driven responses thus tend to be a fitting solution in stable environments, 
but in case of a radical shift they are less appropriate. When threats are unknown, studying 
them is necessary and variety of information input and diversity in response is what 
ensures survival through adaptation, aspects which would be considered extremely 
relevant in the Supply Chain resilience stream of research (Wei & Wang, 2009; Pettit et 
al., 2010).  
Lastly, the authors (Staw et al., 1981) found that individual and group responses to threats 
resonate across organizations, a facet that would be further explained by psychology 
research on resilience (Mallak, 1998, Mallak & Yildiz 2016), and that people in key 
positions attempted to maintain the established power structures and the objective of the 
organization. 
1.3 Resilience as Internal Reliability 
Linnenluecke (2015) stressed how research on resilience has always been highly 
dependent on the studies’ context. If the seminal papers were addressing adaptation, 
rather than resilience, it is because organizational science during that period was dealing 
primarily with evolutionary theories and interactions with the environment. This led 
Meyer (1982) and Staw et al. (1981) to analyze the ways in which organizations facing a 
threat activate specific processes that enable functional or dysfunctional reactions, which 
have an impact both on performance, strategy and ultimately the firm’s survival.  
From the late 1980s, the research paradigm shifted from a focus on external “jolts” to 
crises that were generated internally. Accidents and disasters (such as Chernobyl, Exxon 
Valdez, Bhopal, Three Mile Island) in industrial settings with complex technology 
catered the attention of scholars, who focused on the reliability of intra-organizational 
processes and the avoidance of failures and deviations which, if neglected, could rapidly 
pile up and escalate into high-consequence events.  
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Consequently, crisis management literature began influencing resilience literature since 
its infancy; however, this stream of studies wasn’t as concerned as Staw et al. (1981) with 
crises as events, a perspective that leads to studying the reactions and the aftermath 
instead of the causes of such occurrences (Williams et al., 2017), but rather as processes 
that could unfurl over a period and that required attention during pre-events as well. This 
would lead Williams et al. (2017, page 739) to define a crisis as “a process of weakening 
or degeneration that can culminate in a disruption event to the actor’s […] normal 
functioning”: the studies from Perrow (1984) would provide the basis for such a 
definition, which emphasizes an erosion in the quality of organizations’ processes as a 
possible source of disruptive events. 
1.3.1 Normal Accidents Theory and First Disconfirmation 
The book (Perrow, 1984) begins with the description of a man that has an important 
appointment and is thoroughly prepared to arrive on time. A series of unrelated events 
begins slowing down the protagonist: after leaving in a rush he forgets his car keys in his 
apartment; the car keys were in the same keyring as his house keys, which he forgot inside 
the building, so he relies on his first backup system, a copy of said keys which were under 
his doormat. However, he had borrowed them to his neighbor, who was nowhere to be 
seen. He then tried to use a taxi (another backup system) but a traffic jam made it 
impossible to arrive on time. Even the metro was unavailable because of a strike. This 
predicament served as an example to show that even if a system has various means of 
backup, the interaction of multiple failures could lead to a catastrophe. The man, in fact, 
arrived late to the appointment. 
The issue is that this sort of accidents (unintended and untoward events that disturb a 
system’s normal functioning and which damage affects more than one unit, leading to 
disruption) could happen in contexts such as nuclear power plants where the 
consequences of a failure are disastrous. Accidents are supposedly normal and inevitable 
for the following reasons: 
 Tight coupling (absence of slack or buffers between two items) between 
technologies/systems reduces the time available to react as well as the range of 
available reactions in case of a failure, with a chance for its propagation. This point 
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would be confirmed in the Supply Chain Resilience literature, which identifies in 
bullwhip effects a possible source of disruption (Wei & Wang, 2009); 
 A complex system might lead to unintended or hidden interactions that an operator is 
not able to interpret correctly nor to foresee, as for example he relies on indirect or 
inferential information sources and/or has a limited understanding of the process (as 
in the Three Mile Island accident); 
 In some situations, elements that weren’t foreseen as part of the system suddenly 
factor in, creating “baffling interactions”, much like in the example from the man and 
his appointment. 
Perrow (1984) concludes that only through simpler systems or more loose coupling 
(which would lead to ambiguous or flexible performance standards) these shocks and 
failures could be absorbed by systems, but this, in his opinion, couldn’t be a viable option 
in technologically complex systems such as nuclear power plants.  
Perrow’s Normal Accidents Theory soon faced many critiques, with Hopkins (1999) 
exposing how some disasters aren’t “normal accidents” deriving from internal failures 
that reverberate through a system but rather untoward events deriving from the 
environment. An example would be crises as intended by Staw et al. (1981), such as the 
9/11 terrorist attack (Gittel et al., 2006). Moreover, Hopkins (1999) argues on how 
decision-making structures are oversimplified in Perrow’s (1984) examples, and how 
they can be more flexible than how they were depicted, and this applies as well to his 
definitions of centralization/decentralization and the interaction with tight coupling and 
system complexity. Lastly, the deterministic take of the author on accidents stymied any 
operational solution. 
The merits of Perrow’s contribution however are that they stirred discussion over crises 
that could be generated internally in organizations and that could lead to the same 
negative outcomes (system failures) as external threats. The focus on small, unrelated 
errors that could cause unintended consequences would constitute one of the bases for the 
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) research which is explored in paragraph 1.3.2. 
The argument that backup systems could increase complexity while still being fallible is 
also a concern that would be later addressed in the rest of the literature (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001; Lee et al., 2013; Boin & Hart, 2010; Luthans, 2002, and more), with the perspective 
that such systems are fundamental to increase organizational resilience but should be kept 
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as flexible as possible to be able to cope with uncertainty as it arises, reducing automated 
responses which could be detrimental as in the case of threat-rigidity driven answers. 
To move from the Normal Accidents Theory to the High Reliability Organization (HROs) 
literature, a paper from Roberts (1990) is analyzed. This work describes high reliability 
organizations as the ones able to operate without failures that could cause catastrophic 
consequences tens of thousands of times. HROs are characterized by both advanced 
technology, which requires a specialist’s understanding, and high degrees of 
interdependence among units, employing generalist understanding. They are forced to 
strike a balance between tight coordination and control, necessary for the reliability of 
their outcomes, and sufficient flexibility to deal with their uncertain environment.  
In this situation, technological failures and human / organization factors have a chance to 
interact with each other and lead to unintended consequences due to unforeseen 
interdependences, conflicting goals, environmental uncertainty (Roberts, 1990).  
The example that is taken and carefully examined through the study of multiple of such 
organizations is that of nuclear aircraft carriers – hazardous organizations featuring 
dangerous and complex technology which can cause unintended interactions, and which 
often provides indirect information that is difficult to analyze (Perrow, 1984).  
However, Roberts (1990) highlighted how accidents, even given such tough premises, 
never occurred, and attempted to understand how carriers’ operators coped with 
complexity and tight coupling. The findings were the following: 
Table 1.1 Elements addressing Complexity and Tight Coupling 
ADDRESSING COMPLEXITY ADDRESSING BOTH ISSUES ADDRESSING TIGHT COUPLING 
Personnel undergoes extensive training 
to understand all the foreseeable 
interactions between technologies and 
how to normally address them, but 
there is also room for flexibility and 
creativity when necessary. 
Some systems are duplicated (for 
example, two persons check the 
coordinates before giving them to the 
navigation boss) to avoid failure. 
The system is extremely mechanistic 
(and brittle): actions are sequential, 
communication between navigation and 
air bosses must be continuous and 
coordination of all operators must be 
perfect. This is mitigated through 
redundancy and a sort of “hidden 
slack”: if everything works correctly, 
there is tight coupling, however the 
team can follow different routines if 
deviations occur. The number of 
solutions is still limited. 
Overlapping: the same task is 
performed by multiple people which 
might not be mainly assigned to that 
role; it’s mostly a substitute for 
unavailable time as resources are scarce 
in the ship. 
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Activities that would result in a 
catastrophe when intermingled, such 
as fueling jets while loading munitions, 
are kept separate. 
All members have a high degree of 
responsibility and accountability. 
Bargaining greatly reduces the negative 
effects of tight coupling: a 
“gatekeeper”, the operations officer, 
travels around the ship to find an 
implementation plan that satisfies all 
the parties involved in an operation 
(with a maximin solution). This breaks 
communication silos and allows for 
lower level management to ensure safe 
working conditions (enough rest for 
their collaborators). 
There’s a culture of reliability: there’s a 
tension between centralization and 
decentralization, and this is resolved 
only thanks to a culture that provides 
latitude for interpreting, improvisation 
and unique action (where necessary). 
Source: adapted from Roberts (1990) 
These aspects also address concerns raised on possible antecedents to accidents which 
can be driven by human factors, such as poor training, motivation and manning 
(Shrivastava, 1986; cited in Roberts, 1990). As observable, in nuclear carriers, training is 
continuous, with fresh recruits learning on the job through veteran coaching; motivation 
is instilled through a culture that rewards responsibility and accountability and manning 
is covered through role redundancy.  
A nuclear aircraft carrier’s objective though isn’t strictly related with performance, but 
rather with reliability (Roberts, 1990), so the solution might not appear as being optimized 
economically, especially given the high amount of slack that is identified. The goal of 
overcoming the risk of Perrow’s (1984) normal accidents is achieved though, proving that 
a solution to the inevitable occurrence of unpredictable situations can be developed.  
Another interesting finding from this paper is that soft aspects of the organization, such 
as bargaining, culture and the power structure in the carrier are some of the main ways 
through which these errors and the dilemma between centralization and decentralization 
are resolved, as discussed earlier by Meyer (1984).  
This is achieved through a balance between extreme hierarchy, almost a hegemony, as 
defined by Gramsci (Clegg et al., 2006), which is the most fitting power structure to 
manage interdependences, and the practice of deferring to expertise, allowing all the 
personnel to place a veto on aircraft landing while attributing full responsibility on the 
matter until its solved (Roberts, 1990), much like in Toyota’s production system which 
allows for “human jidoka”, the authority for an employee to stop the production line in 
case of malfunctioning (Slack et al., 2013). 
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The author (Roberts, 1990) though highlights how HROs differ from normal 
organizations not only for their objective but also due to their improved ability to enforce 
rules through socialization: they are total institutions that can exert considerable top down 
control, as members cannot walk away nor quit in case of a crisis. 
The following literature tried to expand these perspectives, trying to understand whether 
the approaches utilized in HROs could be extended to normal organizations and whether 
this could be done in an economically viable way (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001).  
This is an important step in building theory on what can contribute to resilience, and 
ultimately what this concept is about, as, by taking the perspective cited in the 
introduction of this chapter from Annarelli & Nonino (2016), dealing with internal shocks 
is just as important as addressing external threats, and the issues raised by Perrow (1984) 
couldn’t be solved by the focused insight from Roberts (1990).  
1.3.2 Mindfulness, the Core of HROs’ Literature 
Reliability cannot be summarized as operating without failures altogether. In a late 
contribution to the literature, Boin & Hart (2010) would describe HROs as being built to 
prevent incidents from escalating into full-blown crises: mistakes and disturbances are 
expected, and systems are assumed to fail in unimagined ways in such an organization. 
On the other hand, Weick et al. (1999) define effective HRO as complex adaptive systems 
that combine orderly processes of cognition with variations in routine activities in order 
to sense and manage complex, ill-structured contingencies. 
In such a context, developing as many backup systems as possible will never be a 
sufficiently thorough answer: even the sturdiest of systems is prone to Perrow’s normal 
accidents. Meyer (1984) suggested that social norms and qualitative aspects are more 
useful to build adaptability than fixed routines and, building on Roberts’ (1990) findings, 
Weick et al. (1999) bring forward a social construct that explains how HROs constantly 
succeed while facing accidents, threats and high variability: organizational mindfulness. 
In their view, reliability depends on the lack of unwanted, unanticipated and 
unexplainable variance in performance. However, an HRO’s environment is so rich with 
the potential for error that to remain reliable it must somehow handle unforeseen 
situations in ways that forestall unintended consequences. There is still variance in 
performance, even more so, but it can be anticipated: stability is found in the processes 
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of cognition that, instead of applying unvarying procedures, constantly revise routines so 
that they are able to cope with uncertainty (Weick et al., 1999).  
This multiplies the ways through which a goal can be achieved and it’s a method to 
develop organizational resilience as intended in Weick & Sutcliffe (2001, page 69), i.e. 
“the capability of a system to maintain its function [ability to achieve objectives] and 
structure in the face of internal and external changes and to degrade gracefully when it 
must”.  
Weick et al. (1999) argue that such stability in cognition processes can be achieved only 
through mindfulness, a social infrastructure, i.e. a group of social forces that informs 
actions of the involved actors and is reinforced by their actions (Weick & Roberts, 1993), 
that is deliberately designed to notice weak signals, to avoid a drift toward inertia and to 
effectively manage surprises.  
Figure 1.1 A Mindful Infrastructure for High Reliability 
 
Source: Weick et al. (1999) 
The complexity of the concept of mindfulness requires a more in-depth study, as it has 
strong ties with how resilience is built according to the following literature (f.e. in 
Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Grøtan et al., 2008; Battisti & Deakins, 2015).  
Weick & Roberts (1993) draw from the neural networks theory to develop this construct. 
According to that perspective, any unit’s activity is regulated by the activity of 
neighboring units, connected to it by inhibitory or excitatory links whose strengths can 
vary according to system design and/or learning. Connected activities thus encode 
concepts and ideas in organizations much like connected neurons encode concepts and 
ideas in brains: they provide certain interpretations of reality and shared meanings among 
individuals. This creates a collective mind which shapes actions of the involved actors 
and is shaped by their contributions. 
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The authors (Weick & Roberts, 1993) define heedful action, which is action where people 
put their care in what is being done: when this happens, processes aren’t mere routines or 
replicas of the past; performance is modified by precedent outcomes, ensuring continuous 
learning and training as long as the agent is attentive and applies its intelligence to the 
action. 
If actions and processes are heedfully interrelated, which means that there’s a deliberate 
attempt to attribute an unambiguous meaning to an activity system, individual activities 
are shaped by this super structure and the more this structure is developed, the more heed 
can be found: the system becomes able to cope with unexpected events as it comprehends 
them and, given its higher complexity, it is better able to sense and regulate complex 
events (Weick & Roberts, 1993).  
This happens because when connected individuals, who hold related information in 
different locations of a system, can trade lower-order, detailed and disparate information, 
they often discover higher-order themes: without heedful interrelations, events become 
incomprehensible as each actor understands the local situation rather than the joint event 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993). Agents might act heedfully according to their view, perhaps 
by applying a routine to solve a problem as usual, but this might be detrimental to the 
system as a whole. If heedful interrelating fails, people become isolated and the system 
is pulled apart. 
Different, single actions of the participants in a system are thus connected in a meaningful 
way, something that develops mindfulness and allows a system to grow in complexity 
and deal with more complex problems. The authors (Weick & Roberts, 1993) apply this 
theory to groups by showing that developed groups with an underdeveloped mind lead to 
groupthink, cults and subordination to a system that is envisaged carelessly, assuring 
thoughtless contributions, whereas under-developed groups with developed minds, such 
as the personnel in nuclear aircraft carriers after a new round of recruitment, tend to 
perform well with a lower risk of inertia. 
The convolution of these constructs requires an example to better understand what the 
authors meant to deliver. Consider a soccer team: the objective is known to all its 
members, they have a set time to score as many points as possible while avoiding goals 
from their opponents. If said team is a mindful system, each member knows the role of 
the others, what to expect from them, the strategy to reach the opponents’ door and the 
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meaning of signals (such as shouts or hand-signs) from their teammates. If the system is 
mindless, these heedful interrelations are missing: an attacker wouldn’t know who the 
other attackers are, what defenders are supposed to do, nor the scheme that should be 
applied to deploy a possible plan to reach the opponents’ door. Signals in this situation 
become more confusing, as the shared meaning is missing, and each actor interprets them 
in their own way, creating baffling interactions (f.e. a forward passage that isn’t 
understood, leaving the ball to the opponents).  
This greatly increases the chance for “normal accidents”: in the mindful system, if a 
defender is ill-positioned as he attempted to push forward during a counter-attack, a 
different member of the team might take his role for an action. In the mindless system, 
such minor error is amplified as no member perceives the overall situation, thus defenders 
might move to chase the ball (which is their specific role, they are simply following their 
routine) leaving one flank completely defenseless.  
The comprehension of unfolding events is weakened in mindless systems, whereas a 
smart, mindful system that has carefully engineered heedful interrelations does the right 
thing regardless of its structure and the turbulence of the environment (Weick & Roberts, 
1993).  
One last aspect that should be highlighted is that mindfulness is more probable in groups 
during their earlier stages, as they are still defining interrelations; as they grow older, 
interrelating becomes more routinely and only the introduction of new members that are 
trained actively on these interrelations allows to avoid the drift toward inertia. The 
reasoning behind how the system was built that way should always be manifest, 
increasing comprehension and allowing for its revision, while improving the overall 
know-how of the system (Weick & Roberts, 1993).  
In Weick & Sutcliffe (2001) and Weick et al. (1999), mindfulness is broken down in the 
series of processes that lead to the creation of this infrastructure. These processes and 
their definitions are summarized below: 
 Preoccupation with failure. Any lapse is treated as a symptom of possible errors in 
the system, particularly if several small inconsistencies happen at the same time. This 
has to happen as HROs cannot learn through experiments: in case of failure, 
consequences would be too disastrous to bear, so an HRO has to learn from near-
misses (when the system is on the brink of collapse, or when processes witness 
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disruptions but manage to resume functioning nevertheless). This awareness also 
extends to success, as HROs have to understand the liability deriving from 
achievements, such as complacency and trust in tried and performing routines. As the 
environment might shift abruptly, procedures aren’t fossilized but rather always 
attended to, leaving windows for improvements or an increased fit to new situations 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al., 1999). Learning is also shifted from 
exploitation (using previous knowledge) and exploration (trial and error) to an 
exploration of meaningful analogues as a mean to approach problems from new 
perspectives, and in Weick et al. (1999) this, coupled with attention to failure and 
situation awareness, seems to create many of the adaptive changes that would be 
associated with typical learning. 
 Reluctance to simplify interpretations. As people are prone to interpret new data in 
ways that confirm their expectations due to group behaviors (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001), an HRO has to keep enumerating mistakes as they occur and to avoid an over-
reliance on precautions (Perrow’s backup systems) as they fit with a simplified view 
of the world. Assumptions in the collective mind are fewer, and skepticism toward 
data is encouraged: information that is retrieved is double checked and cross checked 
to ensure that the right interpretation is given throughout the system. 
 Sensitivity to operations. In HROs there’s an active, heedful attempt to create and 
maintain connections and communication between the parts so that no agent misses 
or neglects details on the meaning and functioning of the activities. Cumulation of 
errors is forestalled to avoid the alignment and the creation of baffling interactions: if 
a system behaves differently from what is expected, the routine stops to verify and 
make sense of what’s happening. This can be seen in Roberts (1990) where when an 
operator noticed he couldn’t find his wrench, he called a halt on aircraft landings until 
the item was retrieved, with a communication to all the actors involved. Like this, 
situation awareness is developed, and power delegated to the front lines, allowing 
both for continuous adjustment and errors preventions.  
 Commitment to resilience. The example from the previous point is a form of flexible 
crisis management that is enacted in HROs: resilience is a preparation to inevitable 
surprises and to absorb the generated change, and these organizations provide formal 
support to improvisation that is directed to this goal. The operator was commended 
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after the incident (Roberts, 1990). Taking from Wildavsky’s perspective, Weick et al. 
(1999) argue that a generalized capacity to investigate, learn and act without knowing 
in advance the situations that will appear is a vital protection against unexpected 
hazards. There’s thus an active attempt to improvise workarounds and contain errors, 
to foster the capabilities for recovery and fresh thinking and to allow creative solutions 
which might derail from routines, but not from the collective mind’s assumptions and 
cognitive processes (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 Under-specification of structures and deference to expertise. Orderly hierarchy can 
amplify errors due to the possible lapses created by mindlessness. Decision making is 
more diffused, as well as responsibility and accountability, so that operators may 
exercise their knowledge on the contingent situation, while maintaining a level of 
awareness that prevents the drift toward mechanical routine repetition. The loosening 
of hierarchy also increases the comprehension of complexity, as actors cannot simply 
defer to authority if an error occurs.  
Enacting these processes allows to build resilient systems through the creation of slack 
resources and alternative means to a goal (a way to loosen tight coupling), which Meyer 
(1982) and Staw et al. (1981) already stressed as factors that improve adaptability. The 
ability to deal with a crisis is largely dependent on the structures that have been developed 
before chaos arrives, Weick & Sutcliffe (2001) argue, and a mindful organization is 
exactly a type of infrastructure that is meant to contain uncertainty.  
Summarizing, in HROs, reliability, and thus resilience to internal and external changes, 
is built through conceptual slack (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), which is the theoretical 
construct that refers to all the social norms which foster learning from near-misses, the 
avoidance of simplifications, a culture revolving around double checking information, 
caring for errors (while being candid about them) and the willingness to question the state 
of things and the basis of current success. This is the form of slack resources that is 
produced in these otherwise mechanistic structures, whereas alternative means to a goal 
are conceptualized as requisite variety (Weick et al., 1999), the fostering of differences 
in points of view to enhance comprehension of current situations, flexibility in routines, 
a reduction of the pressure to consensus to reach decisions quickly and to address 
problems as they appear, bypassing hierarchy where needed. Contingency plans are 
prepared but they are shaped by an all-hazard approach: they must be designed to face 
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the unknown and are assumed to be fallible (Boin & Hart, 2010). Their purpose is not to 
create a system that provides an invariable output but rather programs of carefully aligned 
activity clusters (i.e. interrelations) which are understood by the agents and activated to 
face disruption as it arises. 
1.4 Resilience as an Individual’s Capacity 
The next body of literature that is discussed focuses on resilience at the employee level, 
the interplay between personal characteristics and the system or organization they are part 
of and whether resilience is a trait (a fixed characteristic) or a state-like construct 
(something that can be taught, that is transient and that doesn’t depend on deep-rooted 
personal characteristics) (Luthans, 2002 (a & b)).  
This approach requires a focus on works pertaining to the positive psychology field, rather 
than organizational sciences. Nevertheless, given the topic of this thesis, only studies that 
are related with workplace performance or that frame resilience from a systemic point of 
view are mentioned as they directly contribute to the research purpose. 
Since after the Second World War, psychology has been concerned with human failures, 
dysfunctions, biases and frailties, and how to deal with these problems (Luthans, 2002a). 
Resilience was consequently perceived as a capability or trait that allowed people 
equipped with it to avoid showing psychic disorders, illnesses or pathologies. More 
recently, psychology studies have turned their attention to positive feelings and the 
nurturing of people qualities (Luthans, 2002a); nevertheless, both perspectives are 
important as resilience’s output shelters from developing maladaptive behaviors (Masten, 
2014) but is also a class of phenomena characterized by good outcomes in spite of serious 
threats to adaptation or development (Masten, 2001).  
 
Luthans and his colleagues (Luthans, 2002a and 2002b; Luthans et al., 2006; Luthans et 
al., 2010), however, refer to “resiliency” as a part of an individual’s positive 
psychological state of development, theorized with the name of Psychological Capital 
(PsyCap). The purpose was to create a construct that was measurable, developable and 
manageable for performance improvement in workplaces through the accrual in a single 
term of various positively oriented human strengths and psychological capacities 
(Luthans, 2002b): these were hope, optimism, confidence and personal resilience. 
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These sub-definitions stem from the concepts of self-efficacy, defined as a perceptual 
judgement or belief of how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with 
prospective situations (Luthans, 2002a). They were described as follows: 
 Hope: a cognitive set that is based on a reciprocally derived sense of successful 
agency (the willpower to reach an objective, a determination to pursue a goal) and 
pathways (the ability of an individual to identify possible pathways to meet those 
objectives and the capacity to set milestones and feasible smaller steps that can be 
used to measure success) (Luthans, 2002a; Luthans et al., 2006); 
 Optimism: an active attempt to build confidence through the creation of alternative 
plans that attempt to minimize the impact of obstacles (Luthans et al., 2006), which 
allows an individual to expect good things to come (Luthans et al., 2010).  
 Confidence/Efficacy: an individual’s confidence on his/her ability to mobilize 
motivation, cognitive resources and actions needed to successfully execute a specific 
task (Luthans, 2002a). It’s optimism applied to a single context or task (Luthans et 
al., 2010).  
 Resiliency: the capability of individuals to cope successfully in the face of significant 
change, adversity or risk. This characteristic is beyond human adaptation, but derives 
directly from some basic adaptational systems (Luthans, 2002a), and it’s a capability 
that varies over time and is enhanced by protective factors of the individual or the 
environment (such as a solid education, a home, a good income) while being reduced 
by risk factors (abusive relationships, absence of mentors) (Luthans et al., 2006). 
In Luthans et al. (2010), PsyCap was ultimately described as a motivational propensity to 
accomplish goals and succeed, but this doesn’t quite capture the richness of all the sub-
definitions the authors identified.  
Hope deals with being able to set objectives and attributing meaning to them, optimism 
is about accepting reality, and the idea that a single plan might not work so more pathways 
should be developed. Efficacy is about an assessment of the available resources and how 
they can be deployed to make the various plans feasible, and ultimately all the elements 
seem to contribute to resilience in a way, as identifying alternative means to a goal was 
already proven to be an approach that allowed to better face adversity or risk (Meyer, 
1981; Staw et al., 1982; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
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Psychological Capital in fact merges different aspects of personal resilience as described 
by Masten (2014) or Coutu (2002), so the split in its sub-components doesn’t add much 
to the discussion. Starting from the perspective that PsyCap partially overlaps with 
resilience definitions, two more insights from Luthans and his colleagues should be 
brought to attention.  
First, PsyCap is, much like resilience in Masten (2001) and Coutu (2002) and mindfulness 
in Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), something that can be instilled and trained in individuals. 
It’s not just a characteristic that people (or organizations) are born with, but rather a state-
like construct, a stance or complex feeling toward reality that can be developed through 
interventions (Luthans et al., 2006; Luthans et al., 2010). An experiment on 153 students 
and 80 managers from Luthans et al. (2010) proved both the existence and developability 
of PsyCap, confirming the idea from their earlier work (Luthans, 2002a) that much like 
economical capital, Psychological Capital can be improved through focused investments 
of time and resources (at least in the short term), and it can be leveraged upon for future 
return. The following image depicts the micro-interventions that were enacted for this 
experiment and how they impacted the sub-constructs mentioned earlier, albeit the model 
had a better statistical fit if the core PsyCap construct was taken in consideration (so the 
overall effects on the dimensions after the intervention) rather than its constitutive 
elements.  
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Figure 1.2 Positive Psychological Capital Intervention 
 
Source: Luthans et al. (2010) 
Figure 1.2 also brings up the second contribution from these authors: a better 
Psychological Capital score translated into a performance improvement both in self-
assessments and from the employee supervisors’ point of view, which is quite a precedent. 
Although this paper was focused on confirming a specific view of resilience, this is an 
empirical confirmation that not only it can be taught to individuals and employees, but 
that resilience also leads to an improvement in their performance in the workplace: this 
means that, as speculated in Staw et al. (1982), resilience can be developed on multiple 
levels in an organization and, as theorized by Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), each level 
contributes to the resilience of the whole system; moreover, personal performance is 
increased but, following a resource-based view of the firm, a specific development of 
resilience/Psychological Capital can also lead to an optimal use of human capital, which 
can be a key source for competitive advantage given how difficult it is to replicate (Teece 
et al., 1997).  
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If resilience can be developed at an individual level with positive outcomes for 
organizations, its conceptualization should be improved, and the works from Coutu 
(2002) and Masten (2001, 2014) can help in this task.  
Coutu (2002) was attempting to understand why some people and companies buckled 
under pressure, while others bent and later managed to bounce back. Three points 
emerged, which are interestingly similar to some characteristics of mindfulness (in Weick 
et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Resilience was about: 
 A staunch acceptance of reality: a down-to-earth view of the parts of reality that 
matter for survival, with a true understanding and acceptance of the situation that 
constitutes the base to be resilient and to construct contingency plans that act as a 
preparation to endure and survive extraordinary hardships; 
 A deep belief that life is meaningful: an active search for meaning and objectives that 
aims at constructing a better future or state of things given current hardships; an 
attempt to learn from the state of things and to make the present more manageable, 
reducing its overwhelming factor. This was achieved primarily by infusing the 
environment with meaning through a strong value system that allows to interpret and 
mold events, and here Meyer’s (1982) comments on social aspects of resilience and 
HROs literature (Roberts, 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993) perspective on culture 
provide further bases to this argument. Coutu (2002) highlights however that resilient 
people in a company might be a drawback if they survive on their own and act 
resiliently without following these sets of common values from the 
organization/group, as their goals might differ from others’; 
 An uncanny ability to improvise: companies and people that survive regard 
improvisation and making do as core skills. Organizations in particular tended to defer 
to experts and allow autonomy at lower levels, so that this operative bricolage 
wouldn’t be thwarted. Once again, the parallel with Weick et al. (1999) concept of 
sensibility to operations is striking. 
Coutu (2002) concluded that resilient behavior seemed to appear if all these conditions 
were pre-existent: if there is a set perception of reality, hardships, even internment in 
concentration camps, appeared as a thing to fix, but there was no need to recreate the state 
of things from the ground. People under pressure regress to their most habitual way of 
thinking (Staw et al., 1981), but if the structure of reality is properly built they already 
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know what’s needed to move in the right direction, much like in the case of smart systems 
for Weick & Roberts (1993). 
Masten’s research, on the other hand, deals primarily with resilience in children during 
their development phase (from their infancy to their twenties), but the findings can be 
extended to any complex system given the approach that has been adopted, which draws 
from systems literature. It is also one of the few studies that employs longitudinal data 
that cover more than a decade, and even though many of the parallels with organizations 
have yet to be empirically tested, most of the work deals with sufficient resilience 
literature from other research fields to provide notable insights for organizational 
resilience.  
In Masten (2001) a theme that can be retrieved in later conceptualizations of resilience 
(Williams et al., 2017) would appear: an individual cannot be considered resilient if there 
hasn’t been any major threat to his development or adaptation, a demonstrable risk. Risks 
are actuarially based predictors of undesirable outcomes, drawn from evidence that such 
status or condition was statistically associated with higher probability of “bad” outcomes 
in the future.  
In children, these risk factors could be bad parenting, being raised in a difficult 
neighborhood or in a warzone, being discriminated and so on. Each of these risk factors 
had an opposed asset, or protective factor (also present in Luthans, 2002a) that was its 
contrary and could shelter from other risks (for example, good parenting, a pleasant 
neighborhood etc.).  
In previous literature, an individual could be assessed as being resilient if he featured no 
internal problem (low level of distress, absence of psychopathologies) or from an external 
perspective (good adaptation with the community/society, academic achievement, 
success in relevant development tasks and so forth). Masten (2001) attempted to see if 
the presence of assets would lead to a better life outcome compared to the average 
population. The parallel with resource-based theories on competitive advantages is self-
evident (Teece et al., 1997).  
The main finding was that risk factors always negatively affected performance of the 
observed sample, but even in a very high-risk environment, if enough assets were 
available, the outcome was good nevertheless. In organizations this would later be 
indirectly confirmed by Gittel et al. (2006), a point that is further developed in paragraph 
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1.5 but that already foreshadows how merging the insights from the psychology stream 
of literature provides a great contribution for organizational resilience studies.  
Maladaptive behaviors and overall worse outcomes resulted only from a combination of 
high-risk environments and weak protective resources, with only very few cases 
appearing in the same environments with enough assets. Moreover, problems were more 
likely to appear during early stages of development (childhood, teenage) with a significant 
reduction of maladaptation in young adults, mostly thanks to an increase of the available 
assets, and the high-performance groups had very similar psychosocial resources (such 
as better parenting quality, intellectual functioning, positive self-concepts), despite their 
different environments (high-low risk). 
Masten (2001) also brings up some of the possible protective factors that could shelter 
individuals from risk: caring adults in the family/community (resembling management 
and governance engagement in an organization), cognitive and self-regulation skills 
(competences in firms), positive views of self, motivation to be effective in the 
environment, attachment, authoritative parenting, intelligence, pleasure-in-mastery, 
intrinsic motivation.  
Cumulative competence and stress protection, as well as a focus on the aforementioned 
adaptive systems, such as intelligence, pleasure-in-mastery and attachment, often led 
these kids to better than average outcomes, and in high-risk environments, to resilient 
behaviors. 
These concepts were further generalized in Masten (2014), where the author assumes 
individuals as complex systems and thus could apply part of her reasonings to societies 
and organizations as well. In the introduction of the chapter, Masten’s definition of 
resilience was already mentioned. That construct was applied in the various proposed 
studies on children in their different development steps, with competence and success 
being defined as patterns of effective performance in the environment, evaluated from the 
perspective of salient developmental tasks in the U.S. society.  
A few findings that might also be employed in organizational studies are highlighted: 
first, competent individuals were less likely to face severe adversity compared to less 
competent peers, and more likely, when exposed, to have or mobilize resources for 
positive adaptation. The same was found to be true on individuals with high adaptability, 
which stems from some fundamental adaptive behavior such as working memory, 
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cognitive flexibility, effortful or inhibitory control (the ability to suppress impulses or 
automatic responses to answer in a preferable or novel way to a situation) and the will to 
learn from unknown situations. Having better personal assets ultimately led to better 
reactions to trauma. 
Second, actively working on resilience and improving the associated protective factors 
wasn’t enough in some situations where stress exposure was continuous and lasted too 
long. Resilient responses were ordinary for negative events, even in very tough situations 
such as homelessness or after the separation between mothers and children; however, risk 
breeds risk and if a previous situation was already difficult, a traumatizing event was 
found to have a much stronger impact. Preventing stress exposure or mitigating its effect 
is thus another primary aspect, as stress dose was found to be correlated with the 
development of maladaptive behaviors. The total absence of risks was also seen as a 
possible source of maladaptation: a system needs exposure to manageable stress to train 
and to learn how to respond to novel situations. It’s almost like an immunization, and 
evolution was found to favor organisms that developed adaptively, altering regulatory 
systems. 
These two aspects already show that growing a child in a difficult situation isn’t 
conceptually too different from the development of a collective mind in an organization, 
and the empirical part of this thesis will stress these parallels. But more relevant topics 
emerged from Masten’s (2014) book.  
Soft aspects are some of the most relevant assets that can be developed to foster resilient 
behaviors: generating hope and giving meaning to events reduces the recalling of failures 
and negative emotionality (which are considered risk factors); relationships and cultural 
belief systems shared in community groups play a sustaining role in stressful situations. 
Moreover, communities can also develop resilience through a set of networked adaptive 
capacities which are facilitated by resources in the domains of economic development, 
information or communication systems and social capital (relationships and a community 
sense), facts that were proven true by Gittel et al. (2006) and that confirm once more the 
multilevel nature of resilience. 
The main argument from Masten’s (2014) book merges these disparate perspectives by 
showing that resilience is, in fact, a sort of “ordinary magic”, something extraordinary, 
such as facing extremely tough situations, that is borne from a series of normal adaptive 
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systems that are put in place by the individual, its group or family or organization, its 
cultural system and the society in which he lives in. When enough of these basic adaptive 
systems work together, risk factors can be faced easily and traumatic experienced 
confronted with little consequences. When the latter become overwhelming, or if these 
adaptive systems are found lacking, then the data confirm a tendency toward 
maladaptation and non-resilient behaviors. 
Figure 1.3 “Short List” of Resilience factors and associated Adaptive systems 
 
Source: Masten (2014) 
These findings highlight how resilience isn’t a trait that only few, lucky individuals or 
systems possess. And it’s not even something that stems only from a person through 
training, as Luthans et al. (2006) argued. It’s a mix of normal factors, behaviors and 
adaptation systems that work together to maintain the functioning and flexibility in face 
of threat in people and systems. Thus, investing in all the three levels that were underlined 
by Staw et al. (1981) is likely to develop the organizational resilience capability through 
the enhancement of the various underlying adaptive systems: self-regulation and mastery 
motivation were explored by Luthans (2002a, 2002b); spiritual and cultural belief systems 
by Gittel et al. (2006), learning, thinking and education systems can be identified in some 
elements to measure resilience in McManus et al. (2008) and Stephenson (2010). The 
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impact of social networks can be identified in Battisti & Deakins’ (2015) ability to 
integrate external resources after a crisis, attachment in Walker’s et al. (2014) stress on 
how staff engagement improves performance and resilience in organizations.  
The list suggests that there are fundamental systems that protect human development 
under many different circumstances and they are a product of biological and cultural 
evolution, shared in their basic aspects across many societies (Masten, 2014). If such 
systems are the roots of adaptability and resilience in complex systems as societies, it’s 
likely to expect organizations to develop their resilience capabilities through similar 
systems as well.  
Moreover, given how resilience can appear through different levels of an organization 
(Staw et al., 1981), a firm could focus on improving it at an individual level (fostering 
attachment to the company, improving self-regulation through resilience training, 
teaching to enhance mastery motivation), group or intra-organization level (a culture and 
reward system promoting resilience and mindfulness, a structure for continuous 
formation), or at an inter-organizations or system level (developing deep relationships 
throughout the supply chain which might provide support in time of need, structuring 
relationships for flexibility). 
There are different patterns to reach resilience in individuals and all derive from the 
statement that competence begets competence, thus restoring adaptive systems is 
essential to promote resilient outcomes. 
1.5 Resilience as the Adaptability of Business Models 
Another stream of research that developed in the same period was concerned with 
studying resilience in terms of strategic and business model flexibility: Hamel and 
Valikangas (2003) argued on the idea that in less turbulent times, companies could rely 
on momentum to sustain their success, whereas at their time, with trends like the Internet 
and globalization, the world was becoming turbulent faster than organizations were 
becoming resilient. 
The underlying concept was that to face the continuous risks of technological 
discontinuities, regulatory upheavals, geopolitical shocks, industries disintermediation, 
nontraditional competitors and shifts in consumer tastes, companies needed to 
consistently pursue the imperative of being different. Continued success would ride on 
resilience, described as the ability to dynamically adapt business as circumstances 
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changed, a parallel with the routine optimization from Weick et al. (1999) but brought 
from the operative level to a strategic perspective.  
This brings to the conclusion that resilience deals with anticipating and adjusting to deep, 
secular trends, and that abrupt shifts of strategy such as turnarounds are transformations 
that were tragically delayed (Hamel & Valikangas, 2003), non-resilient answers which 
were triggered by Perrow’s normal accidents on a strategic rather than operational level.  
To chase this quest for “zero trauma transformations” that are aimed at chasing 
opportunities and incipient trends as they arise, without negative repercussions on the 
organization, Hamel & Valikangas (2003) propose an approach that is close to the one 
proposed by the HROs literature: a diffusion of decision power to middle managers 
leaving room for them to perform small investments and experiments to pursue 
innovation in all the relevant processes for the organization, a stance that also allows a 
less stiff allocation of resources, which increases flexibility and allows problems to flow 
toward expertise (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). This is also a way to avoid the shortcomings 
of centrally planned decisions through a more “market-like” approach, which history has 
proven to be more resilient and ultimately effective (it’s enough to bear in mind the fate 
of the Soviet Union, compared to more open and decentralized economies).  
A similar perspective is adopted by Sutcliffe & Vogus (2003) who build on the research 
from Staw et al. (1981), Masten (2001) and HRO literature to conclude that resilience 
was essential in that day’s business environment given the high risk of unexpected turns 
and how this capability allows to manage uncertainty. The idea is once again that 
competence begets competence, and that even if resilient answers might not appear, being 
competent in one period sets a company up for competence and resilience in the next 
period. Therefore, it is imperative to create processes which increase learning capabilities 
(providing new assets) and reduce risks and stressors to promote the likelihood of positive 
adjustments. 
The authors furthermore argue that resilience isn’t extraordinary: it comprises a set of 
processes promoting competence, efficacy restoration and growth that allows to maintain 
positive adjustment under challenging conditions. Some examples that are deemed more 
effective than a simple reduction of risks were discussed: allowing active individual 
choice and self-organization while attributing responsibility is a good way to promote 
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resilience, as knowledgeable decisions are taken by operators who can understand the 
consequences. 
In groups, variety becomes a way, along with learning, to expand the collective 
knowledge base and to increase the ability to sense, register and regulate complexity 
(Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003), with a clear reference to mindful practices from Weick & 
Sutcliffe (2001). Group-efficacy feelings are also to be promoted to increase confidence, 
competence and mastery motivation.  
Organizations on the other hand would need to balance growing (enhancing variation and 
innovation) and building competence, a stance that promotes efficiency. Growing 
expands behavioral repertoires, providing a deep and broad range of possible actions 
which, according to Weick et al. (1999), fosters resilience and improves information 
processing and perception; focusing on efficiency instead affects mastery motivation 
systems as an organization feels it can achieve success. The findings from Sutcliffe & 
Vogus (2003) are summarized in figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4 Resilient and Rigid Responses to Threat 
 
Source: Sutcliffe & Vogus (2003) 
Various processes lead to resilience in an organization according to this stream of 
research, just like in individuals. Barnett & Pratt (2000), adopting a view of resilience as 
crisis response, argue that business models and strategies can be willingly put under 
stressful conditions by the top management through a so called “autogenic crisis”.  
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Crises (Barnett & Pratt, 2000) are considered as limited, unanticipated threats to a 
system’s survival, featuring heavy disruption of processes and core assumptions as well, 
effects that might overwhelm emotional, cognitive and behavioral capacities. If, however, 
the associated threats are latent, a system can initiate an autogenic crisis: it begins moving 
in advance and pre-adapting to future adversity, generating a highly functional bundle of 
disconfirming data that allows to “unfreeze” a situation and to act on it flexibly, instead 
of through a threat-rigid response.   
This way, processes can be unlearned and re-learned by the organization through a 
structured “near miss” (in HRO terms), acting like a buffer to the real crisis as the 
environment is more controlled and power is willingly decentralized to allow experiments 
and errors while providing a psychologically safe setting.  
The perspective from Barnett & Pratt (2000) though is very focused on the idea that 
organizations can sense in advance the crises which might hit them, a view that is closer 
to Annarelli & Nonino’s (2016) definition of organizational resilience. Gittel et al. (2006) 
on the other hand provide us with an analysis of a crisis that couldn’t possibly be precisely 
foreseen, the 9/11 terrorist attack to the World Trade Center and its effects on the airline 
industry.  
The sector was deeply shaken after this unforeseen, untoward event, with a 20% reduction 
of very short flights demand in the U.S. and an 11% reduction for short-medium flights 
that were still within U.S. borders. Various companies were analyzed, yet two of them, 
Southwest Airlines and US Airways, were very similar in size, business scope and 
strategy. However, after the crisis, the first one witnessed growth and good performance 
whereas the second lost market share and faced controversy between employees and 
management staff.  
Gittel et al. (2006) stress how Southwest wasn’t planning to respond to a sharp reduction 
in demand due to terrorist attacks, however it was a firm that adopted the all-hazard 
preparation stance that Boin & Hart (2010) would discuss years later. The company was 
reportedly managing in good times as though they were bad times, carefully strengthening 
relationships with employees, building up financial reserves instead of relying on high 
levels of debt and avoiding to take risks through inorganic growth, etc. 
The authors (Gittel et al., 2006) identified these as the main sources of competitive 
advantage after the crisis: instead of laying off employees, a measure that was found to 
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work only in the short term through a relief in cash flows at the cost of a long-term 
reduction in recovery speed, Southwest used its financial reserves and leveraged on the 
trust of its workers (through a wage reduction and the promise not to cut jobs) to absorb 
the first impact of the crisis. The negotiations that ensued with the unions didn’t feel 
pressuring, and the firm managed to acquire market share from its rivals and to adapt its 
business model. There is a clear consistency with Meyer’s (1982) findings.  
Three were the key findings of the paper: resiliency requires positive relationships and 
relational reserves as a prerequisite, but financial reserves are also extremely important 
to absorb the initial shock and buffer the company long enough for it to adjust the business 
model to the new situation. Layoffs destroyed shared values, trust and loyalty in US 
Airways, a fact connected with its weak financial position, and this greatly delayed the 
recovery of the company as job security is essential for sustained innovation and 
productivity, which was sorely needed after the environmental shift (Gittel et al., 2006). 
These effects also highlight a loss of mindfulness in US Airways, as the commonality of 
culture was undermined and employees felt like the company wasn’t caring for them, 
which led to an increase in strikes that further impaired aircraft and labor productivity. 
Southwest instead fostered their collective mind, and this allowed them to capitalize on 
the investments in social capital as they could reduce their operating costs while retaining 
their workforce, tweaking their strategy and business model so that it could fit the new 
environment. 
Figure 1.5 Conceptual Model of Organizational Resilience 
 
Source: Gittel et al. (2006) 
This perspective further highlights how resilience can be developed in multiple ways in 
companies, and that it’s not circumscribed in the ability to foresee and adapt in advance 
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to possible environmental jolts. The flexibility of business models and strategies could 
rely either on innovation in strategy, as for Southwest Airlines, or on supply chain 
resilience, another stream of research which is expanded upon below. This branch should 
be considered as a natural evolution of what was discussed in this paragraph, as instead 
of taking the perspective of a single firm, whole supply chains are analyzed, looking at 
their innovation, business models and strategic stances from a complex, higher level 
system point of view. 
1.6 Supply Chain Resilience 
The articulation of the literature discussed in this paragraph connects once again themes 
featured in crisis management literature with supply chain management suggestions while 
framing them from the point of view of organizational resilience to understand which 
activities can be put in place to absorb disruptions and bounce back after untoward events. 
As a clarification, this paragraph uses the definition of supply chain provided by Pettit et 
al. (2010, page 1), which is “the network of companies involved in the upstream and 
downstream flows of products, services, finances and information from the initial supplier 
to the ultimate customer”. 
The analysis begins from the article written by Sheffi & Rice (2005) which builds on the 
research from the business models adaptability literature and frames some empirical 
examples of resilience (or absence of it) as primarily supply chain related issues. One of 
these stories is concerned with the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attack on U.S. supply 
chains: Toyota had to halt the production in its North American facilities within hours 
after the event. The argument was that even though risk and uncertainty in that day’s 
business world primarily stemmed from demand issues, such as customer expectations, 
global competition and greater product variety, managers still had to cope with 
disruptions in the supply chain.  
How to cope with these is a strategic issue, as resilience can be achieved either by 
increasing flexibility or creating redundancy. The latter however creates primarily a cost 
through the duplication of resources, while the first provides a considerable competitive 
advantage. According to the authors (Sheffi & Rice, 2005), the first step to build a 
resilient enterprise was identifying vulnerabilities, which are the inabilities of a system to 
cope with adverse impacts or the degree of susceptibility to disruption of the system 
(Linnenluecke & Griffith, 2010). If firms managed to understand what could go wrong, 
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the likelihood of the event and the consequences associated with it, building flexibility to 
face the disruption could be turned in an investment. 
Figure 1.6 Sample of a Vulnerability Map for a Company 
 
Source: Sheffi & Rice (2005) 
This approach would be later refined by Pettit et al. (2010) identification of a possible 
measure for vulnerabilities (the likelihood of an event times the potential severity) to help 
practitioners in understanding where investments were more crucial.  
Furthermore, Sheffi & Rice (2005) identified some elements in the supply chain where 
flexibility could be enhanced to build resilience. At a supplier’s level, a strategic decision 
on whether to employ multiple sources or single ones with deep, integrated relationships 
had to be taken accounting for the associated vulnerabilities.  
From an internal point of view, the ability to respond to disruptions in processes could be 
answered through flexibility. Apple and Dell for example faced a component shortage 
from the same shared supplier in a very different way: the first tried to substitute it with 
a lower quality component, generating a wave of customer dissatisfaction which led to a 
number of refunds and orders cancellations that ultimately reduced their quarterly 
revenues. Dell on the other hand always worked with a build-to-order perspective, so they 
steered customers toward products they knew they could build reliably, affecting demand 
to absorb the shock. 
Control systems in a supply chain should also become more flexible to provide timely 
and detailed information which reduces baffling interactions between the firms, and a 
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shared culture among the members was also deemed important to provide the same 
interpretation of facts and strategies. 
This initial input was the primer that began closing the gap between supply chain 
management and resilience literature, thus, unsurprisingly, many constructs that were 
already analyzed in previous chapters are discussed and labelled differently, but the 
underlying concepts remain quite similar. The authors clearly show perspectives that are 
close to mindfulness, previously analyzed in HRO literature, and adapt them to a supply 
chain level.  
While previous literature was focused on improving protective factors and assets that 
would enable resilient answers to threats, this thread stressed how acting on risks and a 
proper risk management is also an instrument to achieve resilience. Craighead et al. 
(2007) argue that supply chain disruptions are unavoidable, but that this inherent risk of 
disruption, which is tied to vulnerabilities, can be reduced preemptively through proper 
design.  
Three main design faults can lead to disruption in supply chain operations (Craighead et 
al., 2007): an excessive node density, meaning that most of the actors involved are in the 
same geographical area, which leads to more entities being likely to be affected from 
crises due to their proximity; a chain that is too complex, meaning that few nodes receive 
flows of information, materials or people forward, backward and within-tier, increasing 
the severity of a disruption caused by a single node’s malfunction; absence of warning 
capability or other communication issues, which exacerbate disruptions in a supply chain 
due to the misalignment between demand and supply.  
A mindful approach to designing a supply chain, with a preoccupation with errors and 
possible issues that might arise due to these characteristics, may reduce efficiency, but 
Craighead et al. (2007) believe that it’s one of the few ways to properly address risks and 
increase supply chain level resilience. Moreover, the involved organizations should 
develop mitigation capabilities, routines or predictable patterns of activities that allow a 
supply chain to recover quickly from a manifest disruption and to create awareness of a 
pending disruption. The faster a problem is addressed, the lower its severity, as there is 
less time for it to reverberate.  
The idea that mitigating capabilities in logistics are linked with supply chain resilience is 
reinforced by Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009). The authors identify some characteristics 
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that should be incorporated in supply chains design to reduce risk: event readiness, 
efficient and effective response plans and the capability to recover from disruptive events. 
Their perspective focuses on improving stability, the velocity at which a system returns 
to equilibrium, however Holling (1973) already discussed how this concept differs from 
resilience, which is more related to the persistence of a system than with finding equilibria 
per se.  
Furthermore, Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009) highlight that supply chain resilience 
doesn’t deal only with operations quality and their ability to recover, but also with staff’s 
psychological stability: one of the best ways to deal with disruptions is improving 
confidence at a supply chain level in their opinion, which is gained with the perception 
from operators that they are able to recover or adjust quickly to adversity and change. 
Visibility and control improve this characteristic, but in general the authors highlight the 
lack of a holistic perspective that can account for all these aspects of resilience.  
Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009) also stressed a vital point that wasn’t clearly addressed in 
the previous literature: to generate competitive advantage, a company must be faster at 
creating options and realigning resources than its competitors. The dynamic integration 
of logistics capabilities enables supply chain resilience, which is the adaptive capability 
to prepare the supply chain for unexpected events, to respond to them and to maintain 
continuity of operations, and this can lead to competitive advantage as even disruptions 
created by innovation, new product launches and so forth can be easily absorbed by the 
system. The authors raise this argument from a resource-based perspective of the firm, 
which establishes that firms obtain competitive advantage by accumulating internal 
resources that are rare, valuable, difficult to imitate (Teece, 2007), with the underlying 
idea that resilience is a set of resources and capabilities that can be employed to boost an 
enterprise’s success.  
This competitive advantage is also deemed sustainable as it reinforces itself, because it 
enables competence and resilience in future periods (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). The 
authors (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009) also verified that designing for resilience 
improved control, coherence and connectedness throughout the supply chain, and that 
risk sharing between the members of the chain would enable more effective decision 
making under uncertainty, improving how mitigating capabilities led to resilience. 
The following scheme summarizes this view. 
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Figure 1.7 Supply Chain Resilience Framework 
 
Source: Ponomarov & Holcomb (2009) 
Following this train of thought, Pettit et al. (2010) proposed that supply chain resilience 
increases as capabilities (attributes required for performance or accomplishment) increase 
and vulnerabilities (fundamental factors that make an enterprise susceptible to 
disruptions) decrease, mirroring Masten’s (2014) perspective on how protective and risk 
factors affect resilient responses.  
Pettit et al. (2010) also noted how, in contrast with Boin & Hart’s (2010) view, risk 
management and the ability to sense and address in advance any possible threat don’t 
build resilience directly. This approach entails examining all possible outcomes of a 
project or process, weighing risks and potential returns, but it relies on past and subjective 
information, thus it can rarely foresee low-probability, high-consequences events like the 
ones highlighted in Gittel et al. (2006). This perspective slightly detached the direction of 
resilience studies in supply chains from traditional risk management and business 
continuity planning, fleshing out how even in logistics not everything can be accounted 
for and how resilience should be more concerned with building resource bases for the 
future.  
In particular, Pettit et al. (2010) underlined how there should be a fit between capabilities 
and vulnerabilities: excessive vulnerabilities would result in excessive risk (and the 
negative outcomes that risk accumulation can bring to a system, as Masten (2014) noted), 
while excessive capabilities would erode profitability. Performance improvements derive 
Resilience: Theoretical Definitions 
43 
from striking a balance between the two. Research from Fantazy et al. (2009) confirmed 
empirically the need for this fit, which varied along with the core strategy of a firm. 
In parallel, Linnenluecke & Griffiths (2010) suggested that to cope with uncertainty, 
enterprises developed risk and crisis adaptation mechanisms, which increase their coping 
range (the range of normal variability with which an organization can cope, which is 
extremely context dependent). However, while adaptation is gradual and it’s a response 
to some form of external pressure that requires a different fit between firm and 
environment, resilience is more dynamic and concerned with addressing challenging 
conditions as they occur and defusing them before they escalate, further stressing the 
difference with a risk management perspective that would attempt to avoid these 
conditions. In fact, reducing risk chance does not improve resilience in terms of ability to 
bounce back from adversities (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011). 
The authors (Linnenluecke & Griffiths, 2010) also identified four characteristics that 
appeared in long-living companies and supply chains, mentioning however that these 
weren’t resilience predictors but rather measures of sources for past successful coping 
with adversity: sensitiveness to the business environments and a capability for quick 
responses to changing conditions; a good sense of cohesion, identity and community 
among employees; decentralization of decision making but with feedback systems that 
could influence central decision nodes; a conservative approach to financing featuring 
low risk. 
These characteristics brought differences in response mechanisms, suggesting that some 
organizations have different underlying qualities or capabilities that allow them to be 
better equipped against uncertainty, and Jüttner & Maklan (2011) tried to assess 
empirically which adaptive capabilities and resources help supply chains in preparing for 
unexpected events. 
The assumption that was followed is that while risk management in supply chains can 
help in reducing vulnerabilities, not all risks can be prevented, and other characteristics 
focusing on readiness, responsiveness and recovery were necessary to deal with 
unforeseeable events (Jüttner & Maklan, 2011).  
Four factors were identified: 
 Supply chain flexibility, which comprises the number of options available to absorb 
shocks; 
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 Velocity, the ability to quickly address problems and the lead time required to 
reconfigure the supply chain; 
 Visibility, the capability to sense the unfolding of an event; 
 Collaboration, an attitudinal disposition of the members across a supply chain to align 
forces and objectives in case of a risk event. 
Some dimensions have been thoroughly explored at a firm level in operations 
management literature, with flexibility and velocity directly translating in competitive 
advantage and operational excellence, while visibility typically affects customer 
perceptions (Slack et al., 2013). Jüttner & Maklan (2011) though isolated the effects of 
these characteristics in different supply chains during the 2007 financial crisis and the 
successive recession. Flexibility helped in containing negative effects on cost and revenue 
targets, allowing the reallocation of capacity within the internal and external network of 
the supply chain, with positive returns on performance. Velocity speeded up the pace of 
adaptation and of demand pick-ups. Visibility allowed to see the risk from partners (which 
reportedly increased with opportunism during information sharing), making it easier to 
accommodate shocks and increasing the range of possible actions. Uncollaborative 
supply chains also reduced the ability of some examined systems to react, as independent 
and opportunistic choices pursued different goals. 
If these supply chain characteristics provide competitive advantage in normal, routine 
operating times (Slack et al, 2013; Jüttner & Maklan, 2011) and contemporarily enable 
resilience, they should be inspected with more attention, as they might solve the dilemma 
raised by Sheffi & Rice (2005) between accruing costly slack resources and developing 
capabilities that improve resilience and performance. 
1.6.1 Resilience Enabling Elements and their Impact in Supply Chains 
To complement the literature examined above, this paragraph explores some of the 
possible enablers of resilience to further improve the understanding of this construct at a 
supply chain level, while moving toward a more comprehensive theorization of 
organizational resilience. The goal is also to employ studies which verified impacts on 
performance from these elements, displaying how organizing firms around resilience 
enablers can provide competitive advantage. 
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The first characteristic that is discussed is flexibility, analyzed through an empirical study 
from Fantazy et al. (2009) which explored the relationship between different kinds of 
flexibility and performance in small and medium Canadian manufacturing enterprises. 
The assumption is that flexibility requirements encompass all the functions of a firm, and 
the paper attempts to verify the impacts on strategy and performance of an organization 
and its supply chain, considering that being competitive as a single business is not deemed 
enough in today’s world. Due to the absence of consensus in the literature on which 
dimensions provide the most flexibility, the authors focused on the five aspects that 
impact the competitive position of a firm in the market, as they are directly perceived by 
customers (Fantazy et al., 2009; Slack et al., 2013, Kotler et al., 2012) and that were most 
frequently cited: new product flexibility, product flexibility, delivery flexibility, 
information systems flexibility and sourcing flexibility. These dimensions seemed the 
most appropriate to measure overall supply chain flexibility, while featuring enough 
variety to highlight differences in their connections to performance and strategy of a firm.  
Supply chain strategies were summarized as innovative (first-entrants in new markets, 
early technology adopters), customer-oriented (more mature market, exceptional 
customer service, reasonable quality and competitive prices) and follower strategies (very 
mature market state, tight cost control, low cost production). The measures that were 
employed were both financial (net profit, sales growth) and non-financial (customer 
satisfaction, which is the perception of value received over price, Fantazy et al., 2009; 
Kotler et al., 2012) and lead-time performance (time between the receipt of an order and 
its delivery, Fantazy et al., 2009; Slack et al., 2013).  
The following tables show the results of the study. 
Table 1.2 Impacts on Flexibility and Performance of Different Business Strategies 
Impact on Flexibility  Supply Chain Strategy  
 Innovative Customer-Oriented Follower 
New Product Flex. Strong, Positive Slight, Negative Negative 
Product Flexibility Negative Positive Slight, Negative 
Sourcing Flexibility Negative Positive Negative 
Information Systems F. Negative Positive Negative 
Delivery Flexibility Non-Significant Positive Negative 
Impact on Performance    
Net Profit Positive Slight, Positive Non-Significant 
Sales Growth Strong, Positive Negative Non-Significant 
Customer Satisfaction Negative Positive Negative 
Lead-Time Performance Negative Positive Negative 
Source: adapted from Fantazy et al. (2009) 
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Table 1.3 Direct Effects of Flexibility Dimensions on Performance Dimensions 
Flexibility 
Dimension 
New Product Product Sourcing Information 
Systems 
Delivery 
Impact on 
Performance 
     
Net Profit    Positive Non-Significant Positive Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Sales Growth Positive Non-Significant Slight, Negative Slight, Negative Positive 
Customer 
Satisfaction Negative Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Lead-Time 
Performance Negative Non-Significant Positive Non-Significant Positive 
Source: adapted from Fantazy et al. (2009) 
Moreover, the study found that supply chain flexibility helped supply chains adopting an 
innovative strategy in achieving better non-financial performance, while in customer-
oriented chains financial performance wasn’t improved this way.  
Fantazy et al. (2009) conclude their analysis by stressing how innovative supply chains 
tend to pursue new product flexibility, which has positive impacts on net profits and sales 
growth; customer-oriented supply chains sacrifice part of their profitability to provide 
high value through flexibility, as they attempt to create more long-lasting relationships 
with their customers to foster sustainable growth with a variety of products and services 
after sales. Follower supply chains limit their need for flexibility by narrowing product 
range and reducing the frequency of modifications. 
Applying the product life-cycle theory (Kotler et al., 2012) and Kano’s model on 
Attractive Qualities to these findings helps in refining the analysis. Follower firms are 
more oriented to cost compression and face a relatively stable market, greatly reducing 
their need for flexibility. Their margins are in general lower and their sales growth almost 
non-existent, explaining the impact of their strategy on performance. Innovative firms 
must satisfy the basic needs of their customers, without the necessity to rely on delighting 
factors such as a quick delivery or excellent service to achieve sales, as there is a lower 
need for differentiation. This partially explains the impact of their strategy on non-
financial performance, and how investing in supply chain flexibility mitigates this effect. 
The opposite is true in more mature, customer-oriented firms which need to differentiate 
on their service quality to maintain a clear position in a market, while focusing on 
customer lifetime value rather than on a single transaction. 
Flexibility however, especially in sourcing, helps to meet customer expectations and 
directly, positively impacts performance, even if in non-financial dimensions (Fantazy et 
al., 2009). Investments in this area not only provide the firm with resilience capabilities 
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(Jüttner & Maklan, 2011), but also with competitive advantage. However, some types of 
flexibility are more relevant in different stages of the life cycle in which the supply chain’s 
products are, confirming Pettit et al. (2010) idea that blindly investing on resilience 
capabilities can be detrimental. 
Finally, Urcioli et al. (2014) also verified that flexibility can be achieved through demand 
management: proper marketing and economic incentives are also a way to cope with 
disruptions, especially in energy supply chains.  
Urcioli et al. (2014) also stressed the importance of vertical cooperation to anticipate, 
identify, react and learn from incidents, which moves the topic of this discussion toward 
supply chain collaboration. 
In 2008, Soosay et al. noticed that to enable a supply chain strategy, coordination was 
essential, as it allowed to align objectives, to open communication channels, to share 
resources, risks and rewards among participants, a series of aspects that improve 
operational and innovation performance of the chain. The authors identified reciprocal 
and positive effects between innovation and supply chain collaboration, further 
reinforcing the idea that investments which foster other performance measures tend to 
increase resilience as well. This is unsurprising as tighter coordination and cooperation in 
a supply chain can be interpreted as the development of a collective mind that surpasses 
the single organization, improving systemic resilience. 
The last two elements of supply chain resilience are discussed below, as visibility and 
velocity of reconfiguration are closely tied. Velocity interpreted as a short lead-time was 
discussed by Fantazy et al. (2009) with the label of “delivery flexibility”, and Craighead 
et al. (2007) already mentioned its benefit. 
Visibility throughout the supply chain is defined as the extent to which the involved actors 
have access to and share information which they consider as key or useful to their 
operations (Lee & Rim, 2016). It’s a dimension that drives reconfigurability by providing 
strategic and tactical information which is essential to lower uncertainty, improve 
coordination and enhance customer satisfaction, ultimately ameliorating the strategic 
performance of a supply chain (Wei & Wang, 2009). The authors frame supply chain 
visibility as one of Teece’s (2007) dynamic capabilities, as it allows to renew 
competences and reconfigure organizational resources to capture competitive advantage 
in a shifting environment.  
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Wei & Wang (2009) stress how visibility provides real-time information that enables 
sensing, seizing and competitiveness maintaining capabilities, thus, in a supply chain 
context, visibility must be developed to improve these dimensions. Four enabling 
processes allow reconfiguration: sensing the environment, learning, coordinating 
activities and integrating resources. Visibility improves the performance of all these 
aspects as it provides market intelligence about customer needs, it allows sharing of 
information across the supply chain (which activates organizational learning and 
experience accumulation), it improves decision-making processes by providing critical 
information on dependencies in the system and it helps in building a collective identity 
for the supply chain.  
Working on the improvement of this dimension is once again similar to the process of 
developing a collective mind (Weick et al., 1999), highlighting yet another way through 
which supply chains can achieve resilience. Lee & Rim (2016) argue that operational 
performance during disruptions and responsiveness improve as this dimension is 
enhanced, and that the discrepancies between planning and execution, which is 
unintended variability, decrease thanks to the feedback provided by high visibility. 
This digression discussing single components of resilience was aimed at showing the 
theoretical and empirical evidence of the benefits of resilience development, even in its 
basic elements. It’s yet another way to cope with uncertainty which relies on network 
resources and capabilities rather than on internal strengths, giving practitioners another 
dimension on which they can focus their attention to seek solutions which provide the 
bases for resilient outcomes while creating competitive advantage. Furthermore, the 
parallels with theory on mindfulness, organizational and individual resilience show that 
the adaptive factors or systems exist almost identically in each of the three levels 
identified by Staw et al. (1981).  
Lastly, these empirical studies help in confirming how working on dimensions that foster 
resilience provide firms and supply chains with capabilities that also improve their 
performance and competitive advantage, thus a question is raised. Is focusing on an 
organization’s strengths and dynamic capabilities, as intended in Teece et al. (1997) and 
Teece (2007), a similar approach to Masten’s (2014) and William’s et al. (2017) 
development of protective factors? Paragraph 1.7 attempts to unify the perspectives that 
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have been shown thus far and to provide a more comprehensive view of organizational 
resilience. 
1.7 Conclusions: What is Organizational Resilience? 
 
The previous paragraphs should have conveyed how multifaceted resilience is, but a few 
recurring themes have emerged and will be underlined below. The analysis of resilience 
can be split in two temporal dimensions: when a crisis, an untoward and unanticipated 
event that surpasses the typical coping range of an organization, occurs, what Rose et al. 
(2013) defined as “static economic resilience” is witnessed. A system reacts to the shock 
in an attempt to maintain function, employing its endowments to cope with the situation 
(Williams et al., 2017). These crises occur when risk factors, actuarially based predictors 
of undesirable outcomes (Masten, 2001), turn into reality and overcome the typical 
response mechanisms available for an organization that would allow to manage the 
situation in a “Business as usual” fashion (inherent resilience in Rose, 2004), triggering 
the need to resort to ingenuity, bricolage and out-of-the-box thinking to maintain the 
organization’s alignment with its objectives.  
 
A mindful approach during a crisis allows to identify different, unconventional resources 
that can be employed or leveraged upon to cope with the situation. These are not 
circumscribed to financial slack: Williams et al. (2017) mention cognitive capabilities 
(constructive conceptual orientation, accuracy and timeliness of information-sharing and 
problem solving), behavioral capabilities (ingrained routines which facilitate the 
processing and sharing of information and decision-making), emotion-regulation 
capabilities (similar to Psychological Capital) and relational capabilities (social 
connections that enable access to and exchange of resources in the network, such as 
supply chain coordination) as some alternative instruments that enhance resilience. 
However, these can be interpreted as scarce resources that can be depleted during a crisis: 
managerial and staff attention is limited, as is their capacity to modify routines mindfully, 
individual resilience endures up to a breaking point when stressors aren’t addressed for 
too long (Masten, 2014), leadership can be questioned and lose its directive power if it’s 
not able to quickly address the issues at hand (Staw et al., 1981).  
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However, before and after the first answer to a crisis or a near-miss, in organizations that 
manage to avoid crises altogether (Roberts, 1990), there is another phase in which these 
assets or endowments are created for future use and risks are mitigated, or preemptively 
coped with.  
The ability to deal with a crisis is dependent on the structures that were developed ex-
ante (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), as the time constraint of the event doesn’t allow the 
creation of new resources due to their “stickiness” in the short run (Teece et al., 1997), 
nevertheless changing environments can be addressed through gradual adaptation in 
business as usual times, focusing on the fit between the firm and its niche (Linnenluecke 
& Griffiths, 2010). The business model and the firm’s strategy, as well as the 
complementary assets which enable their functioning, can be dynamically adjusted to fit 
secular trends, chase opportunities and develop protective factors (Hamel & Valikangas, 
2003), and this is primarily achieved through dynamic capabilities which allow the 
sensing and seizing of opportunities and the maintenance of competitiveness, activities 
that ultimately shape the organization’s unique asset base (Teece, 2007).  
 
Following Masten’s (2014) and Williams et al. (2017) view of adaptive systems and 
protective assets as the bases for resilient behaviors, preparing and responding to 
untoward events is normal, but as endowments increase a system can cope with more 
risks. Individuals in particular obtain similar levels of performance in high and low risk 
environments if their resources and capabilities are enough. Teece et al. (1997) on the 
other hand argue that valuable, rare and inimitable capabilities create resources and 
establish durable competitive advantage in an organization, thus developing capabilities 
such as mindfulness, flexibility, routines that develop psychological capital are all 
investments in resilience that contemporarily benefit an organization’s position in its 
market, as stressed for example by Sheffi & Rice (2005). The same authors though warn 
practitioners against developing excessive slack resources, which are costly: the theme 
emerges also in Pettit et al. (2010) who stressed how excessive capabilities erode 
profitability while excessive vulnerabilities would result in additional risk, which, if 
cumulated, leads to crises both in operations (Perrow, 1984) and strategic decisions 
(Hamel & Valikangas, 2003).  
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Consequently, endowments, assets, capabilities and in general the protective factors 
which allow a system to maintain function and perform well under duress should be built 
with a clear idea of the risks that are ordinarily and extraordinarily faced by the 
organization, balancing investments in accordance with the requisite variety of the 
context or niche in which it is operating. Available resources and the repertoires of 
responses should be at least as complex and nuanced as the problems that the system must 
withstand, structuring inherent resilience in a way which allows coping with uncertainty 
to be normal. Roberts’ (1990) analysis of how multiple protective factors are built to face 
all possible hazards and crisis situations in nuclear aircraft carriers, at the expense of 
efficiency, shows that systems can be unbalanced even toward excessive reliability.  
 
This approach though isn’t enough to ensure safety and performance in case of unforeseen 
variety, the moment when static resilience is required: some organizational slack which 
can be used for addressing extraordinary events, whether they are external threats or 
opportunities or the concurrent manifestation of multiple risk factors, must be stored in 
the system so that it may deplete or employ these resources instead of completely losing 
its function and structure. Quite often, partially explaining the normality of resilient 
behaviors, this “hidden slack” isn’t immediately visible before the crisis occurs, as 
evidenced by Meyer’s (1982) analysis of Community Hospital, Gittel’s et al. (2006) view 
on the relational capital of Southwest Airlines, the ingenuity manifested by nuclear 
aircraft carriers’ officers in dealing with unexpected weather conditions (Roberts, 1990), 
the opportunities for improved decision-making which arise from cutting overhead 
(Teece, 2007) and diffusing power to front-lines in hierarchic organizations (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  
 
A mindful approach to structuring this “emergency” slack warrants for an explanation of 
why each protective factor is stored and which kind of latent, generic risk factors it can 
contrast. Moreover, firms could actively choose which risks are better confronted through 
“normal” measures, including them in their coping range, and which could be addressed 
with deliberately built slack resources. A comprehensive example can be found in Morgan 
Stanley’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attack (Walsh, 2001), where an evacuation plan 
and backup offices were established beforehand. These were already built slack 
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resources, but during the crisis what really mattered were the leadership, quick decision-
making processes and accountability of employees (endowments which were unrelated 
with crisis prevention per se but were vital in optimally dealing with the issue). This 
allowed 3,694 of the 3,700 employees of the largest tenant in the World Trade Center to 
survive the event, while afterwards, thanks to the “employees’ welfare first” ideology of 
the managers, normal performance was quickly resumed thanks to the aid of over 300 
grief counselors which helped workers in facing trauma and coping with their emotions, 
restoring the system’s resilience in all the three dimensions, individuals, groups and 
system, identified by Staw et al. (1981).  
 
Leadership, accountability and the “employees’ welfare first” culture weren’t backup 
systems structured to be activated in case of terrorist attacks, but rather capabilities that 
could be flexibly deployed if the need raised, moving decision-making from a process 
that lasted six to twelve months with many “painful meetings and bruised egos” to a 
process that produced decisions every five minutes (Walsh, 2001). These elements were 
“hidden slack” for the organization, but in structuring organizational resilience they could 
be considered as sources of static resilience in case of unanticipated threats.  
 
An even more immediate example of how a firm can organize its resilience-enabling 
endowments to address risk is debt. By knowing the degree of flexibility that an 
investment requires, a firm can choose to invest primarily through equity or to employ 
debt to benefit from an optimal capital structure (Koller et al., 2015). If the company 
knows it can absorb resources from other revenue generating streams, or that through 
relational capital with other stakeholders it can forestall the risk of business erosion that 
might arise due to high indebtedness, it could actively embrace the risk of incurring in 
this debt. If these resources are unavailable on the other hand, it could rely only on equity 
to benefit from a less constrained capital structure.  
 
Organizational resilience then relates to coping with unexpected adversity as much as it 
deals with mindful resource and capabilities building and risk assessment to find a balance 
that is both economically viable and reliable enough to maintain functioning under duress.  
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The balance can be achieved through the careful creation of systems that provide 
competitive advantage without incurring in excessive vulnerabilities, and that can be 
reconfigured to address threats and predicaments. The questions that this view rises are 
where this balance point can be found, how much risk can be assumed before additional 
resilience-enabling capabilities should be developed, which assets and risks exist and the 
trade-offs between foregoing an asset (thus increasing risk) to invest in another.  
The high contextuality of this perspective makes generalizations tough, as it considers 
firm-specific capabilities and resources to be the key through which resilience is achieved. 
What a risk or asset is might be clear theoretically, but high indebtedness, excessive 
turnover, the absence of a responsibility and accountability culture might have different 
scales and meanings across sectors.  
Much like in brand management then, where investments are made to reinforce the core 
resources and values attached to a brand, building for resilience should focus on 
reinforcing the adaptive systems which are related to the core activities and sources of 
competitive advantage of an organization. 
Organizational resilience is thus a stance that applies mindful practices to shelter key 
resources while capitalizing from them to contain risk and build success for future 
periods, something more than a dynamic capability as intended in Teece (2007). This 
can’t however translate directly to superior economic returns as capabilities and resources 
are a necessary condition for competitive advantage, but not a sufficient one, given that 
other factors, such as market conditions and power, also play a role. 
Moreover, the pervasiveness and multilevel nature of resilience allows to intervene in 
different aspects of the firm, turning organizational resilience into something more than 
the mere sum of individuals’ resilience (Williams et al., 2017) and allowing for 
improvements both within the organization and in the relationships and interactions with 
other relevant stakeholders. 

  
2. CHAPTER 2 
MEASURING RESILIENCE 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 focused on describing what organizational resilience is, its theoretical 
components and outcomes and the relationship between the construct and the 
development of resources and capabilities. Even though the concept was thoroughly 
fleshed out, showing its many facets and its pervasiveness, measures of resilience haven’t 
been discussed thus far, requiring a chapter that elaborates on the matter.  
Finding a scale to measure resilience is useful for an organization as it helps in 
demonstrating progress toward becoming more resilient and it highlights the ties between 
this factor and competitiveness (Stephenson, 2010). Moreover, it provides a basis for 
scientific interventions that are meant to improve resilience and it could help in 
pinpointing the balance between risks and protective factors that was discussed earlier, 
while also allowing benchmarking with other organizations as well.  
The issue is that resilience is linked with social and cultural factors within the 
organization (Stephenson, 2010) and its supply chain, as shown earlier, and not 
exclusively with a low indebtedness or the firm’s size and other readily measurable 
dimensions. Moreover, its impact on performance is difficult to discriminate as resilience 
is mostly concerned with building resources for the organization, which may translate in 
competitive advantage but does not do so assuredly, as more factors like market power 
and the overall economic situation of the regions in which the organization operates also 
play a role. In fact, a study concerned with understanding how a resilient approach 
influenced results after an earthquake in New Zealand confirmed a stronger impact on 
preserving or altering the resource base of a firm, rather than its performance (with the 
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analysed constructs, a proactive posture and the ability to integrate resources from 
external sources, explaining only 3% of the variability in net profit) (Battisti & Deakins, 
2015).  
These difficulties are also related to the absence of a clear definition of “organizational 
resilience” which led different authors to develop alternative frameworks to measure this 
dimension: some are more oriented to workers’ resilience and how it influences the 
organization (Mallak, 1998, Mallak & Yildiz 2016, Walker et al., 2014), some with 
industry or regional level resilience, taking a perspective which is oriented primarily 
toward economic theory (Rose, 2004; Garmestani et al., 2006; Rose et al., 2013). Other 
perspectives were concerned with safety and crisis management in firms (McManus et 
al., 2008; Patriarca et al., 2017). All these points of view tackle different aspects of 
resilience and shouldn’t be neglected, just like in the previous section the analysis of 
resilience across different levels in an organization allowed to enrich the discussion.  
A common aspect though is that these measures are relative, mostly due to how context 
specific resilience is. Markman & Venzin (2014) attempted to build a more quantifiable 
index based on the idea that resilience was a “persistent superior performance”, but the 
problems with such a definition have been discussed above. The chapter will show these 
main trends in resilience measuring, showing their benefits and limitations and the 
contribution to the overall literature on the subject, and whether they can be adapted to 
understand the risk-protective factors dichotomy that is adopted throughout this thesis. 
2.2 Insight from Individual Resilience Measurements 
Understanding and quantifying resilience at an individual level is the first step to work 
on organizational resilience, as crises can lead decision makers to being overcome by 
events (Roberts, 1990, Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) deeply affecting how a firm confronts 
tense situations. Mallak (1998) was one of the first authors who attempted to measure 
how employees could show resilience in their workplace, displaying positive adaptive 
behaviors that were matched to the immediate situation with minimal psychological 
stress.  
As resilience is a concept which is close to mindfulness, Mallak (1998) tried to capture 
its underlying constructs: bricolage, described as the ability to work under pressure, 
access appropriate resources and create order out of whatever is available; attitude of 
wisdom, which is a mix of curiosity, skepticism and a reliance on multiple information 
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sources; and the presence of a virtual role system, the capacity of a team to work even 
without all of its members thanks to its vision, purpose and members’ ability to assume 
different roles.  
Six factors had emerged in his first research, which measured goal-directed solution 
seeking, problem avoidance, critical understanding of the situation, role dependence, 
information source reliance and resource access in employees in the health-care sector. 
However, his later studies (Mallak & Yildiz, 2016) managed to reduce the measured 
factors to four: active problem-solving, team efficacy (how well an individual works as a 
team member to achieve a goal important to all), confident sense-making, and bricolage 
(constructing solutions only with readily available resources).  
Moreover, in this study, Mallak & Yildiz (2016) highlighted, following the trend in 
psychological analysis of resilience, how these factors are protective factors for an 
employee, counteracting individual risk factors and enabling the taking of action in the 
face of adversity. This perspective is relevant as, combined with Masten’s (2014) 
contribution, these elements can be interpreted as positive adaptive systems related to 
learning, thinking and self-regulation, and they can be improved to bolster organizational 
resilience. 
However, Walker et al. (2014) stressed how even though individual resilience is the basis 
of organizational resilience, the latter is more than the sum of this capability in each 
employee, especially if “second order resilience” is considered, which is the development 
of new capabilities that improve this dimension rather than the simple ability to bounce 
back from adversities. This can be built through the organization, showing how there is 
another measurable and improvable layer of resilience: the authors (Walker et al., 2014), 
whose work draws from the New Zealand researches from the “Resilient Organizations” 
team, reported the main themes and measurable elements that may contribute to resilience 
building in their approach, which are shown in the table below. 
Table 2.1 Themes and Elements of Resilience 
Resilience Themes Leadership and Culture Networks Change-Readiness 
Elements Leadership Effective Partnerships Unity of Purpose 
 Staff Engagement Leveraging of Knowledge Proactive Posture 
 Situation Awareness Breaking Silos Planning Strategies 
 Decision Making Internal Resources Stress Testing Plans 
 Innovation & Creativity   
Source: Walker et al. (2014)  
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This research thread will be further analyzed in paragraph 2.4. The argument that 
concerns individual resilience measuring from Walker et al. (2014) is that employee’s 
engagement and wellbeing (Staff Engagement), as well as Leadership, lead to an 
enhanced organizational resilience through measurable changes in individuals. High 
involvement from staff members in their job and organization led to more concern toward 
the firm and spurred people to go beyond what was required or expected off them. This 
increased workforce adaptability, showing a tight connection between individual and 
organizational resilience.  
Through Masten’s (2014) lenses, more individual adaptive systems can be recognized in 
these elements: social networks, attachment, communities, reward systems. These factors 
improved resilience in young people and are expected to perform even among employees.  
More scales and dimensions are available to measure individual’s resilience, such as 
Connor-Davidson’s one. As they deal primarily with resilience to traumas and 
psychological disorders, they aren’t included in this study. However, they might be useful 
in providing more means to assess employees’ overall resilience, becoming useful tools 
for the understanding of which dimensions can be improved by a firm to benefit its own 
organizational resilience. 
2.3 Insight from Regional and Sectorial Resilience Measurements 
According to Rose (2003), organizational resilience emanates both from internal 
motivation and public or private policies. This means that to properly measure how a 
system can cope with adversity, it can simulate how its performance is affected under 
duress and whether a different policy or decision can mitigate or exacerbate the effect. 
The perspective embodies the idea that resilience ensues in moments that cannot be 
considered as “business as usual”, and that cannot be addressed by regular risk 
management in firms.  
The author doesn’t assume the point of view of a single firm, but rather the performance 
of a region: the study calculates the maximum regional output of water utility providers 
under normal conditions, adopting a standard fixed-coefficient approach. Afterwards, the 
effects of a possible disruptive event, an earthquake, are simulated in two different 
scenarios: with and without a prevention policy. In the first case, older pipes are replaced 
with plastic ones, while in the latter no change is applied to the distribution network. 
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The results show that direct water outage would be estimated at 50% in the case with no 
changes, with a total output reduction of 33,7%, whereas if the pipes are substituted water 
outage is limited to 31% and output reduction to 21%. This method allows to easily 
compare the effectiveness of the policy from the resilience point of view by checking the 
impact on the firm’s output and can provide practitioners with an interesting tool to 
evaluate and compare investments by understanding the output variation in case of an 
unexpected and untoward event, allowing to compute the expected value of the solution. 
In this example, without considering other benefits from the pipes change policy, the 
region would feature 19% less water outage and 12,7% lower output reduction in case of 
an earthquake or similar facility-disrupting crisis. 
For more ordinary shocks, Rose (2013) suggests computing direct static economic 
resilience, which is the ability of a firm or sector to absorb a shock (such as the curtailment 
of some critical inputs) as the percental avoidance of the maximum economic disruption 
that such shock would bring about. A good starting point is a linear relationship between 
an input supply shortage (f.e. tonnes of wheat) and the related output (f.e. tonnes of 
produced wheat flour). Economic resilience is how this linear relationship is disconfirmed 
and up to which point.  
The model is grounded on economic theory alone, consequently showing a flaw that Rose 
(2013) himself highlighted, but it can still provide a basis to quantitatively understand the 
impact of decisions throughout a supply chain or to inform decision-makers about the 
expected additional resilience that a new policy can deliver. This scenario analysis 
perspective relies on the idea that managers can foresee possible untoward events which 
go beyond the usual coping range of their organization, bringing it closer to a crisis 
management study than a resilience study, but exploring different low-probability, high-
impact events can increase the response repertoire of the organization to similar events, 
and this ultimately improves resilience (McManus, 2008) and suggests a possible way to 
measure its outcome. 
Another relevant contribution from sectorial resilience analysis comes from Garmestani 
et al. (2006): the authors used low volatility in employment within an industry as an 
approximation for higher resilience, considering that more resilient industries would 
feature less variation in their firms’ dynamics, requiring the adding or shedding of 
employees less often. The previous chapter discussed how soft organizational aspects like 
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culture are relevant to foster resilience: this suggests that even at a firm level a lower 
volatility of employment can be a sign of resilience, as Weick’s mindfulness has more 
time to develop in the members of the organization and to enable resilient behaviors in 
employees. 
Lastly, both Garmestani et al. (2006) and Rose (2013) attempted to grasp whether firm 
size could influence resilience, albeit at a sectorial level. Their findings suggested that a 
higher variability in the firms’ dimensions within a sector led to higher resilience, as they 
constituted a more diversified economy texture which was better able to withstand 
shocks. At a single firm level, the authors argued that size leads to more formalization, 
task differentiation and specialization, constituting a liability in case of resilience-testing 
shocks, however larger firms could still be more resilient than smaller ones due to their 
better ability to cope with these shocks thanks to their improved knowledge and the larger 
resource stock they can draw from. Size would become an interesting topic for studying 
resilience in later contributions, showing how it brings both benefits and limitations for 
adaptive responses (Stephenson, 2010; Markman & Venzin, 2014; Battisti & Deakins, 
2015). This aspect is further analyzed at a single firm level in the empirical part of the 
dissertation.  
2.4 Measuring Organizational Resilience 
After drawing some insight from other streams of research on resilience, this paragraph 
reaches the core of the chapter: understanding which scales have been developed to 
measure this construct at an organization level. Various approaches have been attempted, 
and the most prominent will be listed below: one particular stream of research, the 
“Resilient Organisations” project from Canterbury University in New Zealand, will be 
explored in detail as it includes most of the theoretical perspectives analyzed in the first 
chapter. The final part of this section will critically discuss the different contributions. 
The first method that will be considered is the VOLARE measure from Markman and 
Venzin (2014), which is somewhat of an outlier. This view assumes that return on equity 
(RoE) is a suitable long-term performance indicator as long as its volatility is contained, 
compared with the industry average. This happens because RoE measures include both 
external market forces and firms’ own results, therefore a positive, stable value highlights 
reliable operations which aren’t altered by contingent factors, offering a measure for 
resilience interpreted as sustained above-average profits.  
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The shortest period required for a proper evaluation is 10 years: first, a homogeneous 
sector is chosen, then the average ROE for each firm and its volatility are computed. 
Afterwards, the results are analyzed through a logarithmic regression. Clearly, hardly 
quantifiable measures such as leadership styles, culture etc. are eschewed from this 
analysis, but so is temporary advantage.  
A high VOLARE score is given by above average RoE with lower than average volatility: 
it helps in showing whether a growth path is sustainable over a 10-year period and 
whether the risk level that is assumed is fitting or not. The principle of affordable loss is 
favored, with resilience (i.e. high VOLARE scores) being tied primarily to organic 
growth than to all-or-nothing opportunities. 
The authors (Markman & Venzin, 2014) analyzed the bank sector and checked for 
significant differences between organization characteristics and high VOLARE scores. 
Size appeared to be a shock absorber that shielded firms against unexpected competitive 
forces and market turbulence, along with the stability and solidity of a firm’s home 
market. The impact of these components was connected to a reduced lower-bound 
volatility in performance, though this could also be achieved through a strategically 
focused internationalization which allowed spreading risk in different geographical 
markets.  
A proper environment, given by healthy macroeconomic policies enhancing market 
efficiency and stability and even social development, along with product diversity which 
helps in spreading risk, had a lesser but still relevant positive effect on VOLARE scores. 
Despite this, delving deeper in the findings, the authors stressed how these factors weren’t 
what thoroughly explained high VOLARE scores: firms like Banco Santader, which 
featured a strong organizational value system, specialized capabilities and a focus on 
enhancing their competences rather than diluting them, were the ones showing the highest 
results consistently. 
These elements suggest once more how capturing resilience only through performance-
related indicators doesn’t provide a comprehensive picture of the concept; moreover, 
different conceptualizations of resilience lead to different measures.  
The VOLARE method has another fault which other approaches attempt to overcome: 
it’s a lagging indicator which relies on past measures of profitability rather than on the 
current performance, becoming a useful tool for scenario analysis and for checking 
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historic results, but losing its value for the assessment of short and medium term 
organizational resilience. Starting from this criticism, the next reviewed approaches 
include qualitative information as well, focusing on softer organizational aspects. The 
contribution to resilience of elements such as adaptive capacity, mindfulness, culture, 
mentality silos breaking, and other aspects is captured.  
To better understand the similarities between these different perspectives, they will be 
ordered in table 2.2, showing which are the primary theoretical factors that are analyzed. 
Organizational resilience encompasses different aspects in a company, thus breaking it 
down in its components is the first step to create a relevant measure.  
Table 2.2 Different Perspectives on Measuring Resilience 
Author(s) Year Resilience Indicators Overall Perspective 
McManus et al. 
Seville et al. 
2008 
Situation Awareness 
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
Adaptive Capacity 
Resilience in the face of crisis 
situations, coping with or adapting to 
disasters 
Somers 2009 
Goal-Directed Solution Seeking 
(absence of) Risk Avoidance 
Critical Situation Understanding 
Virtual Role System 
Reliance on Multiple Information Sources 
Access to Resources 
Resilience as being able to bounce 
back and to become better able to 
cope with surprise, thrive in the face 
of adversity 
Stephenson 2010 
Adaptive Capacity 
Planning Capacity 
Size 
Participation in Exercises 
Organizational Performance 
Refinement of McManus’ measures, 2 
factors instead of 3: adaptive and 
planning capacity. Other dimensions 
partially explained resilience scores 
Lee et al.  2013 
Commitment to Resilience (*) 
Network Perspective (*) 
Situation Awareness 
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
Adaptive Capacity 
Resilience as ability to adapt, being 
reliable, managing disruptive 
challenges, thrive during crises 
Walker et al. 2014 
Collaboration (Internal & External) 
Employee Engagement & Wellbeing 
Learning from Experience 
Leadership – Senior & Middle 
Starting from “Resilient Organisations” 
project, it’s a view primarily focused 
on Human Resource Management 
Battisti & Deakins 2015 
Proactive Posture 
Resource Integration (from external network) 
Age (negatively correlated) 
Role of dynamic capabilities in 
maintaining resource base and 
performance after a crisis or disaster, 
creating resilience 
Organizational 
Resilience Index (BSI 
Group) 
2017 
Leadership (includes financial aspects) 
People elements 
Process elements 
Product elements (includes innovation) 
 
Medium size as the most resilient 
Age negatively correlated with resilience 
Comprehensive measure starting from 
Denyer’s (2017) review. Organizational 
resilience is achieved by balancing 
preventative control, mindful action, 
performance optimization and 
adaptive innovation 
Patriarca et al. 2017 
The following Dynamic Capabilities: 
Responding 
Monitoring 
Anticipating 
Learning 
Safety Management approach, 
resilience engineering to cope with 
complexity and maintaining 
functioning in face of threats 
Factors highlighted with a (*) have a solid theoretical background but had weak explanatory power during the studies 
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The views will now be discussed in detail, showing their overlapping themes. All of them 
adopted structured surveys to measure resilience and checked which other aspects had an 
impact on these values, such as size, firm age, firm performance.  
McManus, Seville et al. (2008) built the foundation of the “Resilient Organisations” 
project, an attempt to identify factors that enhance resilience in organizations to improve 
communities’ resilience after an earthquake in New Zealand. To measure the construct, 
three main factors were analyzed: situation awareness, management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity. The first factor captures how a firm understands its 
stakeholders, their interrelation and the environment in which it operates, with a deep 
understanding on which are the minimum operating requirements for the organization. It 
allows to prevent and mitigate risk. The second is an evaluation of how a firm addresses 
its vulnerabilities, showing which risks are already in place and whether they are critical 
or not for the organization. A vulnerability with a high criticality, meaning that the 
vulnerable component’s disruption can lead to the impairment of the whole system, is 
managed poorly if the firm is not prepared to deal with it during a crisis. Lastly, adaptive 
capacity includes the culture and dynamics of the organization that allow for timely and 
appropriate decision-making, including the ability to alter its structure and to withstand 
perturbations. 
Figure 2.1, taken from McManus et al. (2007) shows the components of each of these 
categories. The authors however didn’t attribute any weights to the measurement of each 
component or category: each of them provides an equal contribution to the overall 
measure of relative resilience. The survey provided a numeric value ranging from 1 (very 
low) to 5 (very high) for each component; afterwards, this was collated through a 
multiplication with the value of other components within the same category to understand 
the total performance of said category. The multiplication between the three categories 
provided the “relative overall resilience” value, which returned a resilience profile of the 
studied organization.  
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Figure 2.1 Resilience Indicators 
 
Source: McManus et al., 2007 
Some clarifications on these components are necessary to understand how they overlap 
with other authors’ perspectives. Roles and responsibilities consider the “virtual role 
system” theorized by Weick and measured by Mallak (1998). In fact, the “situation 
awareness” category features various concepts underlying mindfulness in organizations, 
such as the understanding of the environment and its connections. 
The management of keystone vulnerabilities deals with already present (or absent) 
resources of an organization, measuring the reliability of physical and intangible assets 
that favor or hinder resilience. Redundant resources, network effects both from the supply 
chain and other stakeholders, readiness to crises given by culture and processes are 
included in this category. Finally, adaptive capacity primarily dealt with what enabled or 
hindered recovery during a crisis.  
McManus et al. (2008) furthermore stressed how multiple resilience indicators were 
influencing each other, for example with Roles and Responsibilities being correlated with 
Organisational Connectivity. This points toward two ideas: that each indicator shouldn’t 
be considered in isolation as several of them are intertwined and that competence in some 
dimensions begets competence in others, as conceptualized by other authors (Sutcliffe & 
Vogus, 2003; Masten, 2014).  
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Before discussing the development of McManus’ theory, Somers’ (2009) work is 
investigated, as it starts from Mallak’s (1998) measures of individual resilience to create 
an estimate for an organization instead. In his Organizational Resilience Potential Scale 
(ORPS), Somers captures resilience as a pattern of actions, rather than a prescribed series 
of activities, that attempts to maximize the capacity of the organization to adapt to 
complex situations. The indicators that build the scale consider access to needed resources 
and the ability to fill multiple roles, drawing from Mallak’s theoretical work, while the 
other four dimensions which are listed in table 2.2 focus on aspects closer to Weick’s et 
al. (1999) concept of mindfulness.  
Even though with several limitations, primarily concerning the fact that only public 
municipalities were surveyed, which implied a lower degree of control on budgeting in 
these organizations, the study underlines how mindfulness and single actors’ resilience 
are a key feature for resilience and how both aspects can be estimated reliably; moreover, 
the overlapping measured themes with McManus’ indicators show how different streams 
of research point toward the same dimensions to establish a scale to evaluate 
organizational resilience. 
The indicators identified by McManus were thus verified even in other unrelated research. 
Consequently, it’s unsurprising to find how they turned into the cornerstone for further 
scale developments. In 2010, Stephenson used McManus’ indicators to benchmark the 
resilience of various industries in Auckland. Factor analyses consistently featured the best 
results with two factors, describing firms’ adaptive capacity and their planning capacity. 
This allowed the creation of a more parsimonious scale, resulting mainly from different 
wording of McManus’ components, which led to the following model. 
Figure 2.2 Stephenson’s New Model of Organizational Resilience 
 
Source: Stephenson (2010) 
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Most of the used components are directly taken from McManus’ (2008) research, while 
others have been rephrased or moved within categories. Each component weighed equally 
to evaluate total resilience. Single constructs were measured through questions that were 
similar to the ones used in McManus (2008), however the final resilience score was 
assessed through a benchmark at an industry level, showing the relative performance 
through the percentile in which the firm positioned itself. Stephenson (2010) judged as 
“fair” resilience measures which were within one standard deviation from the mean; 
further detachment from the industry average indicated superior or below-average 
performance (within two standard deviations, and beyond for extreme results).  
This provides an excellent tool to analyze industry level resilience and relative 
performance within peers, but if a benchmark or a reference study is unavailable, the 
methodology might lose part of its value. Regardless, adopting the scale can allow both 
for longitudinal studies within a firm, showing which areas were improved or 
undermined, and for an overall assessment of the perceived resilience of the organization. 
Another relevant finding was that size, the participation in emergency exercises and 
organization performance could be used as factors which explained portions of variability 
in the “Organisational Resilience” score. 6% of the variability could be explained by size, 
52% by the participation of exercises in resilience within the firm and different measures 
of performance, such as a positive and stable cash flow (16%), high profit to sales ratios 
(11%), high returns on investments (15%) and caring for staff (8%), could also be used 
to understand variance within the study. However, none of these measures provided 
evidence for direct causality, in contrast with the components of resilience. Nevertheless, 
they show how an active approach to resilience can have a strong impact on its 
improvement, and that there are significant links between performance and resilience. 
The author (Stephenson, 2010) stressed how these dimensions primarily showed that 
firms with more resources to draw upon during crises can feature higher resilience scores, 
thus working on improving the core business of an organization is also beneficial to its 
resilience. Even though causality wasn’t proven the other way around, the analyzed 
constructs provide resources that boost performance in business-as-usual times, though 
the findings couldn’t clarify to which extent. 
After Stephenson’s work, Lee et al. (2013) tried to summarize the different approaches 
attempted by the “Resilient Organisations” project: even though no relevant findings 
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emerged, the authors discussed two more constructs that were tested and consequently 
discarded after their factor loading was found less effective compared to Stephenson’s 
and McManus’ models. They should’ve provided a measure of “Resilience Ethos”, the 
orientation to being resilient of an organization, through the measurement of its 
commitment to resilience and its participation in the industry network (Network 
Perspective).  
Stephenson (2010) already disconfirmed these two components of resilience, but so did 
Somers (2009) who highlighted how the municipalities’ involvement with their 
community, just like involvement in the industry community, had no statistically relevant 
explanatory effect on resilience measurements.  
Walker et al. (2014) were the next to review the “Resilient Organisations” findings, and 
summarized the main themes as shown in table 2.1. However, they were concerned with 
improving organizational resilience through Human Resource Management practices, 
and thus they suggested four different aspects that could be analyzed: leadership, 
collaboration (internal and external), employee engagement and wellbeing, the capacity 
to learn from experience. This perspective is just a different take on the same theme, but 
it stressed once more how aspects connected to people are the most relevant to improve 
resilience in organizations, and thus they deserved more detailed scales which weren’t 
equally weighed as Stephenson’s or McManus’ components.  
Another contribution from New Zealand’s researchers came from Battisti & Deakins 
(2015), who tried to capture how two specific dynamic capabilities, which were already 
considered in past studies as relevant to breed resilient outcomes, impacted on firms’ 
resource base and performance volatility after a disaster. Proactive posture, described as 
the attention and strategic focus to changes in the environment and tightly related with 
learning, was deemed a capability that could defend a firm’s resource base during crises 
while also reinforcing resource integration, the second capability which focuses on 
acquiring and integrating new resources from external sources in the event of a disaster. 
Both had an impact, explaining part of the variation of firms’ resources after a disaster-
related change (around 17%).  
This effect shows that working on capabilities that favor resilient outcomes, however they 
may be conceptualized, has a positive and measurable effect on preventing resource 
degradation after a crisis and on recovering them after the event. Nevertheless, 
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maintaining or improving the resource base after a disaster had a lesser, yet significant, 
impact on performance, explaining 3% of the variation.  
Building dynamic capabilities that enable resilience is thus a reliable method to protect 
the resource base of an organization in case of crises. Teece (2007) highlighted how these 
capabilities also provided competitive advantage and resources in business-as-usual 
times, however performance is affected by other factors. Therefore, measures of 
resilience should consider primarily whether the resource base is positively affected by a 
resilient approach, rather than performance: Stephenson’s findings (2010) couldn’t 
capture a clear causal effect on economic dimensions for this reason. 
Finally, Battisti & Deakins (2015) found that firms were subject to a liability of oldness. 
As their age progressed, they became less able to respond to crises, with older firms 
having their resource base more negatively affected after disaster events. This verifies 
empirically Weick & Roberts’ (1993) hypothesis for which older firms with established 
routines are less likely to feature resilient answers in face of threats, and was further 
confirmed by the Organizational Resilience Index (BSI Group, 2017) which will be 
discussed now. 
Although this index from the British Standards Institution (BSI Group) is not an academic 
paper, it stems from the theoretical review performed for the Group by Denyer (2017). 
The institution attempted to capture, starting from this theoretical background, which 
were the most important dimensions, according to practitioners, that led to a highly 
resilient organization. Four recurring themes emerged, each with different underlying 
constructs, which are summarized in the following table with their importance ranking 
within brackets. 
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Table 2.3 BSI Group Organizational Resilience Index Themes and Components 
Resilience Themes Leadership People Process Product 
Components Reputational Risk (1) Awareness, Training 
and Testing (10) 
Information and 
Knowledge 
Management (5) 
Innovation (6) 
 Financial Aspects (2) Culture (13) Business Continuity (8) Adaptive Capacity 
(12) 
 Leadership (3) Community 
Engagement (14) 
Governance and 
Accountability (9) 
Horizon Scanning (16) 
 Vision and Purpose (4)  Alignment (15) Supply Chain (11)  
 Resource 
Management (7) 
   
Source: BSI Group (2017) 
Just like in Stephenson’s (2010) research, the index considers sectorial average estimates 
and creates a benchmark through which organizations can understand how they are 
performing relatively to peers in dimensions that favor resilience. The adopted 
perspective however tries to distinguish which aspects are the most relevant for 
organizational resilience, suggesting that not all dimensions are perceived as being 
equally important. This allows to establish priorities on which elements should be 
improved first and to compare the perceived performance with the criticality of each 
element. Reputational risk, for example, was deemed as the single most relevant aspect 
to maintain resilience in the long term, with firms actively trying to perform well in this 
dimension. Supply chain, on the other hand, has a perceived average impact on resilience, 
but most firms admit that they manage this aspect poorly, which constitutes a moderate 
risk to resilient outcomes. 
The last discussed measurement method for resilience adopts a different perspective, 
focusing on safety management and stemming from the resilience engineering field of 
research, and was proposed by Patriarca et al. (2017). Its relevance is tied to how, just 
like in BSI’s Index (2017), elements of resilience are thought to have different impacts 
on overall resilience.  
The construct is first divided in four cornerstones (the Resilience Analysis Grid), which 
are the abilities to respond, monitor, anticipate and learn from threats. The authors suggest 
maintaining a similar weight in the scale for these factors. Their elements, however, are 
extremely context-specific: the ability to respond for example may rely on experience, 
internal protocols and teamwork, but different industries might place a different emphasis 
on either of these components. An environment where tacit knowledge is more relevant 
might value more experience and teamwork over internal protocols. 
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Consequently, each construct is weighted through the analytic hierarchy process, a 
framework which allows to assign relative importance to each item in the grid and to 
understand the different impact on the total score.  
2.5 Discussion 
If a formal definition of organizational resilience is not yet agreed upon, its estimation 
methods are even more debated. The different takes that have been discussed come with 
both unique insight and flaws, thus finding the most fitting approach appears to be 
primarily a matter of what the research is attempting to isolate.  
Markman & Venzin’s (2014) VOLARE scale is appealing due to how its underlying 
components are quick to measure and readily available (especially for public companies) 
but using RoE to understand resilience leaves some factors out of the equation. This 
approach could benefit from using Enterprise Value variations (and their volatility) as an 
additional dimension through which VOLARE is computed. This way, the index would 
consider all the resources comprised in the organization rather than its yearly performance 
only: the previous section showed evidence of how resilience has stronger ties with 
resource building than with the economic bottom line; if the enterprise value is estimated 
through a discounted cash flow approach (Koller et al., 2015), more variables are 
accounted for, including the information on whether profits were generated through 
sustainable investments that, through capital expenditure, keep on renewing the resources 
of the firm or through divestments that improve RoE measures in the short term, but 
deteriorate profitability in the long term. Even with this change though, VOLARE 
measures are still lagging indicators that can only verify whether the firm was managed 
with a resilient approach in the past, but their predictive value is questionable.   
Mallak & Yildiz (2016) Workplace Resilience Index, on the other hand, is an excellent 
tool for human resource management practitioners to evaluate and improve individual 
resilience, but it doesn’t capture the whole organization’s capability to respond to threats. 
Rose’s (2013) methodology is a precious instrument to build scenario analyses that can 
be employed to assess how well a single investment in resilience would perform. It’s 
bound to evaluate ceteris paribus situations, with only one policy being put in place, yet 
it can help in comparing which would be the optimal investment in different resilience 
components. The issue is that it can capture the overall static and dynamic resilience of 
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an organization, with and without the new mitigating policies, but it fails in separating 
the components of resilience in the base case scenario.  
On the other hand, the scales that were developed to assess organizational resilience, 
summarized in table 2.2, are the ones addressing most of the themes that concern this 
thesis, as they attempt to grasp a measure which includes individual, group and inter-
organizational aspects. Though McManus’ et al. (2008) and Stephenson’s (2010) models 
are more explanatory from a qualitative point of view, they might be improved through 
the weighing of each resilience component according to the importance for the sector, as 
suggested by Patriarca et al. (2017). This could be achieved either through the analytic 
hierarchy process or through an evaluation of which generic risk each resilience factor is 
attempting to mitigate. The purpose is primarily to understand how different components 
might be more or less useful to develop an underlying resilience factor: the next studies 
that wish to measure organizational resilience should attempt to pinpoint not only if there 
are some components that are chiefly important, but whether this applies across different 
firms or sectors as well. 
The measures from BSI Group (2017), McManus et al. (2008) and Stephenson (2010) 
managed to capture most of the adaptive systems that the literature has identified thus far, 
yet, as argued by Pettit et al. (2010), an excellent resilient profile might not be the optimal 
target from a business standpoint, and even considering how improving single elements 
of resilience has positive effects on other dimensions as well (McManus et al., 2008; 
Stephenson, 2010), the impact, for example, of establishing business continuity plans or 
leadership might have varying effects across multiple organizations and sectors (Patriarca 
et al., 2017).  
Some more aspects weren’t considered: first, risk factors and the interplay with the 
protective factors weren’t analyzed quantitatively in the reviewed literature. Arguably, a 
low score on some resilience elements, such as silo mentality, can be interpreted as an 
indicator of risk, following the insight found in Masten (2014). Moreover, an organization 
could ask itself: how often is this protective factor put to a test? How vulnerable is the 
organization to a change of that element? What would happen if that specific component 
of resilience deteriorates? Would the organization risk collapse, or would it still adapt? 
This leads to a second conclusion: measures of resilience should capture how sensitive 
each element is to change and the negative effects on performance measures stemming 
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from changing each protective factor to understand whether they are critical or not for the 
organization. Could a company still survive if its excellent relationship with employees 
is damaged? Can it withstand financial difficulties, or any misstep in this area might cause 
severe disruption across the organization? Analyzing how a variation in each resilience 
element alters the outcomes for the firm can provide a better picture for the managers, 
who would then be able to focus resilience investments in an area instead of improving 
components that aren’t constantly subject to stress. 
Another aspect that was highlighted in Chapter 1 is missing from the available scales to 
measure the construct: organizational resilience can be theoretically split in “day-by-day” 
resilience, which is the normal coping range of the organization and the amount of 
variability it can manage without having to resort to additional resources or capabilities, 
and static resilience, when unforeseen events cause the organization to be confronted with 
novel situations that require adaptability instead of the typical responses within the coping 
range. The analyzed scales assume that there is no difference between improving elements 
that continuously buffer against volatility, for example a good knowledge and information 
management within the organization, and the factors that activate only in case of more 
complex situations, like giving recovery priorities. The difference could be relevant and 
should be tested, as it would divide resilience building in a phase working specifically on 
addressing frequently appearing variability and another one devoted to brace the 
organization against unlikely, yet potentially catastrophic, events. 
One of the conclusions from the previous chapter was that the response repertoire of the 
organization should be at least as complex and nuanced as the situation it has to deal with, 
thus another dimension for the analysis of resilience could be the pairing of each 
component with the risk it helps controlling: is it an unlikely risk with the possibility for 
a huge impact, or a constant risk factor that should be held in check during business-as-
usual times? This would provide scales that factor in risks, following the most recent 
trends in this research field which do not even consider a behavior as resilient if it’s not 
facing any risk factor at all (Masten, 2014; Williams et al., 2017), which can be used to 
direct investments in resilience with even more heed. Furthermore, this approach could 
help researchers in identifying if some elements are more “generic”, being useful to 
improve resilience for any firm in any sector and situation, or more specific, either for the 
analyzed sector or the contingent situation that the organization is facing, allowing also 
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the split between elements that improve the business-as-usual coping range and 
components primarily devised to enable adaptability during unforeseen crises. 
Lastly, the effects on performance indicators after the improvement of resilience elements 
have not been thoroughly understood yet: Soosay (2008), Fantazy et al. (2009) and Wei 
& Wang (2009) identified some direct ties with firms’ results, stressing how some 
components of supply chain resilience improve financial indicators while others enhance 
customer satisfaction or other less evident dimensions. Many other authors cited across 
this thesis also hinted at the connection between resilience and superior performance. A 
full understanding of these effects might be difficult to reach until an agreed and shared 
theoretic definition and measure of organizational resilience is devised, yet scholars who 
wish to contribute to this field of research should bear in mind the practical importance 
of understanding how resilience affects the overall organization output, just like in Rose 
(2013).  
2.6 Conclusions 
The previous paragraph raised many questions, and developing a comprehensive measure 
of resilience which accounts for all the details that were noted is still a daunting feat. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the inquiries that have appeared thus far, laying the basis for the 
remainder of this work which will attempt to identify patterns that verify or disconfirm 
the theoretical deductions that were presented. 
Table 2.4 Questions Raised after Literature Review 
Theoretical Question Basis for the Question Practical Implication 
Can Resilience Components (protective 
factors) and the associated risks they 
help mitigating be divided between firm 
specific and generic components? 
Resilient answers are often divided 
between normal behaviors, which is 
adaptability within the typical coping 
range of the organization (inherent 
resilience, as defined in Rose, 2004, or 
mindfulness during operations, as 
defined by Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), and 
extraordinary feats, such as Southwest 
Airlines’ or Morgan Stanley’s responses 
to crises (Gittel et al., 2006; Walsh, 
2001). 
Generic protective factors are mostly 
slack resources which can be depleted 
during a crisis to absorb the shock, 
focusing primarily on the development of 
endowments for the firm, while specific 
protective factors are active attempts to 
expand the coping range of the 
organization outside of crisis times, for 
example through the reduction of 
vulnerabilities. 
A positive answer would clearly 
identify which factors address low 
probability, high impact events 
(generic risks and protective 
factors) through resource building 
and which are primarily concerned 
with mitigating typical operational 
risk.  
This would help practitioners in 
choosing where and why they 
would invest in resilience building 
factors, according to the needs of 
the organization. 
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Is there a tipping point in which risks 
overcome protective factors, leading to a 
crisis that threatens the survival of the 
organization? Can it be identified 
preemptively? 
HRO literature identified this situation 
when operators are “overwhelmed by 
events” and cannot address all the 
contingent variability. A shift in 
customers’ preferences might be a minor 
nuisance for a resilient firm, or a 
devastating blow for a brittle 
organization which was relying heavily on 
the current habits of their clients. Only 
crises as intended in Staw et al. (1981) 
should be considered for this inquiry as 
manageable jolts are either within the 
coping range of the organization or can 
be answered to through static resilience. 
Knowing beforehand if the 
organization may face a serious 
threat to its survival, either due to 
the deterioration of a protective 
factor or the appearance of a new 
risk, would be an important tool for 
managers to activate processes 
meant to restore organizational 
resilience before the crisis ensues. 
Sheffi & Rice (2005) and Pettit et al. 
(2010) noted how risks (vulnerabilities) 
might have a different relevance for 
different organizations. Does this apply 
to protective factors as well, or do they 
have a similar importance? Can this 
difference be applied across sectors, or is 
it industry specific? 
Masten (2014), McManus (2008) and 
Stephenson (2010) haven’t weighted 
resilience components (or protective 
factors) in their studies. However, 
Patriarca et al. (2017) and BSI’s resilience 
report (2017) suggest that there are 
differences between the importance of 
each protective factor.  
If each protective factor is equally 
important, organizations could 
invest on any of them indifferently 
(from a resilience standpoint). If 
differences exist, investing in some 
specific factors should be the 
primary goal for decision-makers. If 
these differences are verified not 
only within an industry, but even 
across sectors, some resilience 
components should always be 
preferred to others. 
When is a protective factor actively 
matching a risk? When are additional 
investments required? Is it possible to 
develop a unique mean of analysis to 
answer these questions? 
Pettit et al. (2010) suggested to avoid an 
over-investment in resilience enabling 
capabilities (HROs like nuclear aircraft 
carriers are a perfect example of resilient 
systems that aren’t economically 
optimized).  
Developing resilience per se might 
require scarce resources which 
decision-makers would rather 
allocate to different projects. An 
understanding of which protective 
factors are considered as “active”, 
meaning they constantly mitigate a 
risk or will be used in case of a crisis 
to address the new risks, or when 
they are “inactive”, meaning that 
there is an excessive slack, would 
provide additional information for 
practitioners to direct their 
investments in resilience. 
What’s the precise impact on 
performance (in terms of avoided losses 
or direct output improvement) of 
enhancing specific resilience 
components? 
The theoretical increase of competitive 
advantage through the improvement of 
dynamic capabilities has been theorized 
by Teece (2007). Effects on various 
performance dimensions have been 
highlighted in other works in this 
research stream, but the effects always 
seem to be context specific. 
Understanding if there is a pattern 
in the effects on performance 
deriving from the improvement of a 
certain component would provide 
more information to managers, 
helping their decision-making 
processes.  
 
The proposed questions are clearly intertwined, and most of them are concerned with 
understanding how and why resilience is built from its components and how it interacts 
with risks. Consequently, considering how a clear-cut measure of organizational 
resilience has yet to emerge, a survey would be inappropriate to test and understand the 
implications of these inquiries. Following Yin’s (2009) perspective, a multiple case study 
methodology would be more appropriate, as this thesis is attempting to study a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth which is also strongly connected to its context. 
Furthermore, attempting to provide a measure for these phenomena without verifying 
their existence beforehand would create a lapse in the chain of evidence, reinforcing the 
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need for theory-testing case studies. The next chapter will focus on attempting to outline 
a case study methodology that could reliably test these concepts. 
 
 
 
 

 3. CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE STUDIES 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A foreword is needed before moving to the definition of the case studies and their 
associated protocol. Yin (2009) implied that the first step to build a proper research is the 
understanding of the questions that the tool is meant to test and, possibly, answer to. 
Consequently, some definitions need to be formulated before the propositions, and their 
possible rival explanations, are laid out. 
Starting from these constructs, the following paragraphs will first establish the frame and 
context within which the cases will be analysed, describing the reasons behind the 
choices, and then the procedure that will be adopted during the collection of the data. This 
will lay the basis for the fourth chapter of this dissertation, which will discuss and 
compare the results and the eventual changes applied to the protocol, if any were 
necessary. 
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Table 3.1 Definitions used in the Case Studies 
Concept Adopted Definition 
Organizational Resilience 
A stance that applies mindful practices to shelter key 
resources while capitalizing from them to contain risk and 
build success for future periods; also the maximum 
disturbance an organization can withstand before losing 
structure and control (Linnenluecke & Griffith, 2010) 
Risk Actuarially based predictor of undesired outcomes (Masten, 2001) 
Vulnerability 
Inability of a system to cope with adverse impacts or the 
degree of susceptibility to disruption of the system 
(Linnenluecke & Griffith, 2010) 
Inherent Resilience 
Typical response mechanisms that allow organizations to 
cope with variability through a business-as-usual approach 
(Rose, 2004) 
Static Resilience 
Answers to untoward and unexpected events that are beyond 
the typical coping range of an organization (Rose, 2013). In 
this phase, organizations’ endowments may be depleted 
(Williams, 2017) 
Coping Range 
Range of variability an organization can normally cope with 
(Linnenluecke & Griffith, 2010). This doesn’t require changes 
in the organization’s operations or in the business-as-usual 
allocation of resources 
Protective Factor Resources, capabilities, endowments, adaptive systems that enable resilient responses and adaptation 
Generic Protective Factor 
A protective factor that is meant to address generic risks (low 
probability, high impact events, possibly unforeseen). A large 
amount of cash would be a typical example. 
Contextual Protective Factor 
A protective factor that mitigates the typical operational risk 
of the considered organization. An example could be a 
process to replace missing critical inputs. 
Crisis A major threat to a system’s survival (Staw et al., 1981) 
Resilience Threshold 
Situation in which adverse impacts, stemming from risks and 
vulnerabilities, overcome both inherent and static resilience, 
or in which the system fails to adapt and maintain its function 
and structure. Similar to Linnenluecke and Griffith’s (2010) 
threshold, though there wasn’t a specific theoretical 
definition. 
Active Protective Factor 
A protective factor which absence or deterioration would 
certainly reduce the organization’s performance (current or 
when static resilience is demanded).  
 
3.2 Initial Propositions and Rival Explanations 
Table 2.4 summarized some of the main concerns that the literature review has raised, but 
a proper methodology requires the clear statement of the research questions that will be 
asked and the possible alternative facts that might explain the phenomena (Yin, 2009). 
Table 3.1’s contents will be used to provide sound definitions through which the 
propositions will be stated.  
The first issue that will be considered is that protective factors can be built in many ways. 
Theory suggests that they could be divided in flexibility enabling factors and slack 
resources (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). The cases analyzed by Meyer (1982) feature both: 
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Memorial Hospital suffered heavy losses but relied on its financial slack, General 
Hospital simply adopted personnel reallocation to flexibly counteract the jolt. This 
division though doesn’t clearly interpret responses to untoward events such as Southwest 
Airlines’ one, described by Gittel et al. (2006), which was based on asking employees to 
bear salary cuts for a short time in exchange for the assurance that there wouldn’t have 
been layoffs. The main difference can be identified when the concepts of static and 
inherent resilience are used in the analysis: General Hospital’s response is a stark example 
of inherent resilience, as even its managers stated that the strike was treated in a business-
as-usual manner through procedures that were typically enacted in case of personnel 
shortage. The processes were tailored to the organization and might not have been 
replicable as efficiently in other firms. They were meant to improve the coping range of 
the organization and worked accordingly.  
Financial slack was clearly a buffer that could help in handling untoward events through 
static resilience, for Memorial Hospital. The employee-friendly culture of Southwest 
Airlines though cannot be described directly as a slack resource: it wasn’t purposefully 
built to face economic downturns and it was operative, providing value for the 
organization, even in business-as-usual times. Nevertheless, it could serve as a buffer in 
case of a crisis thanks to the accumulated relational capital of the firm, which indeed 
costed effort to build up over time. Given these examples and other hints that were met 
across the literature, the research will attempt to answer to the following question. 
Q1 – Protective factors can be divided between the contextual and 
generic category. The first includes factors that constitute inherent 
resilience and are designed to improve the coping range of the 
organization, the latter includes factors that accumulate slack 
resources or hidden slack meant to be employed when static resilience 
is needed. 
One more follow-up statement could be verified: 
Q1a – Generic factors are replicable across different firms and sectors 
with similar impacts on resilience, contextual factors are embedded in 
the organization and highly depend on the contingencies it has to deal 
with, improving resilience only within the specific coping range. 
Some more clarifying examples can help in fixing the reasoning behind these hypotheses. 
In Morgan Stanley’s case (Walsh, 2001), leadership and the employee-first culture could 
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be labelled as generic factors: other firms can focus on them and replicate them, showing 
usefulness during events that are beyond the typical coping range in any sector. On the 
other hand, plans that allow to resume production if a critical input is missing in a 
manufacturing plant, or the elements of supply chain resilience identified by Jüttner & 
Maklan (2011), or the alternative by-the-book answers operators in nuclear aircraft 
carriers could adopt during specific deviations from the devised flow of action (Roberts, 
1990) enhanced the coping range for the organization but wouldn’t develop resilience in 
completely different contexts.  
Both propositions have some equally compelling rival explanations that must be 
considered for a thorough analysis: 
R1.1 – Protective factors that constitute inherent resilience also build 
up static resilience, with slack resources improving the normal coping 
range and contextual flexibility enabling factors that mitigate even 
non-operational risks. 
R1a – Contextual and generic factors are replicable in any 
organization with similar positive effects on resilience building. 
Furthermore, another rival explanation can be formulated: 
R1.2 – Contextual protective factors are the operative declination of 
generic protective factors, being more specialized but better able to 
cope with the associated risk. 
R1.2 would suggest a different take on protective factors, stating that only generic factors 
are relevant for building resilience, whereas their contextual application would just be the 
mean through which each organization reifies the theoretic factors and which might be 
identified as the backup systems proposed by Perrow (1984), much like in the relationship 
identified by Masten (2014) in figure 1.3 between resilience factors and their underlying 
associated adaptation systems.  
The next proposition that the case studies will try to address is based on Masten’s (2001) 
findings which suggest that resilience is a normal behavior and that, usually, protective 
factors forestall different risks. When the current risks exceed the available protective 
factors, a crisis ensues, demanding a response through static resilience. This concept can 
be exemplified through the definition of homeostasis from Connor & Davidson (2003) 
and the collapse phase in Linnenluecke & Griffith (2010). The first implies that 
Development of the Case Studies 
81 
individuals are typically in a state of biopsychospiritual balance, which enables adaptation 
to circumstance even with the presence of internal and external stressors. If, however, the 
protective factors which typically manage these stressors turn ineffective, this equilibrium 
is broken, starting a crisis. The parallel between individuals and systems from the 
resilience standpoint has been discussed in chapter 1, thus this idea might be applicable 
to organizations. 
Linnenluecke & Griffith (2010), on the other hand, suggest that organizations can usually 
adapt to a certain amount of change in a given time while retaining their structure and 
functioning. This is the typical organizational resilience, but if the change surpasses the 
organization’s capacity to deal with it, a phase of collapse ensues, which is a reduction of 
performance that might be irreversible and might determine the disaggregation of the 
system.  
These perspectives point toward the following research question: 
Q2 – Organizations witness crises when current risks are beyond their 
inherent resilience capability; in this situation, the less specialized 
factors which constitute static resilience are employed. The resilience 
threshold is surpassed once the available protective factors are less 
impactful than the contingent risks or the active vulnerabilities, which 
are the negative events the organization is not able to deal with.  
The associated rival theory which will be tested is: 
R2 – The resilience threshold can be surpassed even when protective 
factors are in place and contingent risks are held in check, with a single 
event which overcomes both inherent and static resilience. 
An example that would come to mind when thinking of R2 is Fukushima’s nuclear plant 
accident after the tsunami on March 2011, where protective factors were existing and 
typical seismic risks were supposedly accounted for. A paper from Lipscy et al. (2013) 
though pointed out how the measures that should have avoided the disaster were 
underestimating the threat and thus constituted a vulnerability for the plant, meaning that 
the resilience threshold would very likely be overcome by a tsunami of that magnitude. 
Consequently, more empirical checks are necessary to verify whether Q2 or R2 are the 
most applicable explanations for how crises ensue. 
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Another theme that the case studies will attempt to understand is whether protective 
factors have a different impact on resilience, similarly to vulnerabilities, and whether this 
is true for the same factors across different industries or not. The doubt was raised 
considering how Patriarca et al. (2017) proposed different weights for resilience enabling 
factors, and firms answering the survey from BSI group (2017) reported differences in 
the perceived importance of each factor according to the interviewed managers, as stated 
in table 2.3.  
Q3 – Protective factors have different importance in building 
resilience, with some being critical and others being secondary or 
irrelevant. 
Q3a – These differences in importance are applicable across sectors. 
Consequently, the rival explanations would be: 
R3 – Protective factors are equally important for an organization, 
without any prioritization. 
Which would also invalidate Q3a. If, though, Q3 was found true, another rival theory 
must be tested: 
R3a – Even though protective factors have different impacts on 
resilience, this does not replicate across sectors. Factors’ importance 
varies given the context or industry. 
Finally, the last theoretical answer that the case studies will seek is concerned with the 
matching of protective factors and risks. Pettit et al. (2010) suggested not to overinvest in 
capabilities which might deteriorate profitability while providing little additive protection 
against vulnerabilities. Moreover, McManus (2008) and Stephenson (2010) identified 
multiple protective factors that can help in building resilience. Even if these factors didn’t 
satisfy question 3, thus having a similar importance in improving resilience, the returns 
on investing in each of them might not be linear. Following the perspectives from Masten 
(2014) and Williams et al. (2017), resilient behaviors do not appear unless a risk or 
vulnerability becomes active, turning into a negative event for the organization. After all, 
there wouldn’t be a need to adapt without an active threat (or opportunity) for the system.  
Consequently, protective factors are built primarily to shelter from risks and 
vulnerabilities, either through inherent or static resilience, although they may also 
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constitute the basis for competitive advantage given that many resilience factors feature 
similarities with dynamic capabilities identified by Teece (2007). To identify when 
investing in or enhancing a protective factor is relevant, each factor could be tied to the 
risks or vulnerabilities it helps coping with: formulas to evaluate the likelihood and impact 
of a foreseen risk already exist, and the effects of generic risks such as economic 
downturns, earthquakes and other possible primers for crises can be estimated for 
example through Rose’s (2004) methodology, which can also compute how much of the 
negative outcomes can be negated by protective policies.  
Yet, there might be better qualitative questions that can help in roughly assessing if a 
protective factor is doing its job or if it is likely to help coping with a risk should it turn 
into reality. Such questions could also allow firms that excel in certain protective factors, 
for example in business continuity planning, to understand the opportunity costs of a 
deterioration of that factor, seeing the direct, likely impact that it could have if, for 
instance, the continuity plans were sloppier. Some of these questions will be tested 
throughout the case studies, though they go beyond the scope of this dissertation: the 
primary concern is with the following research question. 
Q4 – Protective factors can reach an efficient point where, ceteris 
paribus, further investments would provide decreasing returns, here 
intended as positive effects deriving from the factor (avoidance of 
losses or business erosion, reduction of downward performance 
variability, increases in relevant performance dimensions) minus the 
costs sustained to improve said factor.  
Indebtedness and its connection with a capital structure’s performance already suggest 
the possibility that this efficient point exists: a rickety financial position constitutes a risk 
which can greatly deteriorate the performance of a firm when it’s over-leveraged. An 
optimal capital structure provides the best returns while an exceedingly safe one foregoes 
the benefits deriving from tax savings, though the risks of overly high debt are far more 
punishing on performance than an excessively cautious capital structure (Koller et al., 
2015).  
The poor management of debt and financial aspects has been already discussed in Chapter 
1 as a risk factor, contrasted by its optimal management which constitutes a protective 
factor, thus the need for its optimization from the resilience standpoint doesn’t need 
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further inquiries from a theoretic point of view. It remains to be seen if the same applies 
to other protective factors.  
Logic though helps in answering this inquiry: a factory with no extinguishers is more 
vulnerable to fires, but after enough of them have been installed, more would be 
redundant and constitute a slack resource, providing only minimal added resilience and 
value. In this case, the extra extinguishers might be an almost irrelevant protective factor. 
3.3 Choosing the Cases 
As part of the planning for proper case studies, the reasons behind their choice must be 
explained (Yin, 2009). First, a multiple cases approach was chosen not only for the more 
solid evidence it can provide, but also because the formulated propositions, in particular 
Q2, Q3 and Q3a, require the investigation and comparison between multiple 
organizations.  
The following list enumerates some of the reasons that guided the choice: 
 Case studies allow to capture more qualitative aspects compared to surveys, and 
an experiment wouldn’t have been possible given the low degree of control a 
researcher can have on complex organizations such as firms and even more so on 
the economic context they operate within;  
 Different firms possess different protective factors, thus studying more than one 
organization within a sector can help in identifying the differences, if they exist, 
that the propositions attempt to verify; 
 As resilient answers ensue upon the actualization of a risk which shifts 
environmental conditions and requires adaptation from the organization, the 
sectors selected for the study should have witnessed the activation of a risk, for 
example an economic downturn, which involved most of its members. This allows 
to check the effect of a single, major threat that could be beyond the typical coping 
range of the organization and that is almost similar for any organization within 
the industry, just like in the paper from Gittel et al. (2006) where the reduction of 
flights within the US affected the whole airline sector; 
 Some of the questions wish to test whether protective factors apply in a similar 
way to any organization or whether different sectors require different resilience 
enablers. This concerns primarily generic protective factors, as contextual ones 
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are expected to vary across industries, and the possible existence of a similar 
pattern for crises, identified by the resilience threshold; 
 Consequently, at least two sectors are necessary for this study, both having 
witnessed a similar shock (economic downturn) and with firms that have 
experienced similar patterns in their economic performance during the period of 
analysis, facts that ultimately benefit the comparability of the cases; 
 Two patterns of performance will be accounted for: one firm per sector should 
have withstood only minor effects, suggesting that its inherent or static resilience 
were enough to weather the storm; the second firm should feature a severe dip in 
its performance signaling a crisis situation, followed by a recovery phase which 
would show a different kind of resilient answer where the initial static resilience 
wasn’t enough to cope with the risk, possibly signaling a situation where risks and 
vulnerabilities overcame the ability to manage variability of the organization. If 
the recovery was successful though, the firms would likely be able to show how 
they developed or discovered new protective factors to counteract the 
predicament, providing additional clues on the interplay between risks and 
protective factors; 
 Given how size has mixed and non-explanatory effects on resilience (Garmestani 
et al., 2006; Rose, 2013; Stephenson, 2010), the study should focus on firms that 
are similar on this aspect. Larger firms though are expected to have more 
protective factors given their broader resource bases, whereas smaller 
organizations would witness the contrary. As a consequence, the study should 
consider medium size companies, which are less likely to be affected by the size 
effect; 
 As Fantazy et al. (2009) identified that different strategic orientations lead to 
different impacts on performance dimensions from protective factors, the selected 
cases should consider organizations with a similar strategic scope, increasing 
comparability yet again. 
To summarize, meeting these requirements means identifying two sectors which 
withstood an economic downturn; then two medium-sized firms per sector, one 
witnessing a decrease in performance and a recovery within the downturn period, another 
experiencing either growing or constant performance during the same period. This defines 
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the unit of analysis, circumscribing it in a single organization and avoiding the focus on 
whole supply chains: these will be considered as fixed and external elements, unless the 
interviewed firms state that they have an active role in influencing supply chains or sector 
dynamics. The fact that the selected organizations are medium-sized should reduce the 
chance of this happening and avoid the blurring of the effects that influence a single 
organization compared to the ones reverberating across the whole chain of value. 
The sectors that were identified as being suitable for the analysis were the Italian 
Construction and Furniture industries.  
3.3.1 The Furniture Sector 
This sector was already undergoing major changes in Italy during 2005 (Crepaldi, 2011): 
the manufacturers were adapting their business models to the competition from emerging 
economics, such as Poland and China, a situation that was reducing the export from Italy 
to the rest of the world, slowing down industry growth. In 2008, the producers had 
apparently been able to cope with the increased competition deriving from globalization, 
but both the sector and Italy’s internal economy were beginning to suffer from the global 
economic crisis which started in 2007 (Possamai, 2013). Between 2007 and 2012, the 
Italian furniture industry members experienced a severe reduction in revenues which 
brought the overall output from 42 billion to 28 billion euros, with more than ten thousand 
firms having to close due to the new market condition, fraught with a weak demand both 
in the home market and in developed countries such as the US or the rest of Western 
Europe (Manzo & Banfi, 2013). The situation was deeply connected not only to the global 
crisis, but also to the contraction of the Construction industry worldwide, which reduced 
the demand for newly crafted furniture.  
The presence of some risk factors emerges from these facts. First, the sector used to rely 
primarily on the internal market, especially due to its fragmented nature: only 218 of the 
almost twenty-nine thousand firms of the industry featured revenues above 16 million 
euros in 2017 (Mancini, 2018) showing that even after the crisis there wasn’t a 
consolidation within the sector. This precluded the access to external markets for some 
smaller firms, which constituted the only opportunity to perform well during the crisis 
(Manzo & Banfi, 2013).  
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Moreover, the sector’s performance relates to the Construction industry, which due to its 
cyclical nature wasn’t faring well during the negative economic conjuncture that Italy has 
witnessed since 2009. 
Revenues have begun picking up pace in 2016, due to the improvement in the available 
income for Italian families and a small betterment in performance for the Construction 
industry, and even though competition from lower-wage countries is still a threat for 
Italian furniture manufacturers (Repubblica, 2017), innovation and a stronger presence in 
foreign markets have been leading the recovery in 2017 (Dell’Olio, 2018). The sector 
managed to recover to pre-crisis export and revenue levels, showing promising signals 
for the coming years (Confartigianato, 2018).  
Thus, this Italian industry is a perfect example of a similar risk applied to all its members: 
the pressures from a shrinking home market and the need to maintain both high innovation 
standards and manufacturing quality to counter the rise of new low-cost competitors in 
other countries activated new risks for the involved firms, setting up an excellent 
environment for case studies in the resilience field. Moreover, the recovery of the whole 
industry in the last two years allows to study with higher precision which companies 
followed the economic cycle, which ones managed to recover earlier, and which are still 
bearing the negative effects of these additional risks. 
3.3.2 The Construction Sector 
If the Italian furniture sector has suffered from the economic crisis that has influenced the 
country from 2009 to 2016, the construction sector, due to its deeper connection with the 
gross domestic product (GDP) performance, has fared even worse (Freddi, 2018).  
The data showing the volume index of production in the Italian construction sector shows 
the dramatic effect the crisis had on the considered companies’ revenues. 
Figure 3.1 2010-2016 Volume of Production Index in the Italian Construction Sector 
 
Source: European Commission (2018) 
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A 30 % decrease over five years in a sector that literally lays the foundations for GDP 
growth in a country is a clear signal of a crisis per se, but the reasons behind this sharp 
decrease require a quick overview: 
 The crisis, which led to lower average wages and a severe credit crunch both in 
the residential and non-residential sub-sectors, greatly slowed down demand up 
until 2015 (Freddi, 2018); 
 The sector has suffered from a lack of productivity improvements for over two 
decades, as shown in figure 3.2. This effect is not restricted to the Eurozone, it has 
in fact been verified across the globe, with the manufacturing sector achieving 1.7 
times higher productivity compared to the construction one in 2010 (Changali et 
al., 2015). This constitutes a vulnerability for the industry, as operating margins 
are slim and much inferior if compared to other service firms (Blanco et al., 2016); 
Figure 3.2 Productivity Index Comparison between Construction and Other Industries 
 
Source: Blanco et al. (2016) 
 The sector is suffering from a skill shortage that partially explains the low 
productivity (European Commission, 2018); 
 Globally, very few firms adopted innovative ways to deliver their projects or to 
employ cutting-edge technology, which would not only improve productivity but 
provide the opportunity for a real technological disruption which may greatly 
improve industry margins (Armstrong & Cilge, 2016); 
 Green construction is becoming the main demand trend in the sector, though not 
all the firms are ready to tackle this challenge (Mandyck & Jones, 2016). This 
requires investments in R&D; however, in Italy, between 2012 and 2014, only 
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30.5% of the construction companies with more than ten employees engaged in 
innovation activities (European Commission, 2018), showing yet again a 
vulnerability that afflicts the industry. 
These are just some examples of the current, dire situation the Construction sector is 
facing worldwide, but they help in providing an overall picture that confirms the presence 
of risks and vulnerabilities, both old and new, that apply sector-wide in Italy. Moreover, 
the connection with the Furniture sector and the fact that both have suffered from the 
recent economic crisis the country had to face provide an excellent field where to look 
for resilient companies, which despite these challenges might have been able to achieve 
above-average performance or to recover from crises.  
Additional details on the risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the active trends in the 
sectors, will be detailed during the case studies reports where necessary. 
3.4 The Selected Firms  
After having identified two sectors that experienced a similar untoward event, though 
their risk factors differ, the desired firm profiles are described, showing the process that 
narrowed the choice. 
First, a medium sized firm definition was adopted as a research parameter: the European 
Commission (2009) notation was deemed the most suitable, establishing three 
requirements. The chosen organizations had to feature a staff headcount between 50 and 
250 units, a turnover between 10 and 50 million euros and a balance sheet ceiling of 43 
million euros (in assets).  
To obtain a list of the companies that met these requirements, while being part of the 
sectors mentioned above, the AIDA database (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende 
Italiane) was employed. The search was issued using the following NACE Rev. 2 
(economic activity identifier) codes, C31 (Manufacturing Activities – Manufacture of 
Furniture) and F41-F42-F43 (Construction Activities – Construction of buildings, Civil 
engineering, Specialized construction activities) and the medium-sized firm constraints 
described above. Moreover, to facilitate the collection of data and the field research, the 
limited area of the Veneto region was adopted as a constraint. This geographical 
limitation doesn’t hinder the validity of the study as it’s both a part of Italy bustling with 
economic activities pertaining to both sectors and it has suffered the untoward events and 
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witnessed the sector dynamics highlighted above just like many other regions both in Italy 
and Western Europe.  
The two lists comprised 144 organizations for the Construction sector and 105 for the 
Furniture one. Data on the total assets, Return on Equity and net profits or losses over a 
10-year period (2008-2017) were also collected for the sampled organizations to evaluate 
their performance during the crises. For the purpose of this dissertation, within the 
sample, only firms with complete data entries on these three dimensions were considered 
in order to avoid picking firms that might have defaulted in the period, as the objective is 
to capture two resilient firms per sectors which managed to maintain function 
notwithstanding the untoward situation. 
3.5 Detailed Expected Cases 
Yin (2009) suggested a method to aid the analysis of case studies’ propositions and to 
help validating them: the researcher should identify which are the likely patterns that 
would appear across the cases beforehand, both while envisioning the hypotheses and 
their rival explanations. If these prefigured patterns are confirmed during the data 
collection phase, they constitute further evidence for the analytic confirmation of the 
proposed theses, as pattern matching is a solid technique to verify compelling theories, 
but other methods will also be employed to ensure the validity of the findings.  
Consequently, the following expected case results are discussed. Starting from the RoE 
and net profits performance for each analyzed organization, two types of cases may 
emerge: firms that have continued growing and obtaining good results despite the 
negative conjuncture of their sectors, with stable RoE and net profits paths, and 
companies that suffered the hit but managed to recover earlier compared to the sector.  
In the first case, theory leads to think that, just like for General Hospital in Meyer (1982), 
the organization would have maintained a business-as-usual behavior, addressing the 
crisis without measures that felt extraordinary to the staff. This would hint to the presence 
of a higher inherent resilience compared to other cases: the interview questions should, 
thus, focus on this aspect, highlighting whether generic factors were also employed to 
face the predicament or not and whether the context-specific factors are described by 
interviewees as mere declinations of the generic ones. 
Moreover, the risk factors that may have emerged during the industry downturn, such as 
increased pressure from competition or a reduction in sales, would be clearly matched by 
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this kind of “unflinching” firm. Even though they manifested, the existing, ordinary 
protective factors would be described by the interviewees as the means through which the 
risks were mitigated and coped with.  
To verify Q3, in this situation, the case would expectedly verify that some already built 
factors were the key through which the organization managed to perform well under 
duress, yet if R3 was a better explanation of reality, any other protective factor could’ve 
been used to protect the organization’s performance. Lastly, the case should confirm that 
given such a resilient response, more protective factors wouldn’t have led to an increase 
in performance during the economic downturn for the industry, providing the company 
with the ability to perform well, but not any better compared to what it was able to do in 
the business-as-usual period. To confirm whether all the protective factors were “active”, 
the interviewees should confirm that any reduction in a protective factor (f.e. less readily 
available cash, less loyal customers etc.) would’ve led to a direct reduction in either the 
firm’s performance or its ability to answer this well to the untoward event. 
In the latter case, where the firm undergoes a decline and a recovery phase, the following 
elements are expected. The recovery would be quicker than the trend in the industry only 
if some generic protective factors helped in speeding up the process. Extraordinary 
measures should appear in these cases, but they would be enough to enable a static and 
resilient answer from the examined firm. If, however, context specific factors played a 
role in recovering from the crisis, Q1 should be disconfirmed in favor of R1.1. 
Another expected behavior would be seeing risk factors overcoming the typical response 
mechanisms the firm had in place, with managers commenting on how, for example, they 
were surprised by the situation or couldn’t foresee such a strong effect. The organization 
though still featured resilience through recovery, thus, to confirm Q2, the interviewees 
should shed light on how more protective factors were developed or deployed during the 
crisis to restore the normal functioning of the firm. On the other hand, R2 would be 
confirmed if the company was thoroughly prepared but still suffered from the economic 
downturn.  
If resilience factors do have a different importance in the recovery case, some of them 
would result as being vital for the restoration of the firm performance. The interviewees 
could provide a negative answer to this question by stating that any other factor could’ve 
been developed to overcome the situation. Finally, to verify the presence of an efficient 
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point for resilience factors, comments on how performance during the crisis would have 
decreased if any protective factor (f.e. business continuity plans) was less effective would 
be expected. To check whether the protective factors “activated” during the predicament, 
the questions should prove how some protective factors turned out to be insufficient or 
ill-suited for the situation, a fact that would explain how the crisis ensued.  
These are some patterns that are expected to appear across the cases to address the 
questions or confirm their rival explanations, but some other structures of the events are 
foreseeable when taking in consideration cross-case comparisons, which are employed 
primarily to test how the hypotheses (Q1a, Q3a) can extend beyond a single firm or sector.  
If the differences between context-specific and generic protective factors exist, then only 
the latter would be replicable across industries (and perhaps across firms). Consequently, 
the cases would be similar only when comparing their generic protective factors. Their 
importance could also be akin for different firms; thus, the interviews need to confirm 
that some factors are perceived as being vital in all four cases to verify that these 
resemblances apply notwithstanding the organization’s situation or context. 
3.6 Adopted Field Procedures 
After identifying which are the most interesting cases for the analysis and the expected 
outcomes, the method through which the data will be collected are to be explained. 
Following the advice from Yin (2009) and Lee et al. (2013), senior management and 
owners, in the case they are involved in the day-by-day business of the firm, will be 
contacted for the selected organization. This is primarily done because key people are 
more knowledgeable about the events that are going to be examined: possibly, the owners 
of the decision-making processes that were activated during the economic downturn in 
the sector will be the ones to whom the questions will be addressed. Their access to 
resources, documentation and the events that occurred during this period will provide 
evidence on what happened across the organizations. 
After their availability is confirmed, a survey, retrievable in appendix 6.1, will be issued. 
The goal is to build a resilience profile for the analyzed firm, using questions with 
statistically relevant loading factors found in Lee et al. (2013) and in the Resilience 
Benchmarking Tool from “Resilient Organisations” (2014), used in the research from 
Vargo, Seville, McManus and Stephenson. Some more inquiries will be included in the 
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survey to provide a starting point for further discussion with the key people that will fill 
in the survey. 
Afterwards, once the resilience score has been evaluated and the situation of the firm 
assessed externally through publicly available information, interviews with the 
responders will take place to directly test the propositions devised throughout this chapter. 
Where possible, such inquiries will be made directly at the firm’s premises, in order to 
allow direct observation from the researcher which could provide additional clues to 
verify the hypotheses.  
The interviews will follow a semi-structured path, with the backbone retrievable in 
appendix 6.3. The results of the survey will be discussed immediately to verify that it was 
thoroughly understood, and that the responder confirms the situation photographed by the 
benchmarking questions.  
Afterwards, the concepts of protective and risk factors, vulnerabilities and coping range 
will be introduced to the interviewee, in order to maintain technical language throughout 
the data collection process. Due to how multifaceted protective factors are, they have been 
bundled according to the most relevant and recurring themes in the literature: the first 
step involved using the factors proposed in the Organizations Resilience Index from BSI 
(2017) and checking the similarities with other elements discussed in chapter 2 (from 
McManus, 2008; Stephenson, 2010; Lee et al., 2013; Somers, 2009; Battisti & Deakins, 
2017; Patriarca et al., 2017). Then, the similarities with adaptive systems found in Masten 
(2014) and the other elements of resilience reviewed in chapter 1 were analyzed to create 
the following aggregating labels, which will facilitate the interpretation of the empirical 
data and the discussion with interviewees. The questions used in the survey have been 
matched to these labels, showing the relationship between these categories and the 
resilience factors (Adaptive Capacity, Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities, 
Situation Awareness) developed by the “Resilient Organisations” stream of research, 
which also helped in identifying which of these categories were the most useful in 
developing each factor. 
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Table 3.2 Recurring Resilience Themes and Underlying Constructs 
Recurring Themes Labels Underlying Theoretic Elements and Constructs Associated Resilience Factors 
Innovation Oriented Leadership Leadership, Innovation and Creativity Adaptive Capacity, these elements all favor adaptation to new situations 
External Stakeholders Supply Chain management, Network elements, Reputation management 
Primarily Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities, fitting the concept that a 
medium-sized firm has a limited impact 
on its economic environment and can’t 
easily shape it to achieve adaptation 
HR Protective Factors 
Staff Engagement, Alignment, Unity of 
Purpose, Culture and other soft internal 
resources 
Adaptive Capacity and Management of 
Keystone Vulnerabilities: these 
elements enable adaptation and allow 
staff members to actively keep risks in 
check 
Business Continuity  
Business continuity Planning, Recovery 
Priorities, Participation in Exercises, 
Training and Plan Stress Testing 
Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities, as business continuity 
plans primarily attempt to allow the 
firm to maintain function in spite of 
foreseeable risks and vulnerabilities 
Hard Internal Resources 
Financial Aspects, Premises and Backup 
Systems, Resource Management and 
processes that accumulate them 
Management of Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Mindfulness 
Virtual Role System, Devolved and 
Responsive decision-making, Goal 
Directed Solution Seeking 
A mix of Adaptive Capacity and 
Situation Awareness which enables the 
former 
Situation Awareness Horizon Scanning and Situation Understanding Situation Awareness measure 
 
This division allows to better frame the discussion with the interviewee, and is meant 
primarily to facilitate communication, with no pretension of creating new, valid construct 
or factors, although their theoretic backing is solid and could provide the ground for 
further investigation. Table 3.2 will be shown during the interview. 
The next step will involve asking the responder an account of the crisis in the sector, how 
it affected the firm and what allowed the organization to thrive despite the difficulties or 
to recover successfully. This will allow to identify through the narration which protective 
and risk factors involved the organization, and to compare the previous situation with the 
current resilience score of the firm.  
Afterwards, the questions will begin directly addressing the propositions of this thesis: 
the first concern relates to the difference between contextual and generic protective 
factors. The interviewee will be asked his or her perspective on how the untoward 
situation was perceived by the organization: was it considered as business-as-usual or as 
something out of the ordinary? In the first case, were the resources and capabilities that 
are usually deployed in a day-by-day situation sufficient to address the problem? Or was 
something different required to solve the predicament? Then, focusing on the specific risk 
and protective factors identified in the previous step, the researcher will inquiry whether 
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the resilience elements were specifically built to address extraordinary situations or not, 
and whether factors that are closer to the generic definition, thus being less firm or process 
specific, were what helped in sheltering from the impact.  
The main concern is studying whether there is a difference between factors that cope with 
typical variability (and the firm will provide a definition of what they believe is normal) 
and other factors that are atypical, meant to be used for the static response. The 
interviewee will be asked to agree or disagree with this statement and with another 
question regarding whether factors that appear to be more firm-specific are just 
declinations of their generic version.  
Then the second proposition must be tested. The key question is: did the present risks 
overcome the typical response mechanisms? Did the firm have the perception that they 
would’ve failed if their generic protective factors weren’t available or in place? Or even 
though they were thoroughly prepared, nothing they could do could possibly forestall the 
untoward event?  
The third question is less tricky to formalize, as the interviewee will be asked to identify 
the most important protective factors that helped the organization during the period and 
whether there could’ve been any substitutes to them. Table 3.2 and a review of the 
resilience score will be used to facilitate the process, and the researcher will ask to rank 
three of these elements and to verify why some were perceived as being more important 
and why one would be more important than another. Finally, the researcher will propose 
some different protective factors and ask whether they would’ve been as useful as the 
ones listed by the responder, given the situation, as another attempt to check the 
substitutability of protective factors, particularly generic ones. 
The discussion will continue on the three factors identified by the interviewee, focusing 
on whether the improvement of each of them would have resulted in better outcomes 
during the economic downturn period or not in his opinion. Moreover, the researcher will 
ask whether all protective factors were useful and activated during that period or whether 
some felt unnecessary, and whether they actively matched risks that emerged during this 
phase. Lastly, a question will check whether the protective factors were or not designed 
to cover some specific risks.  
Other questions posed during the interview will be accounted for in the case study reports, 
as they will primarily derive from the flow of the conversation and cannot be foreseen. 

 4. CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 reaches the core of the dissertation, focusing on studying four cases of medium-
sized Italian firms from suffering sectors that likely displayed resilient behaviours, in an 
attempt to address the theoretical questions proposed in Chapter 3.  
The first part of the chapter will feature the reports of the four cases, discussing their 
behaviour during the period in which their industry witnessed a crisis and how the firms 
are currently dealing with variability. Afterwards, the limitations of the studies and the 
overall conclusions will be explained. Due to the delicate subjects the researcher touched 
through the resilience benchmark survey and the interview with key people in the 
companies, the names of the firms will be substituted by placeholders that mirror the 
underlying expected structure of the case, as described in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Placeholder Names adopted for the Case Study Reports 
Expected Case Structure Furniture Sector Construction Sector 
Economic variables suggested there 
was no crisis High-Res Fixtures High-Res Structures 
Economic variables suggested the 
presence of a crisis and a recovery 
phase 
Cri-Rec Fixtures Cri-Rec Structures 
This measure is adopted to comply with the privacy agreement under which the 
information pertaining to each firm was disclosed. 
4.1.1 Data Collection 
Although the research setting and the adopted methods were discussed in Chapter 3, the 
thesis should report which data was effectively collected, and how it was analysed, hence 
the two following paragraphs. 
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The field work was performed between September and October 2018. The firms that 
showed financial performances that were close to the desired ones were contacted through 
e-mails, phone calls or social network interactions with key people within the 
organizations. As the goal of this approach was to foresee the presence or absence of 
crises starting from the hypotheses from Markman & Venzin (2014), newspapers weren’t 
checked immediately for information on crises for these companies, though other publicly 
available information on their website was carefully reviewed. After the organizations 
showed their interest and availability to participate in the project, limited to one firm per 
type of case study as reported in table 4.1, the survey (retrievable in the attachments, 7.1) 
was sent to an available key person in the organization in order to get a first grasp of the 
resilience profile of his or her firm. After the reports (retrievable in the attachments, 7.2) 
were issued as a preliminary description of the capability in the organization, each 
responder was approached for a follow-up in-depth interview, which backbone can be 
found in attachment 7.3.  
The interviews usually lasted for 1 hour and 10 minutes, albeit the conversation continued 
for up to 2 hours and a half with Cri-Rec Fixtures’ interviewee. Although these interviews 
weren’t digitally recorded nor transcribed, the researcher was allowed to take extensive 
notes and to ask confirmation and advice on both his perspective and the interpretation of 
the case study that he was proposing. The interviews also allowed to verify the reliability 
of the survey. 
Finally, after examining the case studies, news articles were sought to confirm the 
information reported during the interviews, to further solidify the findings.  
Table 4.2 summarizes the data that was collected and used in the analysis. 
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Table 4.2 Collected Data and Use in the Analysis 
Data Type Amount and sources Use in the analysis List of the interviewees 
RoE, Net Profits and Assets 
of the firms (2008-2017) 
AIDA database (consulted on 
September 2018).  
144 entries for the 
Construction Sector 
105 entries for the Furniture 
Sector 
Understanding pre-
emptively which firms 
witnessed crises during the 
sectorial downturn and 
recovered before their own 
industry, and which firms did 
not face performance drops 
during the untoward event 
Cri-Rec Fixtures 
(*) Managing Director and 
Entrepreneur, one of the 
three siblings currently 
owning the company (2h and 
a half interview) 
 
High-Res Structures 
(*) Managing Director, son of 
the founder 
Founder and current owner 
of the company (1h and 10 
minutes interview) 
 
High-Res Fixtures 
(*) HR Manager, works for 
the company since 2002 
HR Specialist, works for the 
company since 2015 (1h and 
10 minutes interview) 
 
Cri-Rec Structures 
(*) Managing Director, son of 
the founder (1h and 10 
minutes interview) 
Survey (Attachment 7.1) 
4 – One per case (submitted 
to the interviewees with a * 
before their role) 
Creating the resilience 
profile of the organization, 
accruing information to 
understand what enabled 
the response to the sectorial 
crisis 
In-Depth Semi-Structured 
Interviews (Attachment 7.3) 
4 – One per case 
Total duration: 6 hours.  
Testing the proposed 
constructs, understanding 
the reliability of the 
collected data, comparing 
the interpretation of the 
researcher and the inputs 
from the theory with the 
empirical case 
Direct Observations 
Each interview was 
performed at the firm’s 
premises  
The goal was to see and feel 
if the described current 
situation matched the 
interviewees’ account on the 
facts and to identify possible 
artifacts (such as formalized 
culture manifests) that 
explained high values in the 
resilience profile 
Local and Online Newspaper 
Articles 
5 Total 
2 confirming the 2008 crisis 
for Cri-Rec Fixtures and its 
recovery (VicenzaPiù, 2015; 
Zibaldone Economico, 2017) 
2 confirming the changes in 
Cri-Rec Structures (Mattino 
di Padova, 2012; 2013) 
1 confirming the innovative 
approach from High-Res 
Fixtures (ThisMarketersLife, 
2015) 
Confirmation from external 
sources of the findings 
occurred during the case 
studies, where possible 
4.1.2 Data Analysis 
The analysis of the data followed a three-step procedure for each case. At first, the 
financial information collected through the AIDA database was skimmed to check for the 
most suitable cases in the sample, as using the VOLARE methodology to create a 
benchmark proved difficult given the excessive volatility of RoE in the selected firms 
(deriving mostly from the fact that equity values differ greatly from firm to firm, 
compared to the banks studied in Markman & Venzin (2014)). 
After the firms were manually selected due to their performance between 2008 and 2017, 
their results were compared with the sample’s average, with High-Res cases being 
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selected if their yearly RoE and net profits were always above the sector’s average and 
Cri-Rec cases being selected if the RoE and net profits had a dip way below the average 
and a quick recovery afterwards. The dynamics of the owned assets were also checked to 
see if the sectorial downturn and the profits decrease damaged (or didn’t damage, in High-
Res cases) this dimension.  
As suggested by Yin (2009), the information was recorded in a database after the firms 
answered to the questionnaire, which results were elaborated according to the evaluation 
in the Resilient Organisations Benchmarking Tool (2014) with only slight modifications. 
To provide a score following the themes from table 3.2, the same methodology was 
applied, though the questions were grouped differently according to how fitting they were 
with the according theme.  
The information was then collected in a report that included a brief preliminary analysis 
(attachment 7.2), starting from the data that was retrieved before the interviews (survey, 
websites, AIDA financial information) which attempted to provide an evaluation on the 
resilience profile of the firm according to the theory reviewed in Chapter 1 and 2.  
This information and the report were later checked with the interviewees during the 
conversations, before the research questions were tested: the purpose was twofold. First, 
this allowed to check that the researcher had a proper idea of the firm’s resilience and that 
the employed tools and analysis were fitting with the real state of things, which allowed 
to use this information in the case study analysis, and second it posed the basis for the 
discussion with the interviewees, meanwhile helping the maintenance of the chain of 
evidence through the use of technical language and definitions that were included in tables 
3.1 and 3.2, and in the attachment 7.2.1.  
This approach ensured that the constructs that were being discussed were understood by 
the responders, avoiding misinterpretations and biases which would have compromised 
the evidence from the cases. In all 4 interviews, the inquired personnel thoroughly 
understood the theme, agreed with the definitions and confirmed the validity of the survey 
and the preliminary report analysis, which suggested there was no need to modify the 
questionnaire or the overall approach.  
The notes taken during the interview were immediately added to the case study database 
after each discussion: each contribution was matched with the proposition it was 
providing clues about (from paragraph 3.2), with the researcher always relying on the 
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reviewed literature to ensure that this framing was correct. Furthermore, the stories 
narrated by the interviewees were compared to the expected case studies from paragraph 
3.5, and again the findings were recorded in the database for an effective comparison. 
The closeness to the foreseen cases was often astonishing: the following paragraphs will 
report how what was expected often predicted the real outcome for the firm, providing 
even more evidence of a proper theoretical interpretation. 
Lastly, once the case database was complete, the cases were compared and cross-checked 
according to Yin’s (2009) suggestions, in particular to verify findings that were common 
through multiple organizations and industries. Furthermore, the researcher looked for 
more confirmatory evidence through newspaper articles reporting additional information 
on the studied companies and the crises that invested them, when they were retrievable. 
The constant reference to the reviewed literature, the multiple research instruments 
(surveys, interviews and review of the interpretation from the interviewees), the careful 
maintenance of the case of evidence and the pattern matching technique were deemed 
suitable to provide a proper triangulation of the data and the evidence, as suggested by 
Yin (2009). 
4.2 Case 1 – Cri-Rec Fixtures 
Cri-Rec Fixtures was selected as a suitable case study after an analysis of its performance 
during the years 2009-2014, during which the identified sample in the Furniture Sector 
witnessed the most intense dip in performance. The firm displayed a strong reduction in 
its assets between 2008 and 2011, as well as low or negative net profit values up to 2012. 
Afterwards, the results showed a sharp improvement both on the net profits and assets 
dimensions; this suggests both a crisis and a recovery phase which wasn’t dictated by 
sectorial trends.  
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Figure 4.1 Cri-Rec Fixtures Net Profits and Assets (2008-2017) 
 
 
Source: adapted from AIDA database, data retrieved on September 2018 
The entrepreneur of the company was immediately available to participate in the research 
project. Consequently, the survey was issued directly to him, providing insightful answers 
that highlighted some characteristics of the current resilience profile of the firm even 
before the interview. 
The results of the questionnaire implied that the organization relied primarily on its 
adaptive capacity to address variability and overcome threats to its functioning, with 
lower scores in pre-emptive and formal planning and in the management of keystone 
vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the overall evaluation was positive.  
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The interview began with the verification of the information retrieved through the survey 
and the AIDA database; the entrepreneur confirmed that the results were reflecting 
correctly the current situation of the firm, a fact that facilitated comparisons between the 
elements of resilience through the remainder of the conversation.  
Due to how the questionnaire was discussed, the first research inquiry that was addressed 
was Q3, concerning the importance of some elements to build resilience over others. 
Without any doubt, the interviewee replied that financial safety and stability, captured 
through the management of internal resources dimension, was the foremost enabling 
factor for resilience in his opinion. He mentioned how for medium-sized firms based in 
the North East of Italy, which are primarily entrepreneur driven, financial uncertainty 
leads to a strong psychological stress which severely hinders decision-making processes, 
just like a diver whose oxygen tanks are about to run out.  
All the other categories identified by the survey were deemed useful to build resilience, 
with an emphasis on leadership and internal stakeholders. The entrepreneur also 
underlined how the firm was trying not to undertake excessive risks, favouring a steadier 
but more sustainable growth.  
Before moving on the topic of the 2008 crisis which was witnessed by the company, the 
interviewee mentioned an untoward event the firm had to face during the current fiscal 
year: the owners of the organization feel that their reputation toward costumers can be 
maintained by showing them a positive firm performance, but due to unforeseeable order 
cuts from some clients their EBITDA goals were at risk.  
This required some non-ordinary actions to obtain the desired outcome, a clear signal of 
the enterprise’s adaptive capacity: the entrepreneurs and the managers decided to 
willingly cut their wages, some suppliers were asked whether they could provide 
additional discounts (not through hard bargains, but rather through a comfortable 
agreement due to the volume of business Cri-Rec Fixtures brought to them), the 
production department underwent some additional stress due to the need to achieve excess 
production in a limited time frame and some costs which the firm sustained for an owned 
subsidiary were transferred to the controlled organization.  
This event allowed to frame the response as an example of static resilience, and the 
entrepreneur agreed with the researcher on the matter. Furthermore, the story stressed 
how different aspects are necessary to properly build resilience: the commitment of the 
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owners wouldn’t have been enough to address this unforeseen event. The engagement of 
other stakeholders, internal and external, was crucial to resolve the predicament, and all 
these factors contributed to a flexible and adaptive response.  
The researcher noted how, even though the EBITDA goals were deemed fundamental by 
the firm, there was no formal plan to confront such a situation nor the sudden reduction 
in orders from the most prominent customers, confirming the lower scores in the planning 
capacity of the firm. Additionally, the interviewee said that the firm didn’t have formal 
plans to address issues with suppliers, which sometimes led to untoward variability on 
commissions, yet it wasn’t considered as an important factor for resilience. The same 
applied to credit insurances, as given the niche in which the firm operates, dealing 
primarily with larger customers pertaining to the luxury industry, the probability of credit 
default is almost non-existent. 
4.2.1 Cri-Rec Fixtures Crisis 
The thread of the discussion then moved on to the real crisis period the firm withstood: 
the years 2008 and 2009. The financial data pointed in the right direction, as the enterprise 
was already suffering before the economic downturn which affected the sector due to a 
fragmented leadership that didn’t have a clear unity of purpose and an unambiguous 
strategic goal. The fact that the net worth of the owning families was intertwined with the 
firm’s assets also complicated matters, constituting another vulnerability. As the financial 
crisis and the sectorial downturn began to expand, the risk factors for the firm became 
unbearable and it became evident that a change was necessary.  
Resources which were beyond the perimeter of the firm were employed to solve the 
situation: a portion of the family decided to perform a sort of “hostile takeover” of the 
firm, offering to devaluate the assets of the organization and purchase everything but the 
premises. These became property of the remainder of the family and were rented to the 
organization.  
Even though the company was still suffering, the governance and leadership issues were 
dealt with, strengthening the resilience profile of Cri-Rec Fixtures. The entrepreneur and 
now main owner of the organization also recognized the need for improved managerial 
skills within the firm, and in 2011 he completed an MBA to learn new competences and 
to guide the firm with more heed. This investment paid dividends, as the firm started 
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obtaining better results in 2012 and continued to do so during the next years, while 
contemporarily accruing more assets and developing a more refined vision and identity.  
This close call compelled the new ownership to formalize a clear succession plan and a 
division between the family and firm assets, improving the coping range of the 
organization on this subject through a written and binding agreement, identifiable as a 
pre-emptive plan. Furthermore, it heightened the awareness of the entrepreneur on the 
need to allow the firm not to rely on few key people: this will be the next objective for 
the organization which will study new organizational models to cope with the issue.  
The conversation ended with a discussion on the resilience project, with the interviewee 
underlining how excessive formalization could hinder the qualitative insight provided by 
the research. Furthermore, he mentioned how the environment of North East Italy implies 
some specific contextual characteristics which aren’t properly captured by the survey and 
that the research tools could be improved through instruments that are more suited to 
include information on the economic background.  
4.2.2 Analysis of Case 1 
This case study was rich with information that can answer to the inquiries posed in 
Chapter 3.  
Proceeding in order, Q1 was concerned with exploring whether protective factors can be 
divided between generic and context-specific. The case doesn’t suggest a clear-cut 
distinction, yet formal plans and more standardized response methods, such as the 
production load planning the company put in place to balance and manage order 
fulfilments or the rules that separate the assets of the ownership from the organization’s 
properties, appear to be close to the definition of contextual protective factors. 
The survey identified a lack of these elements in the firm, particularly through the analysis 
based on Stephenson’s two factor model: the questions addressed to the interviewee 
seemed to confirm that planning capacity captures more contextual protective factors in 
this case study and that these contribute to the coping range, as more situations are treated 
in a business-as-usual fashion rather than as unforeseen and untoward events. On the other 
hand, adaptive capacity, which captured more generic factors through its measure, 
allowed the firm to address unexpected variability in creative ways, just like through the 
methods that were employed to improve the EBITDA performance. The entrepreneur 
confirmed that this reaction matched with the definition of static resilience: even though 
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the situation wasn’t a crisis, it surely wasn’t a desired event for the organization, and a 
more standardized response would have allowed to treat it with less pressure. 
The interview also leads to agreeing with the concept that some specific plans like the 
ones formalized by the organization aren’t replicable or useful outside of their context, 
whereas more generic factors (such as leadership, employee engagement, availability of 
internal resources) are enablers of resilience which can be developed similarly in other 
companies.  
Moreover, contextual protective factors do not appear as mere operative declinations of 
generic factors: they are fixed plans and protocols with completely different underlying 
assumptions, and they can be developed without the need of an associated generic factor, 
according to this case. 
Regarding Q2, which implies that risk factors which overwhelm the coping range require 
static resilience to enable responses and that only when even this is insufficient real crises 
ensue, the interview provided some stark examples of how this hypothesis can be 
explanatory: the EBITDA downturn hasn’t been perceived as a crisis, whereas the various 
risks witnessed in 2008-2009, coupled with the lower resilience elements of the firm, felt 
like they were beyond the resilience threshold, as extra resources were needed to ensure 
a positive outcome from the predicament. Furthermore, there was no evidence in the case 
pointing toward R2 being a more fitting perspective. 
The degree to which different protective factors contribute to resilience was also 
confirmed, addressing Q3. Financial aspects were deemed crucial, just like in the BSI 
Group (2017) analysis. However, all generic protective factors played important roles 
according to the entrepreneur and a need for a balanced resilience structure was 
confirmed, as relying only on a few elements might constitute a risk. Contextual factors 
on the other hand could be irrelevant for the firm, as the credit insurance example verified. 
Thus, the case (and the discussion with the interviewee) point toward context-specific 
differences in how elements of resilience can contribute to the overall resilience capability 
of the firm. Quantifying these differences though could be counter-productive, given how 
tied to the context these values would be. Consequently, assigning relative measures 
rather than strict weights appears to be a better solution in ranking protective factors 
according to Cri-Rec Fixtures’ case study. 
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Finally, considering the perspective raised through Q4, there appears to be an efficient 
point in the contextual protective factors. Credit insurance, for example, would be 
excessive given the very low risk the firm faces on this field; furthermore, the methods 
described by the entrepreneur to evaluate suppliers, based on a rough due diligence that 
considered the ownership structure and the overall performance of the business partner, 
didn’t feel like they would have provided more value if they were more refined. 
On the other hand, improving generic factors was described as a sure way to enhance 
resilience, given their underlying elements: the company would actively invest to improve 
these protective factors. The questions weren’t factoring costs in, thus a balance point 
between the expenses and the benefits of investing in these factors wasn’t identified. 
Nevertheless, given the more dynamic nature of generic protective factors and seeing how 
all of them played significant roles in addressing untoward events for the firm, the 
contribution of these factors appears to have less diminishing returns compared to 
contextual protective factors, according to this case study. 
Lastly, taking into account the pattern matching methodology proposed by Yin (2006), 
this case closely follows the structure that was postulated in Chapter 3 for a firm that 
witnessed a crisis but managed to recover. This recovery was quickened through the 
improvement of protective factors after 2009: the development of more ownership 
competences and the clear separation of family and firms assets, as well as a better 
governance structure, were important tools to enable organizational resilience after the 
event. The case also highlighted how multiple risk factors weren’t properly managed in 
2008-2009, leading to the bypassing of the resilience threshold. Also, to prevent the crisis, 
the two protective factors mentioned above would have been crucial. Overall, the 
proposed pattern matched closely the real situation, providing additional confirmatory 
information for the hypotheses. 
4.3 Case 2 – High-Res Structures 
The case study involving High-Res Structures allowed to investigate a small, yet 
remarkably resilient organization. Despite the ongoing sectorial crisis, which began in 
2009, this firm managed to achieve positive results throughout the last ten years. The net 
profit has improved gradually and steadily, and so did the owned assets, whereas similar 
firms went bankrupt or decided to leave the market.  
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Figure 4.2 High-Res Structures Net Profits and Assets (2008-2017) 
 
 
Source: adapted from AIDA database, data retrieved on September 2018 
After being directly contacted by the researcher, the managing director of High-Res 
Structures, son of the founder of the company, agreed to answer to the survey and to be 
available for the interview. During the latter, his father was also involved to provide a 
better account on the history of the organization and due to the decisional role he still has 
in the organization. 
The resilience benchmarking survey displayed a very solid resilience profile, with high 
scores in almost all the studied categories. Slightly inferior values were assigned to the 
management of external stakeholders and the contribution of innovation and creativity to 
the protective factors, although this didn’t strongly affect the overall evaluation.  
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The interview had to verify if the analysis provided by the survey was biased or accurately 
reflected the state of things. Consequently, the first step before moving on gathering 
information about the research questions required the checking of each recurring theme 
from table 3.2.  
4.3.1 Organizational Resilience in High-Res Structures 
The firm is led by family members who actively manage different aspect of the 
organization, and throughout its history there was a constant unity of purpose and 
devotion toward the success of High-Res Structures from all the involved relatives. 
Nevertheless, as a mean to improve inherent resilience, a pact between the owners 
regulates the passing of quotas and mandates that they cannot be assigned to non-family 
members. 
Even though strategic decisions are only set by the owners, internal stakeholders are 
included in the decision processes where their know-how is essential to make an informed 
choice. Moreover, experienced workers who show their involvement in the firm and their 
capabilities are often rewarded with key positions, which grants them decision-making 
power in fields such as production and sales. These factors improve both internal 
resources and the organization’s mindfulness. 
The personnel are actively trained not only to renew competences and capabilities, but 
also to be able to interact professionally with clients, especially larger companies, and to 
achieve the necessary certifications to operate in certain contexts. The interviewees 
agreed on saying that their workers are the primary resource of the firm and their 
management and loyalty are thus vital, even to enable resilient answers. If, for example, 
there were issues with the workforce, the firm wouldn’t be able to perform according to 
the agreements with its customers, therefore incurring in hefty contractual penalties. 
The attention to the economic environment is also extremely relevant in this firm: even 
though it is a follower and not a technological leader, mostly due to its size, the owners 
showed a keen attention to weak signals and the rising of new trends, allowing the 
organization to capitalize from any opportunity it was presented during the recent years 
(such as the photovoltaic plant incentives), as long as the operational risk was deemed 
low and the required know-how adequate for the situation. 
The financial aspects of the firm were described as another dimension which was 
managed carefully: the interviewees mentioned how without a solid financial position, or 
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with the presence of debt, resilient answers wouldn’t be possible. They considered this to 
be the primary enabler of resilience, as it allowed them to heedfully choose clients instead 
of taking on projects just to meet cash requirements, to save slack resources for times of 
need and to be able to invest when necessary to capture burgeoning market opportunities.  
Considering more internal resources such as premises and insurances, the company 
features both a flexible structure, which allows it to relocate relatively quickly and 
inexpensively in case of disruption, and enough insurances to cover part of the expenses 
in case of disasters and address business-as-usual variability such as issues with 
customers, credits, incidents and more. This allows to improve horizon scanning as well 
given that the organization is notified whenever the credit risk of a customer increases, 
allowing to avoid continuing business with unreliable partners.  
Lastly, to maintain operations continuity, clear plans were put in place to address peak 
loads of production, and employees aren’t required to work overtime too often as the firm 
always relies on external suppliers in these periods and, where needed, on temporary 
employment. Long-term recruitment is carefully evaluated as, in order not to break the 
trust between the firm and its employees, the owners accurately avoid any layoff; the 
strategy is to avoid projects the organization cannot address with the owned resources 
rather than risking on the long run.  
The owners were also able to explain why the score on the management of external 
stakeholders’ theme was lower: High-Res Structures isn’t a large company, thus they 
cannot always support their supply chain, even though they actively monitor performance 
both downstream and upstream.   
On top of the plethora of protective factors the firm has in place, the niche in which it 
operates felt a reduced impact from the economic downturn, as it is also concerned with 
maintenance and the upgrading of already built systems, which provided safe streams of 
revenues during the period. However, various similar firms in this niche witnessed 
negative effects, thus the low exposure to risk described by the interviewees is more 
related to the organization’s ability to prevent and avoid threats rather than to external 
factors only. 
4.3.2 Analysis of Case 2 
One of the first elements that stood out while envisioning this case was that a small size 
and a lack of large resource pools do not imply the absence of organizational resilience. 
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High-Res Structures managed to grow steadily during the sectorial crisis through its 
down-to-earth and methodical approach to possible risks and opportunities. The stance 
was similar to the one displayed by General Hospital in Meyer’s (1982) case studies: 
focused, precise responses that allowed to bear the situation in a business-as-usual 
fashion, to the point where the untoward events weren’t felt at all.  
Such a reaction required a thorough verification of the protective factors the firm is 
endowed with to understand whether inherent or static resilience played more important 
roles. High-Res Structures employs semi-standardized plans to cope with daily 
variability, signalled for example by the diligent evaluation of customers, the approach to 
workload peaks and recruitment, the family pact; this however doesn’t hinder the adaptive 
capacity of the organization as there is an active attempt to engage the workforce and 
train it to sustain performance, slack resources are accumulated to face possible threats 
and opportunities and all the family is consulted before decisions are made.  
Even though the latter protective factors are closer to the generic factor definition, and 
they helped the firm in maintaining its poise over the last ten years, specific plans and 
procedures (i.e. contextual factors) were set up to cope with most of the relevant issues 
that could arise. Consequently, the coping range of the organization is rather wide, and 
the interviewees confirmed that they felt like the sectorial crisis was still within this range, 
being a disturbance they were prepared to deal with and confirming proposition Q1. 
Furthermore, the case didn’t provide any clear evidence toward R1.2: contextual factors 
didn’t seem mere declinations of generic factors; the two categories are different and 
contribute to resilience in different manners. In fact, the examples provided by plans and 
mindfulness in Roberts’ (1990) case study showed approaches that are similar to how 
High-Res Structures copes with variability.  
Q2, which attempts to verify the existence of the coping range and the resilience 
threshold, was also confirmed: the enterprise never witnessed a crisis throughout its 
history, remaining within the threshold, and even when the disturbances in its 
environment increased, starting from 2009, risk factors were kept low while new 
opportunities were being captured, suggesting the existence of a coping range that was 
wide enough to address the newest threats in the market. 
Regarding the differences in building organizational resilience through the enhancement 
of different protective factors, captured by Q3, this case underlined how financial stability 
The Normality of Adaptation: Organizational Resilience and the Interplay between Risk and Protective Factors 
112 
could be essential to enable any kind of resilience. The pressure deriving from a turbulent 
environment and a rickety debt structure would alter decision-making processes leading, 
if the need arises, to uneconomic choices taken simply to satisfy cash constraints. 
Regardless, this is just a starting point as numerous factors played a relevant role to shelter 
the organization from problems: awareness toward their customers, continuous training, 
diversification which allowed to mitigate operational risks, a strong leadership. The 
interviewees noted how some of these factors are specific to their industry, such as the 
requirement of certifications for their personnel and the need of insurances given the 
typical risks in the sector.  
Still, the entrepreneurs ranked the importance of protective factors for their firm in the 
following order: financial safety, management of internal stakeholders and resources, 
leadership. There was the perception that these elements played a pivotal role for their 
resilience capacity, whereas no evidence pointed toward an equal weighing of all the 
factors which influence this capability. 
Concerning Q4 and the identification of instances where factors are active or at an 
efficient point, the interview suggested that the company was being very cautious with its 
financial structure, more due to the careful approach to risks of the ownership than due to 
a process of financial engineering. Despite this, static resilience was perceived as being 
possible only with enough slack resources to back it up, thus the researcher cannot 
conclude that this was a sub-optimal approach. However, the availability of specialized 
workforce, comprised in the internal stakeholder management measure, was described as 
good, but constantly put under pressure: if there were better ways to temporarily employ 
people during peak load periods, the firm would achieve an even superior performance. 
The managing director mentioned how even after dispatching part of the orders to external 
suppliers and momentarily increasing the workforce, ten more operators would be 
necessary to tackle all the opportunities the organization was presented in this period. 
Still, due to the layoff avoidance initiative, High-Res Structures prefers to miss on some 
offers or projects rather than increasing long-term risks. Safety was more appreciated over 
risk-seeking growth. 
This is a clear example of a factor that is below its efficient point, requiring further 
investments and attention to reach an improved performance of the element, both in its 
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contribution to organizational resilience and to the firm’s results. Therefore, evidence 
points toward a confirmation of proposition Q4. 
The analysis of this case provided solid clues to verify all the theoretical propositions, 
thus to accrue additional proofs that the envisioned theories are appropriate 
representations of reality, pattern matching will be checked. Paragraph 3.5 proposed the 
following expected outcome: a firm with a stable or growing RoE during the crisis should 
have been the signal for a firm that maintained a business-as-usual behaviour, with a 
balance between context-specific and generic protective factors that allowed the coping 
range to absorb the variability during the period. The description closely matches what 
happened do High-Res Structures. 
The already present factors, which were further developed in the time being, had a chief 
importance during the downturn. Finally, although internal stakeholder management was 
consistently put to a test due to the steady, risk-free growth path the firm chose, improving 
this dimension would have assured only limited benefits from the organizational 
resilience standpoint, though the organization’s results might have improved. Overall, the 
effective case closely resembles the prefigured path, giving even more credit to the 
proposed theory. 
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4.4 Case 3 – High-Res Fixtures 
High-Res Fixtures was selected as a candidate for case studying because its RoE, profits 
and assets have been positive during the crisis years in the furniture sector, with a 
substantial over-performance compared to its peers.  
Figure 4.3 High-Res Fixtures Net Profits and Assets (2008-2017) 
 
 
Source: adapted from AIDA database, data retrieved on September 2018 
The survey and interview were answered by the HR (Human Resources) manager of the 
company, who has been working in this firm for sixteen years and is thus deemed 
knowledgeable enough to provide an accurate account of the elements of resilience that 
were discussed.  
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The findings reported from the questionnaire were somewhat surprising: the current 
resilience profile of the firm showed a strong focus on adaptability and flexibility, which 
would suggest a noteworthy static resilience capability, yet the planning capacity and the 
management of keystone vulnerabilities measures hinted toward a poor performance in 
these dimensions. The first conclusions drawn from the survey suggested that High-Res 
Fixtures was employing some factors (such as mindfulness, good decision making and 
horizon scanning structures and a solid growth in its core business) to compensate lack 
of solid and formalized plans to guide the firm in business-as-usual times and the poor 
recognition to personnel for employing creativity and initiating innovation.  
The interview had the purpose to clarify the state of things. It involved a tour of the 
facilities of the company which allowed to analyse some artefacts the researcher was able 
to notice. At the beginning of the discussion, the interviewee, who was being assisted by 
an HR specialist colleague, was asked to identify the limitations of the questionnaire. 
Although there weren’t relevant issues, the responder focused on the definition of external 
stakeholders which was adopted by the survey: he argued that their customers couldn’t 
be considered as part of the category and that this dimension wasn’t relevant for High-
Res Fixtures as the company is acting like a market leader. 
He stressed how, instead of chasing the market trends, analysing the purchasing 
preferences of the clients and overall relying on formal information gathering, the firm 
was concentrating on creating high-end products which would be recognized by anyone 
as beautiful and visionary. This greatly reduced the need to interact with customers, in 
his opinion, letting instead the quality of their products talk by itself and providing higher 
returns to agents and distributors as long as they complied with the policies and showroom 
designs suggested by the company. The only aspect which was constantly checked was 
the financial stability and lawfulness of the customers, as they are primarily businesses 
and not consumers.  
The relationship with suppliers was also deemed only slightly important, especially 
considering third-parties involved in the refinement of materials and production of semi-
finished products. Due to how the products of the firm are designed, most of the added 
value happens during the assembly phase, which is entirely kept in-house: moreover, 80% 
of the products and their parts are crafted in-house, greatly reducing the ties with external 
suppliers in the eyes of the responder.  
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4.4.1 Organizational Resilience in High-Res Fixtures 
This atypical stance allowed to discuss in detail how the firm succeeded in the last ten 
years. The HR manager promptly replied that this high performance is primarily tied to 
the design ability and acute entrepreneurial spirit of the managing director, who 
anticipated the market and solved any issue creatively beforehand, instead of relying on 
plans, numbers and forecasts. Jokingly, he mentioned how whenever the firm had to 
formalize its three-years projections, the managing director rolled his eyes saying that the 
firm could change course thrice during that period, in an attempt to outrun the market and 
set the trend of the whole sector, instead of following it. 
Nevertheless, the firm features a high degree of formalization in the production 
department: the principles of lean production are not only applied, but fully embraced by 
the personnel, as signalled by the Kanban boards scattered through the premises. Peak 
loads are carefully managed and levelled, as well as logistics, but this planning capacity 
falls short when considering low-chance, high-impact events such as the possibilities of 
a fire or flood, the sudden inability of the products to meet the market desires or the 
disappearance of the managing director and his creativity.  
The interviewee stated that if the last two situations were to materialize, the firm would 
cease to exist almost immediately: even though the employees embrace the firm culture 
which is oriented to innovation, out-of-the-box thinking, solving problems as they arise 
rather than planning beforehand and fostering the know-how related to products, the lack 
of the visionary lead of the director would greatly reduce the uniqueness of High-Res 
Fixtures, leading to a probable crisis. The same would apply if the creativity of the staff 
was reduced. 
The discussion implied that the firm is striving to maintain its leadership in the market, 
but it had no backup plans to recover if such position was seriously threatened or 
surpassed by a cunning competitor. This aspect was compensated by a careful analysis of 
which risks the firm could take: the available cash was always kept at high levels to shelter 
from unexpected events and to invest in opportunities, and even though the three-year 
budget might not be met, the firm maintains a perspective oriented to the long term. 
Stretch goals are actively set and objectives are communicated and shared with the 
internal stakeholders: the unity of intent and the pervasiveness of this approach was felt 
even by the researcher during the interview, as the workers showed an authentic passion 
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and commitment to the vision of their leader. Even the brand of the firm focuses on the 
idea that their furniture should last long and trigger emotional rather than functional 
attachment, requiring their reputation to maintain high standards. 
4.4.2 Analysis of Case 3 
This case study seems to subvert all the propositions and theoretical insight accrued to 
this point of the dissertation, instead it provides a unique perspective which reinforces the 
idea of how resilience can be developed in multiple ways.  
Proceeding in order, the first research question is analysed. Can protective factors be 
divided between contextual and generic categories, influencing respectively the coping 
range and resilience threshold of the firm? In previous cases and throughout the literature, 
contextual protective factors were often clear-cut plans that identified the typical threats 
an organization might have to face and the procedures to address them methodically. They 
resembled the planning capacity dimension analysed by Stephenson (2010), whereas 
generic factors were more concerned with elements of resilience that enabled flexible, 
unprecedented answers to unforeseen and atypical threats. 
High-Res Fixtures turns this perspective around: for this organization, answering 
dynamically to threats as they manifest is the business-as-usual approach. Each situation 
is addressed uniquely, with a fresh, creative perspective which doesn’t rely on pre-
planned strategies. Consequently, the coping range isn’t the usual set of protocols through 
which variability is confronted on a daily basis: in this case, it’s the mindfulness and 
culture within the firm which requires employees to counteract volatility in a creative and 
contextual way, showing adaptive capacity even in case of common issues.  
Plans and protocols, budgets and forecasts are considered by this company as a generic 
protective factor, something meant to be activated only if the typical adaptability that is 
employed isn’t enough to face the rising threat. Still, very few plans were put in place to 
shelter from these untoward events: the interviewee stated that there hadn’t been any 
formal planning for specific risks until a few days before the research began, when the 
company started to adopt procedures to use in case of a fire in the premises. Following 
this perspective, the static resilience of the company is rather thin, as confirmed during 
the discussion: if the creativity of the company was to falter, a crisis would be very 
probable; the same would apply with the loss of the market leader position or if internal 
stakeholders suddenly became less attached to the values and culture of the firm.  
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The interview and questionnaire identified this lack of backup and business-as-usual 
plans, signalling how the firm never witnessed a crisis as it always employed its creativity 
and ability to anticipate market trends as the main elements of inherent resilience, 
explaining why the firm never flinched during the sectorial downturn. The issues would 
arise only if these elements proved insufficient compared to the active risks: the 
interviewees confirmed that if the risk factors mentioned before were to manifest together, 
or if these capabilities were any less effective, the firm would be caught flat-footed.  
This situation appears to be close to the cases of Nokia and Blackberry, market leaders 
who couldn’t foresee threats and adapt in time and that hadn’t backup plans in place to 
shelter their business in case of a drastic market shift.  
After providing some interesting and atypical clues regarding Q1 and Q2, the case also 
points toward a confirmation of statement Q3. Even though protective factors are tightly 
related to the main characteristics of the firm and its “DNA”, some aspects are chiefly 
important in developing resilience (such as mindfulness and adaptive capacity for High-
Res Fixtures) while others are less relevant; a balanced resilience structure is still 
necessary to face both frequent and rare threats while maintaining the firm’s functioning. 
Lastly, the case provides the strongest evidence toward confirming Q4: the interviewee 
clearly identified creativity and innovation and HR related factors as the elements that are 
most often put to a test in the organization, showing how they are active protective factors. 
On the other hand, given the current situation, the management of financial aspects is an 
inactive factor which does require attention, but wasn’t identified as the chief priority for 
the firm. The level of available cash, paired with the growth trajectory of the firm, is 
expected to be more than sufficient to deal with unforeseen threats. 
After showing the theory confirmation provided by the case study, the pattern matching 
is explained to provide further evidence. The organization was expected to have 
maintained its poise throughout the last ten years, living through the industry downturn 
as if there wasn’t any crisis. This has been confirmed during the discussion as the 
company never felt pressured by the new market conditions. It has also shown a high 
degree of inherent resilience, though in an unconventional way, which explains why this 
period has been managed in a business-as-usual fashion.  
The division between contextual and generic factors is also verified, though to a lesser 
extent if compared to other cases: the plans the firm wishes to develop are aimed to 
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provide generic answers to unforeseeable threats that would bypass the adaptive capacity 
of the firm. Given the culture and typical approach to problem-solving the organization 
has, creating plans and procedures for business-as-usual management would prove much 
less effective than in other companies, yet the researcher recognizes that this is a 
speculation which might not describe the real state of things, although the interviewees 
agreed with this point of view.  
The case showed no evidence of how contextual factors were an operational declination 
of generic one, in fact the categories appeared well distinguished throughout the case. 
Still, as foreseen, the firm was able to withstand the sectorial downturn thanks to its 
market trend anticipation, its entrepreneurial attention and its careful approach to bearing 
new risks, pointing toward a confirmation of Q2.  
The expected case required to identify some factors which allowed to address the rising 
of the threat level (the sectorial crisis) easily, and the creativity and horizon scanning 
capacity of the organization were indeed the chief elements which sheltered from the 
impact. The positive results were obtained through an erosion of the competitors’ market 
share, which shrank in favour of High-Res Fixtures. Moreover, R3 is disconfirmed as 
other protective factors wouldn’t have had the same effects in preventing the crisis. 
Lastly, as the whole period was managed like ordinary administration, a strengthening of 
any element of resilience wouldn’t have led to improved results given the context. 
4.5 Case 4 – Cri-Rec Structures 
Cri-Rec Structures was selected as a case study candidate for its interesting RoE, profits 
and assets dynamics in the last ten years. Up to 2010, it was witnessing a bursting growth 
that doubled the owned assets every year and allowed to obtain a net profit which was 
several times higher than what was achieved by its peers. In 2011 however, even though 
the results were still impressive, the owned assets were halved, and they kept being 
reduced up to this year. From 2012, the performance of the company worsened severely 
(up to the point where it suffered losses instead of profits), though in 2016 it managed to 
bounce back returning to a positive trend. Considering that the construction sector is still 
experiencing an economic downturn, the situation suggested the possible presence of 
elements of resilience which quickened the recovery. 
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Figure 4.4 Cri-Rec Structures Net Profits and Assets (2008-2017) 
 
 
Source: adapted from AIDA database, data retrieved on September 2018 
Consequently, the managing director was contacted for more information and to submit 
the survey; the research met his interest and he agreed to participate in the project. The 
questionnaire revealed that the company had a balanced and fair resilience profile, 
showing some shortcomings only in the engagement of internal stakeholders, the 
capabilities and resources related with external stakeholders and the participation in 
exercises. This pattern of answers was to be expected, considering how the firm appeared 
to be once again in the path of organic growth and economic success.  
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4.5.1 Cri-Rec Structures Crisis 
The interview shed light on what happened since 2008: before the year 2000, Cri-Rec 
Structures was a firm primarily focused on the installation and maintenance of industrial 
electric systems, yet it already recognized how this area was about to witness a crisis and 
a strong reduction in the market size. Strategically, the organization decided to invest in 
competences concerning renewable energy, shifting its core business in that direction. In 
2005, the revenues amounted to 5 million €, and the construction sector in Italy was 
offered a great, yet risky, opportunity: the development of the photovoltaic plants market 
which was heavily subsidized by government incentives.  
Cri-Rec Structures had the knowledge and the means to enter this market, a fact that 
pushed the growth of the firm which had a turnover of 150 million € in 2010, with almost 
all the business being concerned with photovoltaic plants installation (the average project 
at that time had a size of 3 million € per customer). The directors though knew that this 
type of business would come to a halt as soon as the government withdrew the incentives, 
and measures were already being taken to brace for the untoward event: even despite such 
an impressive growth, the firm relied on external third-party installers and increased its 
workforce gradually, instead of being overly optimistic. Financial resources were being 
accrued to invest vigorously in new technology based on other renewable sources (wind, 
biomass), and the R&D department was already working on creating novel products 
which hadn’t any support from government incentives, in order to move away from the 
crutch offered by the State.  
In 2011, as Italy began witnessing the full extent of the financial crisis, the incentives for 
the photovoltaic plants were withdrawn. 80% of the turnover of the firm was hit by this 
change, leading to the dip in performance. The impact was sudden and strong, but the 
organization was ready for the event, to the point where it became a “measured crisis”, in 
the words of the managing director. It’s possible to recognize an example of an autogenic 
crisis as theorized in Boin & Hart (2010), with the company moving in advance for 
extending the period of the crisis to have more time to react adaptively to it. 
The firm began divesting in 2011 from the photovoltaic sector and moving to different 
products, with the objective of diversifying risk and shifting to smaller projects 
(averaging 300.000 € per order) to meet the new market conditions which entailed a 
severe credit crunch that reduced the customers’ ability to commit to larger investments. 
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By 2013, the core business had moved almost completely (70-80% of the revenues) 
toward wind and biomass products that had no incentive from the government, requiring 
a complete economic viability on their own to achieve good results.  
Moreover, Cri-Rec Structures actively monitored the environment for internationalization 
opportunities, entering new markets that were deemed stable enough and that featured 
strong entry barriers, both in terms of regulation and required know-how, despite the 
comments made from the hired consultants who were advising to downsize the firm or 
initiate a liquidation process.  
In fact, the crisis became an opportunity to completely renew the organization, setting it 
on a more sustainable path that capitalized on the strong competences of the internal 
stakeholders and their creativity and development skills. Even from a strategic point of 
view, the firm adopted a keener entrepreneurial spirit and invested in improving its 
planning capacity, as it began tackling whole projects instead of just the installation part, 
which required a stronger industrial and production organization and a better knowledge 
of the product life cycle dynamics.  
This passage though wasn’t described as being completely smooth: the banks were 
closely monitoring the results of both the firm and its customers, gradually reducing the 
granted flexibility. Internal stakeholders were also nervous after such a strong reduction 
in revenues, thus the management had the primary goal to maintain the unity of intent of 
the company: if the creativity and innovation capability derived from the workforce was 
to be reduced, Cri-Rec Structures wouldn’t have been able to complete the change 
process.  
Still, the horizon scanning capability and the presence of a solid plan for the future of the 
company, as well as the absence of other noteworthy risk factors, allowed to maintain a 
cool head and to make proper decisions which led to a well-defined objective. Even 
though the untoward event was a major issue, this preparedness instilled hope in the firm, 
enabling the quicker recovery and the adaptation process, which is still in place as the 
firm is coping with the new market texture and the ongoing Italian crisis. 
4.5.2 Analysis of Case 4 
The review of the case allowed to immediately frame some answers to the various 
research inquiries. Concerning Q1, the account clearly identifies the elements improving 
the coping range (contextual protective factors), which are primarily tied to the planning 
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capacity and horizon scanning capability of the firm. Innovation and creativity also play 
an important role both during crises and business-as-usual times, as confirmed by the 
managing director, whereas factors as leadership, mindfulness and the management of 
internal resources seem to be closer to the generic protective factor definition for Cri-Rec 
Structures. 
The description obtained through the interview didn’t provide strong evidence that could 
confirm that these factors are replicable, yet there was a confirmation that contextual 
factors tend to be tied to the core competencies of the firm. Moreover, the effects of the 
two categories of protective factors seem to influence either the coping range or the 
resilience threshold, with little overlapping: even though all the elements were considered 
useful during both crises and normal administration, the typical approach to variability is 
related with careful planning based on the evidence gathered while studying the market. 
The “measured crisis” that the firm witnessed was beyond the usual coping range given 
its magnitude, and in this case the factors related to static resilience influenced the positive 
outcome: a strong leadership and governance, the previous good management of internal 
resources and adequate decision-making processes enabled resilience as the situation 
unfurled: the solid plan for recovering the business wouldn’t have been sufficient without 
maintaining the involvement of internal stakeholders.  
This also verifies the second proposition of this dissertation, as the dynamics of the 
autogenic crisis the company witnessed meet the definitions of coping range and 
resilience threshold that have been used throughout the cases. Even though the risk factor, 
(i.e. the sudden withdrawal of the incentives) affected 80% of the revenues of the firm, 
the absence of other relevant risks that had to be managed in concurrence allowed the 
situation to stay within the boundaries of static resilience. The case still confirms the idea 
that risk breeds risk, as the economic crisis and the credit crunch led to additional tensions 
among internal stakeholders and the future felt uncertain. 
Protective factors also seem to play a different role in building resilience: the competences 
constituting the coping range were the most important for the firm, whereas some 
elements, albeit useful, played minor roles (such as mindfulness or the management of 
external stakeholders). Without the relevant horizon scanning capability and the 
innovation and creativity the firm possessed, the crisis would have been fatal, as 
pinpointed by the interviewee. This also signals how, given the contingency, these two 
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factors, as well as the elements related to internal stakeholders, were active for the firm 
both before and during the crisis, whereas the management of internal resources, chiefly 
important in other cases, wasn’t put under excessive stress during the untoward event. In 
fact, the static resilience capability built by the firm was enough to face the threat of the 
situation, without requiring the employment of extra resources. 
As for the other cases, to accrue more evidence, the researcher employed the pattern 
matching methodology. Considering the expected outcome, it is easy to notice how Cri-
Rec Structures recovered earlier than its peers from the sectorial downturn thanks to the 
elements of resilience. In particular, the situation wasn’t perceived as business as usual 
(which would imply that the coping range was sufficient to address the contingent 
variability), yet static resilience was sufficient to cope with the threat deriving from the 
market shift, leading to the definition used by the managing director of a “measured 
crisis”.  
This event depleted part of the slack resources accrued through the generic protective 
factors of the firm, but it didn’t completely consume them, enabling the resilient answer. 
The case also shows how there was little overlapping in how contextual and generic 
factors played a role, with contextual factors sheltering primarily from operational risks 
(the need to redirect the strategy and the new market conditions) and generic factors 
adjuvating the firm through the management of atypical risks (possible personnel 
demotivation and detachment).  
Concerning the expected outcome related to the second proposition, the typical response 
mechanisms had to change in the firm as the photovoltaic incentives weren’t going to last 
forever, and they constituted a severe risk for the company, although they enabled its 
quick growth. When the crisis hit, and the subsidies were withdrawn, the protective 
factors began playing their role, requiring an atypical but well-structured response 
(change of strategy). Still, given the absence of other relevant risk factors, a single event 
of this magnitude wasn’t overwhelming, showing that sheltering from risks breeds 
competence even in difficult periods.  
Concerning the importance of some factors, the stress on creativity, innovation and 
horizon scanning provided by the managing director was more than enough to verify how 
the expected path is like the real outcome of the crisis. Other factors wouldn’t have had a 
similar protective impact. The case however didn’t provide strong evidence toward 
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confirming Q4, as even though some factors felt close to the “active” definition, only 
mindfulness was perceived as not being employed during the crisis, but due to its minor 
role during the interview the point wasn’t properly elaborated. 
4.6 Findings from Cross-Case Comparisons 
Before moving to the formalization of conclusions deriving from these cases, the results 
deriving from cross-case comparisons will be explained, as the questions which required 
a broader overview (i.e. Q1a, Q3a) haven’t been addressed yet.  
The cases provided evidence of a clear distinction between contextual and generic 
protective factors, though the most interesting finding is that contextual ones are strongly 
tied with what a firm considers as its core competences. These are the means through 
which typical, day-by-day volatility is contained, and they are often employed even in 
crises. When the coping range is surpassed, however, the unexpected is coped with 
through the elements that build static resilience. These are unconventional instruments 
for the organizations, as they don’t pertain to their typical response repertoire, though 
they are easily replicable: the request of discounts from engaged external stakeholders 
and the family pact in the Cri-Rec Fixtures case or the commitment of the management 
of Cri-Rec Structures in maintaining the unity of purpose aren’t strictly connected to what 
these companies are about in business as usual times. Even the possibility of backup 
planning for High-Res Fixtures, which would be a generic protective factor in the case, 
isn’t part of the essence of this company, yet it would play a relevant role during a crisis.  
These means of adaptation are peripheral resources which do not pertain to the core 
endowments of the organization, thus they are much less idiosyncratic if compared to the 
visionary culture of High-Res Fixtures, the balance between plans and adaptation in High-
Res Structures, the attention to the economic environment and the creativity capability in 
Cri-Rec Structures and the careful production load planning and know-how preservation 
methodologies in Cri-Rec Fixtures. Generic protective factors are enablers of adaptation 
that are less related to the DNA of a firm, such as the financial stability (given by the 
absence of debt) in all the cases apart for Cri-Rec Structures, good relationships with 
internal stakeholders (High-Res Structures, Cri-Rec Fixtures), the due diligence on 
customers. Consequently, they are much easier to replicate as they are close to typical by-
the-book best practices than to distinctive capabilities.  
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On the other hand, their benefit is useful primarily in coping with manifest crises rather 
than with the variability the company has to manage daily. To improve the ability to treat 
more threats as business as usual, the resilience elements must become core competences 
for the firm, something it cannot part with without losing a portion of its identity. 
Otherwise, these protective factors will always be means that are used when the need 
arises, which implies that an unforeseen and untoward event already affected the 
organization. Consequently, these findings point toward a confirmation of Q1a and a 
refusal of statement R1a. 
When moving to the importance of the elements of resilience for different firms and 
sectors, even for generic protective factors the relevance changes considerably among 
organizations. The cases never showed a unique pattern toward building resilience, or 
similar priorities even within the sector. The contingencies each company has to face 
shape the required protective factors, and the contextual protective factors and core 
competences of each firm affect which contingencies are considered as business-as-usual 
and which are high-impact events. Consequently, Q3a has a weak explanatory power 
compared to R3a: protective factors do have different importance given the context, and 
not only this difference doesn’t apply within sectors, but also within firms in the same 
industry. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The first considerations on the case studies are concerned with the tools that were 
employed for the analysis. Studying RoE and net profits dynamics and the variations of 
the assets owned by the firm proved to be effective instruments to identify which firms 
witnessed crises and which had sufficient resilience to cope with the threat. A strong 
volatility in these elements or a sharp reduction are good signals that the firm might have 
weak protective factors, though a formal rule wouldn’t be appropriate for studying groups 
of small or medium sized firms that aren’t publicly traded: the results of such samples are 
too different among each other to be easily comparable through formulas; the 
interpretation of the trends compared to the sector averages provide a richer insight than, 
for example, the VOLARE method from Markman & Venzin (2014), which requires 
firms to be included in certain stable risk classes. 
Considering the survey and the measurement methods proposed by McManus, 
Stephenson and the “Resilient Organisations” research group, they create proper 
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evaluations of the organizational resilience, which were appreciated by all interviewees 
for their accuracy. The interpretation of the profiles still requires an educated eye, as 
proven by the case of High-Res Fixtures: a sub-optimal profile in absolute terms doesn’t 
imply that the firm is witnessing a crisis, as it could be controlling just enough risks to 
cope with the current situations while being prone to disruptions if these risks were to 
increase. Moreover, the data should be interpreted in a relative way when measuring the 
values for single firms, highlighting points of strength and of weakness rather than the 
numeric differences between the measures.  
These instruments also do not consider the context and risk elements that the firm is 
confronted with or do so only partially. A tool that was able to measure risks and compare 
them with the protective factors the firm has in place would be a great improvement over 
the current models. Nevertheless, to measure overall relative resilience, weights shouldn’t 
be assigned to the different elements, as a balanced resilience profile is always preferable 
to one that relies only on its most important factors: in this last case, the organization 
would become brittle and prone to disruptions if these factors were depleted.  
Moving to the research topics proposed in chapter 3, the analysed cases suggest the 
confirmation of the following statements: 
 Protective factors can be divided between the contextual and generic categories, 
with the first primarily contributing to the coping range of the organization and 
the latter improving the static resilience capability, following the definitions stated 
in table 3.1; 
 Crises that can lead to a complete disruption of the organization ensue only when 
the resilience threshold is surpassed. This cannot happen due to a single untoward 
event, but due to the cumulation of multiple risks that aren’t coupled by nuanced 
enough protective factors; 
 Organizations should carefully monitor which factors are enhancing the coping 
range, meaning that they are employed to deal with vulnerabilities and risks that 
arise during business as usual situations, and which develop static resilience. The 
first should be core competences for the firm, while the latter are assets deployed 
when the typical response methods aren’t enough to address the situation, usually 
after a critical environment change which requires flexible adaptation; 
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 Context shapes which resilience enabling factors are more important for a firm. 
All the analysed elements provide at least improvement to the static resilience, but 
the coping range is widened only through the improvement of the core 
competences that are essential for the organization; 
 Even though the importance of different factors varies, the most resilient 
companies have a balanced resilience profile according to McManus’ and 
Stephenson’s models, signalling both a wide coping range and sufficiently 
nuanced resilience threshold. None of the elements of resilience is entirely 
irrelevant, though some (in particular contextual protective factors) are of capital 
importance for the firm; 
 Competence begets competence and risks breed risk: lowering the measures of 
the various protective factors would constitute a vulnerability for an organization, 
and if more risks are active due to the environment, this could lead to a crisis. 
Carefully managing the dimensions that build resilience and monitoring that they 
aren’t neglected or under excessive pressure is critical to avoid crises, and 
renewing them right after a crisis should be a priority as there is a direct 
improvement of resilience after these dimensions are restored; 
 Resilience elements have an efficient point, where further investments would be 
costlier than the relative advantage they offer. Identifying this point precisely 
though requires an analysis that is too dependent on contextual factors: 
consequently, it is more appropriate to identify the opportunity costs of the 
reduction of some elements for each firm. If the opportunity cost is high, 
strengthening that factor should be a priority over the betterment of other 
dimensions; 
 Organizational resilience is a necessary condition for positive economic results 
during untoward events, but not a sufficient one, as other unrelated factors like 
market power and environmental factors influence the results of a firm; 
 Organizational resilience shelters from lower bound variability in performance 
but does not assure above average results compared to peers; 
 Organizational resilience is a normal feature of well-functioning firms that invest 
in their core competences while maintaining enough flexibility to be able to cope 
with new, unexpected threats. The elements of resilience are developed through 
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the typical investments a firm would make in the categories highlighted in table 
3.2, though knowing which factors are more important for ordinary variability and 
which should address low-probability, high-impact threats is relevant to properly 
engineer the resilience profile, rather than relying on the impression of being 
thoroughly prepared.  
Overall, the cases provided satisfactory clues to confirm the proposed theoretic statements 
apart for Q4, which was difficult to capture given the high contextuality of the construct. 
4.8 Limitations 
The conducted case studies featured some limitations. First, only one or two key people 
from each company were asked to compile the survey and participate in the interview. To 
avoid any risk of bias in the results, more individuals within each organization could have 
been consulted to create an average of the results and reveal common themes. Still, given 
the scope of the research questions, the information and the confirmations that were 
retrieved were satisfactory, even if the individual resilience profiles identified by the 
surveys might have been skewed.  
Furthermore, a sectorial resilience benchmark was unavailable and difficult to obtain: this 
meant that there wasn’t a clear case that could be used as a reference for comparisons, 
though this limitation was foreseen given how the research tried to focus on extreme 
cases, rather than average outcomes.  
Moreover, focusing on two sectors that witnessed a crisis helped capturing how a single 
event could tip the balance in the studied organizations: following researches could try to 
understand how resilience acts in industries that are flourishing, pinpointing whether 
overwhelming risks and the depletion of protective factors create crises even given good 
environmental situations.  
If Masten’s (2014) findings are applicable to organizations just like for growing children, 
there is a chance that a favourable environment is enough to shelter firms from untoward 
events, just like some companies in the Italian construction industry who suffered only 
once the government incentives in the photovoltaic sector were withdrawn, as found out 
during the interviews.  
Very few considerations were also made on the context in which the firms operate, though 
according to the interviewees this might influence the outcome of the case studies: similar 
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researches in the future should provide a better account on the subject and attempt to draw 
theoretical conclusions on the point.  
The choice of the North East of Italy as the field for this research might have unwillingly 
included cultural or geographic effects that could have impacted on the results, although 
the choice had the specific purpose to highlight the behaviour of similar firms right after 
a common untoward event.  
More longitudinal studies or inquiries including different countries could provide even 
stronger evidence to generalize the findings displayed through the dissertation: its breadth 
was reduced in favour of the quality of the information that had to be retrieved. As there 
was no empirical study verifying the analysed constructs nor the interplay of risk and 
protective factors and how the latter manifested during crises, approaching the proposed 
questions through statistical methods or more formalized tools wouldn’t have been the 
most appropriate methodology, as suggested by Yin (2009). Now that the definitions have 
been selected as possible means to understand reality, broader studies could provide 
additional insight. 
As a last concern, Yin (2009) suggested that proper qualitative case studies used 
triangulation methods to deliver confirmatory evidence for the studied constructs. The 
maintenance of the chain of evidence, the strong theoretical background and the constant 
reference to proven methods as well as the adherence of the answers reported from the 
interviewees to the cases that were expected before the empirical study began were the 
means that aimed at solidifying the propositions throughout this chapter. 
However, the only external confirmation for the findings came from the feedback 
provided by the interviewees, who agreed with the proposed analysis and provided their 
advice and insight. Other external sources which could verify the connection between the 
financial performance of the organizations and their resilience weren’t available as, 
especially for the High-Res firms, few newspaper articles discussed these organizations. 
The ones that were retrieved were used to cross-check the facts reported during the 
studies, though if more sources were available the evidence would be even more solid. 
4.9 What Lies Ahead? – Suggestions for Future Research 
Although this study provided some important theoretical confirmations, organizational 
resilience is still a field of research that can be deepened, and this paragraph wants to 
suggest some means to improve the available knowledge on the subject. 
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First, looking at the cases, the elements of resilience that were deemed important are 
deeply connected to the structure and strategic scope of the analyzed organizations. Cri-
Rec Structures and High-Res Fixtures were closer to the upper boundary of the medium 
firm size definition and gave the impression of being product-oriented firms, which wish 
to deliver to the market tangible objects first, and services as a complement.  
These findings might explain why creativity and innovation were deemed the most 
important factors, whereas financial security was a relevant element, but it wasn’t the 
primary enabler of resilience. The difference in what was considered as the second most 
important factor could also be tied to the cultural orientation of the firms: attention to the 
economic environment for Cri-Rec Structures, given their tendency to plan to anticipate 
market dynamics, and adaptive capacity for High-Res Fixtures, explained by the approach 
the organization exploits to address typical variability.  
On the other hand, High-Res Structures and Cri-Rec Fixtures, being closer to the lower 
bound of the medium size firm definition, had a stronger concern toward financial 
security as it felt like the reputational basis through which these organizations could seek 
larger partners and aim at interacting with more structured firms. Moreover, they 
described themselves as primarily delivering a service, rather than a product, and they 
were closer to a follower strategy than to an innovator one.  
Fantazy et al. (2009) brought evidence on how different strategies imply a varying 
importance in which flexibility dimensions are useful throughout a supply chain; 
furthermore, the authors underlined how developing this capability influenced results that 
weren’t immediately measurable such as customer satisfaction. Could this apply to the 
findings of these case studies as well?  
In particular, is the importance of the factors that enable resilience tied to the strategic 
scope of the organization and its product or service positioning in the life-cycle model? 
Understanding this would not only include part of the context in the analysis, but it could 
highlight which are the most relevant protective factors that improve the coping range in 
such situations. Moreover, it could help in identifying some cross-sector similarities 
starting from common elements which can apply to different organizations.  
The concept can be better delivered through a metaphor. Consider when resilience could 
be necessary during hitchhiking. An excursionist who likes to stick to known paths, even 
if they include difficult climbs and steep slopes, relies on his map and well-exercised 
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routines to reach the goal. If a thunderstorm suddenly appeared, blocking some paths, this 
traveler initially would still rely on these methods to continue the ascent toward his 
destination. If, however, he lost his map or the tried routines he employs turned 
ineffective, to avoid giving up, he’d rely on his adaptability and knowledge to deal with 
the situation and keep on going. 
A hiker who prefers finding his own path, exploring the nature and going where no one 
has been before relies primarily on his adaptability and tracking or pathfinding skills. If, 
however, the same thunderstorm muddled the traces or confused his sense of orientation, 
to pursue his objective he might rely on a map with possible backup routes and trails that 
could point a way toward the goal.  
Similarly, firms with a different strategic orientation are expected to follow alternative 
means to develop their business and their organizational resilience, although the goal 
(which is economic success) and the possible untoward events remain the same.   
Following a different trail of thought, future research might consider the findings 
highlighted by Masten (2014) and attempt to bring them to the organizational world. This 
study was focused on verifying resilient behaviors, but some inquiries on why this normal 
reaction wasn’t found in some firms would provide further confirmation on the existence 
and dynamics of the resilience threshold. Moreover, understanding which environments 
can be considered “high risk” ones and which aren’t could shed more light on how 
protective factors allow normal performance even under constant duress: an empirical 
analysis of this kind hasn’t yet been performed, leading again to the concept that context 
in organizational resilience studies hasn’t been included often due to how difficult it is to 
categorize.  
Finally, a possible new stream of research could attempt to tie risks and protective factors 
through statistical analyses, verifying which of the elements identified in this dissertation 
are more useful to address which threats. This could allow the categorization of multiple 
resilience profiles that mirror how different types of firms interact with the environment 
and react to changes, showing what is comprised in the coping range or constitutes static 
resilience for different firm templates. However, this approach would require a great deal 
of effort, as the method would be similar to how famous psychological metrics and types 
were developed (f.e. the Myer-Briggs Indicator). 
 5. CHAPTER 5 
FINAL THOUGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Theoretical and Managerial Implications 
As the dissertation comes to an end, the strings must be pulled together to understand 
what can be inferred from the results. 
The research conducted during this dissertation pointed toward more empirical 
confirmation of both Staw et al. (1981) and Meyer (1982) concepts. Organizational 
resilience is definitely a capability that can be developed at multiple levels in a firm, either 
in people, groups or complex systems such as the whole supply chain, as the cases 
evidenced. Moreover, it deals as much with variability perceived like business as usual 
as it does for real crises. However, it does so in different ways: organizations tend to 
develop ways through which issues are usually coped with. This “standard” approach 
constitutes the coping range of an organization, yet as shown in the cases not every 
situation can be classified as being within the range: this is the situation when being 
threat-rigid (Staw et al., 1981), meaning that the typical adaptation methods are employed 
when they aren’t appropriate, leads to a crisis. There is a close match with the backup 
systems theorized by Perrow (1984) and the need to employ them flexibly when the need 
arises, maintaining a critical perspective (Roberts, 1990). 
To shelter from these untoward events, the organization can rely on other atypical 
resources that it has developed beforehand: these elements constitute static resilience, 
they are the generic protective factors that are dormant during ordinary administration, as 
there are more suitable tools to address variability, but that allow to have a lesser degree 
of tight coupling during the crises, leading to flexible performance standards that are, 
however, the right choice when things get out of hand (Staw et al., 1981; Perrow, 1984).  
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This explains how organizational resilience is useful both in business as usual times and 
during untoward events, laying the foundation for long-term success; however, the most 
important confirmation is that this capability is normal. Companies automatically develop 
ways to deal with variability, it’s a constant feature of complex systems (Masten, 2014), 
although what’s relevant to really master resilience is a close monitoring of the interplay 
between risk and protective factors. If the former overcome the latter, the risk of collapse 
in the system suddenly becomes real: practitioners then need to focus their attention on 
restoring adaptive systems as soon as possible (as proven in the case of Cri-Rec Fixtures), 
as if enough of these factors work together, any predicament can be solved easily (as 
proven by High-Res Structures). 
Moreover, the cases also verified that being competent in one period breeds competence 
in future periods (Cri-Rec Structures), and that risk breeds risk (Cri-Rec Fixtures).  
 
The confirmatory evidence toward these patterns is strong, and it can help both 
researchers and practitioners in understanding organizational resilience and how it 
manifests in our world. Still, this research also highlighted some relevant limitations that 
must be considered before approaching the subject. First, there appears to be no clear 
pattern to develop this capability. This can also explain why it is difficult to formalize as 
a concept and to grasp all the underlying factors: they are heavily context-specific both 
in terms of importance and in how the various elements are employed to shelter from 
untoward events (as components of inherent or static resilience). 
It is also difficult to infer how developed this capability is in an organization: the analysis 
of RoE dynamics and performance volatility is fitting as a lagging indicator, meaning that 
it can capture whether organizational resilience was sufficient only after an untoward 
event hit the firm. Only through methods such as the scales developed by McManus 
(2008) and Stephenson (2010), which are based on a measure of the protective factors 
and resources available for the firm, a metric of this capability can be obtained, and it’s 
still a relative one that requires an expert’s interpretation. Through these methodologies 
though, a practitioner could identify which elements pertain to the coping range for his 
firm and which are closer to being generic protective factors, understanding which are 
chiefly useful during a crisis and which should be employed in business as usual times 
(bearing in mind that context shapes which factors are most useful for each company). 
References 
135 
Moreover, by keeping these dimensions closely monitored, an organization can 
understand if there is a chance for the present risks to burst into a crisis or if enough 
resources are in place to cope with the possible variability. Nevertheless, the cases 
highlighted how a balanced resilience profile is the optimal approach, if the firm desires 
to be thoroughly prepared for any untoward event, and that the construct is more tied with 
resources preservation and building rather than to performance. 
Another relevant point is that size doesn’t have an inherent effect on organizational 
resilience; larger firms simply tend to have more resources. 
 
Consequently, both theory and empirical analyses point toward the existence of a pattern 
through which organizational resilience operates: in business as usual times, the firm has 
a set of protective factors that are employed to deal with daily variability (inherent 
resilience) which trace a perimeter of what can be defined as normal administration 
(coping range). In this period, resources can be accumulated and transformed in more 
protective factors: these are the generic factors that can be employed and depleted during 
a crisis to shelter from a complete loss of function (static resilience components). Crises 
are manageable until the elements of static resilience, which create the resilience 
threshold of an organization, are not nuanced enough to cope with the current risks both 
deriving from the environment and from within the organization. The chance for real 
disruption happens only when too many odds stack against the organization: in this case, 
the resilience threshold is surpassed and there is a need for extra resources that are not 
within the control of the organization (help from the State, additional capital from the 
shareholders, help from the community that wasn’t pre-emptively organized). It is 
imperative to maintain a holistic perspective though to properly analyse this capability, 
due to its pervasiveness in an organization. 
 
Given these theoretical findings, practitioners should try to understand how the different 
elements at their disposal interact with risks, and which do so daily. Particularly, core 
capabilities that enable competitive advantage (Teece, 2007) should be engineered so that 
they are the main tools through which typical variability is dealt with, whereas best 
practices or non-core capabilities should be kept as means to withstand crises. The studied 
cases and theory as well pointed toward this direction. 
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 7. APPENDIX 
ATTACHMENTS 
7.1 Survey Questions 
The questions in this section have been translated in Italian from the author of this 
dissertation starting from the inquiries made in the Resilient Organisations Benchmarking 
Tool (2014), and using the concepts and definitions articulated in McManus (2008) and 
Stephenson (2010). The scores assigned to each question were based on these cited 
researches. Where the type of answer is “range”, a range between 1 (completely disagree) 
to 8 (completely agree) was used. The online survey is available at the following link: 
https://ucplbusiness.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6D1UaDbshKiYafH 
Question Type of Answer 
Category from Table 
3.2 
Contributes to which 
McManus (2008) 
factor? 
Contributes to 
which 
Stephenson 
(2010) element? 
(*) 
Qualora fossimo investiti da una 
crisi, I nostri ruoli dirigenziali 
mostrerebbero ottime capacità 
di leadership 
Range Innovation Oriented 
Leadership 
Adaptive Capacity Leadership 
Il nostro organico accetterebbe 
le decisioni di responsabili e 
dirigenti nei momenti di crisi 
anche senza essere stato 
consultato direttamente 
Range Adaptive Capacity Leadership 
I nostri responsabili controllano 
abitualmente il carico di lavoro 
del personale e si prodigano per 
ridurlo o adeguarlo qualora fosse 
eccessivo 
Range Adaptive Capacity Leadership 
I nostri dirigenti pensano e 
agiscono strategicamente per far 
sì che l'azienda sia sempre un 
passo avanti rispetto ai 
concorrenti 
Range Adaptive Capacity Leadership 
I nostri dirigenti sono ottimi 
esempi di professionisti da cui 
vorremmo costantemente 
imparare qualcosa / I nostri 
dirigenti fungono da guida con il 
loro esempio 
Range Adaptive Capacity Leadership 
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La nostra pianificazione 
strategica avviene con un 
orizzonte di medio-lungo termine 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
I nostri dirigenti pianificano con 
cura la strategia prima di 
assumere una decisione 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
Nella nostra organizzazione 
cerchiamo regolarmente di 
impiegare parte del nostro 
tempo di lavoro per rivalutare i 
nostri obiettivi e ciò che stiamo 
puntando ad ottenere  
Range Adaptive Capacity Leadership 
La nostra azienda incoraggia 
attivamente il personale a 
sfidarsi e sviluppare competenze 
attraverso il lavoro 
Range Adaptive Capacity Innovation 
Il nostro personale è rinomato 
per la sua capacità di utilizzare le 
conoscenze in modo creativo 
Range Adaptive Capacity Innovation 
Il nostro personale viene 
premiato quando trova soluzioni 
non convenzionali 
Range Adaptive Capacity Innovation 
Cerchiamo attivamente 
opportunità durante le situazioni 
di crisi vissute dalla nostra 
azienda 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
La nostra azienda è conscia di 
come una crisi possa impattare 
sugli stakeholder esterni 
(fornitori, clienti, comunità etc.) 
Range Management of 
External Stakeholders 
Situation Awareness Recovery 
Priorities 
La nostra organizzazione ha degli 
accordi solidi con altre 
organizzazioni (altre aziende, 
partner governativi etc.) per 
ottenere risorse in caso 
d'emergenza o crisi 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
External 
Resources 
La nostra organizzazione ha 
approntato dei piani per fornire 
supporto alla comunità o ad altri 
stakeholder in caso di crisi 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
External 
Resources 
La nostra azienda mantiene 
contatti regolari con le 
organizzazioni con cui 
collaborerebbe solo in situazioni 
di crisi (ad esempio protezione 
civile, ma anche altri stakeholder 
poco influenti durante 
l'amministrazione ordinaria) 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
External 
Resources 
La nostra azienda è consapevole 
delle interdipendenze con le 
altre organizzazioni del settore o 
dell'area geografica e cerca di 
mantenere attive e di curarsi di 
queste connessioni 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
External 
Resources 
Siamo considerati membri attivi 
all'interno del settore o delle sue 
associazioni 
Range Adaptive Capacity Proactive Posture 
Abbiamo piani precisi su come 
gestire problematiche legate ai 
fornitori 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
Abbiamo piani precisi su come 
gestire problematiche legate ai 
clienti 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
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Il nostro personale sa quanto e 
come eventi inaspettati e 
potenzialmente negativi 
potrebbero influenzare la nostra 
azienda 
Range HR Protective Factors Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
Il nostro personale si assume la 
responsabilità dell'efficacia ed 
efficienza dell'azienda 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Staff Engagement 
Il nostro personale si fa 
attivamente e responsabilmente 
carico di un problema qualora lo 
identifichi fino alla sua 
risoluzione 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Staff Engagement 
Vi è un forte senso di 
collaborazione e cameratismo 
nella nostra organizzazione 
Range Adaptive Capacity Minimization of 
Silo Mentality 
Nella nostra organizzazione è 
reputato importante che non vi 
siano barriere che ci ostacolino 
dal lavorare al meglio sia tra 
colleghi che con altre 
organizzazioni collegate 
Range Adaptive Capacity Minimization of 
Silo Mentality 
Il nostro organico è incoraggiato 
a ricoprire mansioni differenti 
nell'organizzazione e a muoversi 
tra i reparti per acquisire 
maggiore esperienza 
Range Adaptive Capacity Minimization of 
Silo Mentality 
La nostra cultura aziendale 
considera fondamentale l'essere 
di supporto per i colleghi 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
Il morale del nostro organico è 
molto alto / Siamo ottimisti di 
fronte a quasi tutte le situazioni 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
Il nostro organico saprebbe come 
reagire di fronte ad una crisi 
aziendale 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
Il nostro organico dimostra 
sempre di comprendere, 
rispettare e applicare i valori 
della nostra azienda 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
La sua azienda ha utilizzato 
strumenti di valutazione della 
soddisfazione del personale negli 
ultimi due anni? 
Yes / No Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
I risultati di tale valutazione sono 
stati... 
Poor, 
Sufficient, 
Average, Good, 
Excellent, 
Don’t 
know/Non 
Applicable 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
La nostra organizzazione ha 
identificato chiaramente delle 
priorità rispetto a cosa è 
importante ripristinare durante e 
dopo una crisi 
Range Business Continuity Situation Awareness Recovery 
Priorities 
Le priorità su cosa si debba 
ripristinare in seguito ad una crisi 
sono sufficienti per dare una 
direzione chiara al nostro 
personale 
Range Situation Awareness Recovery 
Priorities 
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La nostra azienda è consapevole 
del livello minimo di risorse 
necessario per il suo corretto 
funzionamento (in termini di 
personale, materiali, macchinari, 
clienti…) 
Range Situation Awareness Recovery 
Priorities 
La nostra azienda è consapevole 
che avere piani per far fronte alle 
emergenze non è sufficiente e 
che il piano deve essere praticato 
e testato per essere efficace 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Participation in 
Exercises 
Il nostro personale solitamente 
può sospendere le proprie 
mansioni ordinarie per 
esercitarsi a far fronte ad 
un'emergenza 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Participation in 
Exercises 
La nostra organizzazione investe 
risorse sufficienti per essere 
pronta ad affrontare emergenze 
di qualsiasi genere 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Participation in 
Exercises 
Data l'importanza che ricopriamo 
per i nostri stakeholder, 
riteniamo che la maniera in cui ci 
prepariamo preventivamente ad 
eventi inaspettati sia adeguata 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
La nostra organizzazione al 
momento impiega personale 
nelle seguenti funzioni aziendali 
o possiede piani formali per la 
gestione dei seguenti elementi 
(selezioni tutte le caselle 
rilevanti) 
Multiple 
Choice (types 
of risk 
management) 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
Quanto spesso vengono ripetute 
le esercitazioni dei piani 
d'emergenza? 
Twice per year, 
yearly, every 
two years, 
almost never, 
don’t 
know/not 
applicable 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
L'azienda possiede un piano 
formale e scritto di continuità 
delle operazioni, consultabile in 
una situazione di crisi? 
Yes / No Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
Ritiene che questo piano preveda 
degli standard operativi tali da 
essere adeguati durante 
un'emergenza? 
Yes / No / 
Don’t know 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
La vostra azienda ha effettuato 
alcuna pianificazione preventiva 
nei confronti di un rischio o 
pericolo specifici (ad es. incendio, 
perdita di clienti/fornitori, 
dissesto finanziario etc.)? 
Yes / No Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
Per quali tra questi rischi 
l'azienda ha effettuato una 
pianificazione preventiva? 
Selezioni tutte le caselle rilevanti 
Multiple 
choice (list of 
risks) 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
Prendendo come esempio un 
piano specifico per uno dei rischi 
sopra citati, la vostra azienda ha 
effettuato le seguenti 
operazioni? (selezioni tutte le 
caselle rilevanti) 
Multiple 
choice (list of 
actions) 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Planning 
Strategies 
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Quali sono i rischi più importanti 
che potrebbero portare ad una 
crisi della sua azienda? Trascini a 
destra e ordini i tre rischi 
principali. 
Drag & Drop 
with ranking, 
starting from a 
list of risks 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
Qualora venissero a mancare i 
seguenti servizi infrastrutturali, 
quanto tempo potrebbe operare 
in condizioni normali l'azienda? 
Risponda solo dove ritiene che 
l'opzione sia rilevante per la sua 
azienda. 
List of 
infrastructures, 
immediate 
disruption, 
some hours, 
some days, 
some months 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
La nostra azienda tipicamente 
non riscontra problemi 
riguardanti i flussi di cassa 
Range Hard Internal 
Resources 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
Abbiamo un livello di debito sano 
che stimola gli investimenti senza 
pesare negativamente sulla 
situazione finanziaria 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
La nostra organizzazione 
possiede risorse sufficienti per 
poter operare con successo in 
periodi di ordinaria 
amministrazione 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
Internal 
Resources 
La nostra azienda ha un'ottima 
traiettoria di crescita 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
In periodi di ordinaria 
amministrazione le risorse sono 
gestite in modo da poter far 
fronte a cambiamenti imprevisti 
di piccola entità (ad esempio, 
incremento della produzione, 
mancanza di approvvigionamenti 
etc.) 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
Internal 
Resources 
Qualora un problema si 
presentasse nella nostra 
organizzazione, le risorse interne 
sarebbero maggiormente 
accessibili a tutto il personale 
con breve preavviso e meno 
burocrazia rispetto all'ordinaria 
amministrazione 
Range Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Capacity of 
Internal 
Resources 
L'azienda possiede infrastrutture 
tecnologiche (IT) di backup? 
Yes / No / 
Don’t know or 
not applicable 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
Quanto sarebbe fattibile 
rilocalizzare le attività svolte 
dall'azienda? Selezioni tutte le 
caselle che riflettono la 
condizione attuale dell'azienda. 
Multiple 
choice (list of 
options) 
Management of 
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
 
La nostra organizzazione è 
capace di passare velocemente 
da un orientamento di ordinaria 
amministrazione ad un 
orientamento volto a risolvere 
crisi contingenti 
Range Mindfulness Situation Awareness Proactive Posture 
Qualora delle persone chiave per 
la nostra organizzazione non 
fossero disponibili o reperibili, 
altri membri del personale 
potrebbero assumere il loro 
ruolo 
Range Situation Awareness Information and 
Knowledge 
Management 
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Nella nostra organizzazione, i 
dipendenti sono consapevoli di 
quanto il successo di una 
funzione aziendale dipenda dalla 
performance delle altre 
Range Situation Awareness Monitoring 
Nella nostra azienda in generale 
è semplice ottenere l'assistenza 
di un esperto quando si presenta 
un problema che un dipendente 
non sa affrontare 
Range Situation Awareness Information and 
Knowledge 
Management 
Se qualcosa non funziona come 
dovrebbe, qualsiasi membro del 
personale si sentirebbe libero di 
comunicarlo ai responsabili, ai 
quadri o ai dirigenti 
Range Situation Awareness Monitoring 
Il nostro organico lavora con 
chiunque sia necessario per 
completare al meglio un 
processo, un progetto o 
un'operazione senza considerare 
vincoli di funzione, di mansione o 
organizzativi 
Range Adaptive Capacity Minimization of 
Silo Mentality 
Per noi è una priorità che il 
nostro organico abbia le 
informazioni e le conoscenze 
necessarie per rispondere a 
problemi inaspettati, qualora si 
presentassero, prima di agire 
Range Adaptive Capacity Information and 
Knowledge 
Management 
Qualora accadesse qualcosa di 
fuori dall'ordinario, il nostro 
organico saprebbe chi possiede 
le conoscenze e l'esperienza per 
risolverlo, o potrebbe accedere 
facilmente all'aiuto di esperti 
Range Adaptive Capacity Information and 
Knowledge 
Management 
Ci sforziamo attivamente perché 
le informazioni critiche (come i 
contatti dei membri del 
personale) siano disponibili e 
accessibili contemporaneamente 
in più formati e in più luoghi 
possibile 
Range Adaptive Capacity Information and 
Knowledge 
Management 
In caso di problemi, i responsabili 
o altre figure con l'autorità 
necessaria sono sempre 
disponibili per il resto 
dell'organico 
Range Adaptive Capacity Decision Making 
La nostra organizzazione sa 
prendere velocemente decisioni 
difficili 
Range Adaptive Capacity Decision Making 
Nella nostra azienda le decisioni 
sono effettuate dal personale più 
competente o qualificato, non 
tenendo conto dell'anzianità o 
del ruolo organizzativo ricoperto 
Range Adaptive Capacity Decision Making 
La nostra organizzazione si 
preoccupa di saper rispondere ad 
eventi inattesi 
Range Situation Awareness Proactive Posture 
La nostra organizzazione sa 
rispondere velocemente a 
cambiamenti repentini del nostro 
ambiente economico (ad 
esempio, cambiamenti nelle 
preferenze dei clienti, nelle 
disponibiità dei fornitori etc) 
Range Adaptive Capacity  
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Di norma il nostro personale 
interagisce con una frequenza 
sufficiente per consentire a tutti 
di comprendere la situazione 
corrente in cui versa 
l'organizzazione 
Range Situation Awareness Situation Awareness Monitoring 
I nostri responsabili ascoltano 
attivamente quando viene 
riportato un problema in quanto 
ritengono che possa aiutarli a 
rispondere al meglio 
Range Situation Awareness Monitoring 
Quando la nostra organizzazione 
ha appena rischiato di dover 
affrontare un evento negativo ad 
esempio (perdita di un cliente, 
compromissione dei macchinari o 
dello stabilimento, attriti con il 
personale), sfruttiamo il fatto per 
auto-valutarci criticamente 
piuttosto che confermare e 
celebrare il nostro successo 
Range Situation Awareness Proactive Posture 
La nostra azienda osserva 
attentamente i trend del settore 
per ottenere in anticipo 
informazioni su possibili rischi od 
opportunità emergenti 
Range Situation Awareness Monitoring 
La nostra azienda è capace di 
imparare lezioni dai progetti 
passati e di assicurarsi che 
queste lezioni servano ad 
affrontare al meglio i progetti 
futuri 
Range Situation Awareness Monitoring 
Siamo consapevoli di come un 
evento che può impattare sulla 
comunità che ci circonda abbia 
ripercussioni anche sulla nostra 
azienda 
Range Situation Awareness  
Nella seguente lista sono raccolti 
i principali elementi che 
migliorano la resilienza 
organizzativa. Selezioni quelli che 
durante la recente crisi del 
vostro settore NON sono stati 
utili nè per la ripresa nè per 
affrontare la situazione 
contingente. 
Multiple 
choice: 
categories 
from table 3.2 
Questions for the 
interview 
  
Selezioni quelli che sono stati 
utili per gestire eventi negativi 
SOLAMENTE nel periodo di crisi 
Multiple 
choice: 
categories 
from table 3.2 
  
Selezioni quelli che sono stati 
utili per gestire eventi negativi 
SOLAMENTE durante 
l'amministrazione ordinaria 
Multiple 
choice: 
categories 
from table 3.2 
  
(*) Underlined if part of the Planning Capacity measure, otherwise explains Adaptive Capacity 
Lists used:  
 Types of risk management or pre-emptive planning: gestione della continuità delle 
operazioni / del business, gestione dei rischi operativi, gestione delle crisi 
aziendali, gestione delle emergenze, altri tipi di pianificazione preventiva 
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 List of risks: disastro naturale, crisi finanziaria, incendio, epidemia (ad esempio 
d’influenza), mancanza di servizi critici (elettricità, acqua, telecomunicazioni), 
danno all’immagine aziendale, frode, problemi legali o di regolamentazione del 
settore, crisi nei rapporti con il personale o scioperi, bancarotta di clienti o 
fornitori chiave, altro 
 List of actions: discutere il piano con membri chiave del personale, realizzare un 
piano formale e scritto per affrontare la situazione qualora si presentasse, 
organizzarsi con altre aziende, associazioni o enti per assorbire l’impatto di questo 
rischio sul settore 
 List of infrastructures: approvvigionamento d’acqua, fognature, elettricità, servizi 
di telefonia (fissa e mobile), infrastrutture IT (banche dati, software gestionali), 
strade e autostrade, trasporti su rotaia, disponibilità di carburante 
 List of options: la maggior parte del personale può lavorare da casa, sarebbe facile 
trovare nuovi uffici o impianti, possiamo svolgere le nostre attività in più luoghi / 
impianti, ci sono notevoli limiti regolatori o di sicurezza che concernono i luoghi 
in cui operiamo impedendone il cambiamento, i macchinari e l’equipaggiamento 
sono difficili da ottenere, spostare o rimpiazzare, la nostra impresa è vincolata ad 
operare nei luoghi prestabiliti, potenzialmente potremmo condividere impianti o 
uffici con altre aziende 
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7.2 Firm Reports 
This attachment includes the firm reports submitted to the participating organizations. 
The values reported on the graphics are calculated according to McManus (2008) and 
Stephenson (2010) methods: the values from the survey were aggregated according to the 
theoretical suggestions, then an average value was found. Afterwards, the scale was 
changed to match an easier to understand 1 to 10 scale.  
7.2.1 Common Parts 
Introduzione 
La resilienza organizzativa può essere definita come la capacità di un sistema dinamico, 
come un’azienda, di adattarsi con successo alle turbolenze dell’ambiente che possono 
minarne il funzionamento, lo sviluppo o la sostenibilità.  
Essa è composta da più elementi che normalmente concorrono al buon funzionamento 
di un’impresa, e in letteratura è stato appurato il nesso tra questi elementi e il vantaggio 
competitivo che un’azienda ottiene dopo averli sviluppati. 
Il questionario che avete compilato ha permesso di identificare quanto questi diversi 
elementi contribuiscono alla resilienza della vostra azienda, segnalando i punti di forza 
e di debolezza. I valori sono riportati in una scala indicativa da 1 (pessimo) a 10 
(eccellente) che valuta esclusivamente il loro contributo alla capacità di resilienza 
aziendale, senza considerare se essi portino ad un vantaggio competitivo o abbiano altre 
implicazioni per l’organizzazione. La letteratura tuttavia riporta come vi sia una 
correlazione tra gli elementi che costituiscono la resilienza e il successo dell’impresa, 
anche se questo nesso non è ancora stato quantificato. 
L’intervista personale successiva all’invio di questo rapporto servirà a dipanare alcuni 
dubbi su questo legame e a chiarire se vi siano elementi più rilevanti per rendere 
resiliente un’azienda, se la loro efficacia differisca durante la normale amministrazione 
e i momenti di crisi, se investire in questi elementi abbia sempre ritorni positivi o una 
quota per cui i costi superano i benefici e se esiste una soglia oltre cui i rischi corsi 
dall’azienda superano i fattori protettivi, portando ad una crisi.  
I quesiti posti verranno interpretati secondo due modelli che separano in maniera 
differente gli elementi di resilienza, entrambi collegati alle ricerche dell’associazione 
“Resilient Organisations”. Dati i modelli utilizzati, si consiglia una lettura dei risultati in 
chiave relativa per comprendere quali elementi gioverebbero maggiormente da eventuali 
investimenti.  
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Colgo l’occasione per ringraziarvi sentitamente per il vostro contributo, con l’auspicio che 
la ricerca possa fornire spunti interessanti per la vostra azienda. 
Modello a 3 fattori – McManus 
L’interpretazione dei dati basata sul modello di McManus postula che la resilienza 
organizzativa si sviluppi a partire da tre fattori di eguale importanza:  
 Capacità di adattamento, intesa come l’insieme di elementi che favoriscono sia 
processi decisionali rapidi ed appropriati durante le crisi che la capacità di 
cogliere le opportunità e sfruttarle al meglio; 
 Gestione delle vulnerabilità, ovvero la capacità di conoscere e controllare i 
componenti dell’azienda che potenzialmente possono generare eventi negativi 
(sia in maniera catastrofica, come in caso d’incendio, sia in maniera insidiosa, 
come in caso di mancata percezione di un cambiamento tecnologico radicale nel 
settore); 
 Attenzione situazionale, cioè il grado di consapevolezza per l’ambiente 
operativo, includendo rischi, opportunità e le connessioni tra stakeholder interni 
ed esterni. 
Un profilo di resilienza eccellente non può prescindere da valori elevati in tutti e tre i 
fattori. Gli elementi che influenzano i fattori afferiscono alle otto categorie riportate in 
tabella. 
Categoria Elementi Sottesi Fattore di Resilienza Associato 
Leadership Leadership e governance 
Capacità di adattamento, una buona leadership 
consente ad un’organizzazione di adeguarsi a 
situazioni impreviste più velocemente 
Innovazione e creatività Stimoli ad un approccio creativo nell’organizzazione 
Capacità di adattamento, la creatività consente di 
modificare l’impostazione attuale dell’azienda per 
conformarla alla situazione contingente 
Relazioni con stakeholder 
esterni 
Gestione della catena del valore, rete 
relazionale, gestione dell’immagine 
aziendale 
Principalmente gestione delle vulnerabilità, in quanto 
tipicamente un’azienda di medie dimensioni ha un 
impatto limitato sul tessuto economico che la circonda 
e non può modificarlo eccessivamente per adattarsi a 
nuove situazioni 
Personale e stakeholder 
interni 
Partecipazione del personale, 
allineamento alla cultura aziendale, 
unità d’intenti, altre risorse interne 
intangibili 
Capacità di adattamento e gestione delle 
vulnerabilità: questi elementi favoriscono 
l’adattamento e consentono al personale di 
mantenere monitorati i rischi corsi dall’azienda 
Pianificazione per la 
continuità operativa  
Pianificazione per la continuità, priorità 
di ripristino, partecipazione alle 
esercitazioni, formazione, stress-test 
dei piani d’emergenza 
Gestione delle vulnerabilità, in quanto i piani di 
continuità consentono all’azienda di mantenersi 
operativa a fronte di rischi e vulnerabilità prevedibili 
Gestione delle risorse 
aziendali 
Aspetti finanziari, sistemi di backup, 
impianti e uffici, gestione delle risorse 
e processi volti ad accumularle 
Gestione delle vulnerabilità, questi elementi 
costituiscono delle risorse addizionali a cui attingere 
per consentire l’adattamento 
The Normality of Adaptation: Organizational Resilience and the Interplay between Risk and Protective Factors 
156 
Consapevolezza 
(mindfulness) 
Comprensione dei ruoli aziendali, ruoli 
flessibili, capacità decisionale rapida e 
delegata agli esperti, ricerca delle 
soluzioni orientata agli obiettivi 
Sia capacità di adattamento che attenzione 
situazionale, questi elementi favoriscono 
l’identificazione di problemi e la ricerca di soluzioni 
tramite la flessibilità 
Attenzione all’ambiente 
economico 
Comprensione delle situazioni, 
monitoraggio del tessuto economico 
Attenzione situazionale, questi elementi misurano 
quanto l’azienda è in grado di cogliere i trend di 
mercato ed anticipare gli eventi  
 
Modello a 2 fattori – Stephenson  
L’interpretazione dei dati basata sul modello di Stephenson postula che la resilienza 
organizzativa si sviluppi a partire da due fattori di eguale importanza:  
 Capacità di adattamento, ovvero l’insieme di elementi che consente di adattarsi 
alla situazione contingente in maniera flessibile, qualsiasi essa sia; 
 Capacità di pianificazione, ovvero l’insieme di elementi che consente di 
identificare soluzioni a problemi e situazioni identificate preventivamente. 
Questo modello raggruppa gli elementi che favoriscono la resilienza come segue. 
Capacità di adattamento 
Elemento Contributo 
Minimizzazione della mentalità 
a compartimenti stagni Favorisce lo scambio di informazioni tra funzioni, garantisce una visione d’insieme 
Capacità e risorse interne Assorbono parte dell’impatto negativo dovuto ad una crisi 
Coinvolgimento del personale Un personale coinvolto favorisce la flessibilità rispetto alle situazioni in quanto durante una crisi i collaboratori si sentono responsabili per il successo futuro dell’organizzazione 
Conoscenza e gestione delle 
informazioni 
Un ottimo controllo dei flussi infomativi accelera la capacità di adattamento in situazioni di 
crisi e consente l’accesso immediato ad informazioni critiche 
Leadership Consente ad un’organizzazione di adeguarsi a situazioni impreviste più velocemente 
Innovazione e creatività Consente di modificare l’impostazione attuale dell’azienda per conformarla alla situazione contingente 
Capacità decisionale Buoni processi decisionali consentono agli esperti di partecipare e fornire un contributo informato 
Supervisione della situazione 
contingente Consente la raccolta di dati utili per fronteggiare le crisi 
Capacità di pianificazione 
Elemento Contributo 
Strategie di pianificazione Indica quanto opportuni e informati sono i processi di pianificazione preventiva dell’azienda 
Partecipazione alle 
esercitazioni 
Indica quanto vengono praticati i piani d’emergenza, in quanto senza esercitazioni tali piani 
difficilmente trovano un’attuazione efficace 
Proattività È il rapporto con cui l’azienda si interfaccia agli eventi inattesi; un rapporto proattivo consente di identificarli anticipatamente e non farsi cogliere impreparati 
Capacità e risorse legate a 
stakeholder esterni 
Potere e saper come implementare risorse dall’ambiente esterno in momenti di crisi favorisce 
la resilienza 
Priorità di ripristino Identificare chiaramente quali elementi siano indispensabili per il funzionamento dell’azienda facilita il recupero in seguito ad una crisi 
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7.2.2 Results – Cri-Rec Fixtures 
McManus 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di 
Adattamento 
Gestione delle 
Vulnerabilità 
Attenzione 
Situazionale 
7,96 7,26 7,42 
Resilienza Aziendale 
7,55 Più che Discreta 
 
  
8,0
8,8
6,4
7,3
5,9
9,3
7,8 7,7
Elementi della resilienza aziendale
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Stephenson 
 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di Adattamento Capacità di Pianificazione 
7,97 6,54 
Resilienza Aziendale 
7,25 Discreta 
 
  
7,5
9,2
6,9 7,0
8,1
9,2 8,8
7,7
Elementi della capacità di adattamento
6,5 6,7
7,8
5,3
7,2
Strategie di
pianificazione
Partecipazione alle
esercitazioni
Proattività Capacità e risorse
legate a stakeholder
esterni
Priorità di ripristino
Elementi della capacità di pianificazione
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Valutazione 
Cri-Rec Fixtures presenta un profilo di resilienza più che discreto tramite l’applicazione 
di entrambi i modelli. Secondo i dati disponibili, la buona disponibilità di risorse e la loro 
accessibilità per il personale in caso di necessità conferiscono una solida sicurezza in 
caso di crisi. Questo elemento è coadiuvato da una capacità dell’organico di affrontare 
situazioni impreviste con creatività, fattore che viene attivamente incentivato.  
 
La presenza di buoni processi decisionali e di un adeguato monitoraggio dell’ambiente 
economico stimolano a propria volta la capacità di adattamento dell’azienda, fornendo 
uno strumento prezioso per affrontare la variabilità quotidiana a cui essa è sottoposta.  
 
Vi sono però alcuni elementi che inficiano la capacità di resilienza organizzativa: 
l’azienda ha approntato solo parzialmente piani per affrontare rischi prevedibili legati sia 
all’ambiente che a stakeholder esterni, e la mancanza di una loro formalizzazione fa sì 
che il personale si basi sulla propria capacità di adattamento piuttosto che su linee guida 
condivise.  
 
La gestione delle vulnerabilità e la pianificazione preventiva sono infatti i punti principali 
tramite cui si potrebbe migliorare il profilo di resilienza aziendale: la formalizzazione di 
piani specifici per far fronte ai rischi principali corsi dall’impresa andrebbe infatti a 
migliorare l’approccio dell’organizzazione nei confronti di eventi dalla bassa probabilità 
ma dall’alto impatto negativo, in quanto la capacità di adattamento, pur necessaria per 
interpretare la situazione contingente, potrebbe non essere sufficiente per una risposta 
tempestiva ed efficace all’evento.  
 
In particolare non andrebbero sottovalutati i rischi connessi ai fornitori chiave e le 
opportunità derivanti da una buona gestione dei rapporti con altre organizzazioni 
appartenenti alla catena del valore e al tessuto economico in cui l’impresa è situata. 
Questi attori possono avere un ruolo fondamentale sia nell’affrontare le crisi che nel 
generarle, e l’azienda potrebbe valutare delle strategie per aumentare il loro 
coinvolgimento nelle attività dell’organizzazione.  
 
Secondariamente, per potenziare la capacità di adattamento, si potrebbero facilitare i 
flussi informativi inter-aziendali e incentivare il personale a farsi attivamente carico di 
eventuali problemi riscontrati; una connessione con gli incentivi per la creatività 
dimostrata produrrebbe gli effetti desiderati. 
 
L’azienda comunque presenta un profilo in grado di farsi carico di ulteriori rischi operativi, 
che potrebbero costituire ottime opportunità per potenziare il vantaggio competitivo o 
migliorare la performance, pur mantenendo un approccio che richieda l’uso della 
capacità di adattamento piuttosto che una redazione di piani precisi per affrontare le 
nuove situazioni. 
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7.2.3 Results – High-Res Structures 
McManus 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di 
Adattamento 
Gestione delle 
Vulnerabilità 
Attenzione 
Situazionale 
8,24 8,21 8,33 
Resilienza Aziendale 
8,26 Molto Buona 
 
  
8,4
7,8
7,0
8,0 8,1
8,7 8,5 8,1
Elementi della resilienza aziendale
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Stephenson 
 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di Adattamento Capacità di Pianificazione 
8,16 7,74 
Resilienza Aziendale 
7,95 Buona 
 
8,1 8,3
7,5
8,3 8,3
7,5
8,8
8,1
Elementi della capacità di adattamento
9,0
7,9 8,4
5,9
8,4
Strategie di
pianificazione
Partecipazione alle
esercitazioni
Proattività Capacità e risorse
legate a stakeholder
esterni
Priorità di ripristino
Elementi della capacità di pianificazione
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Valutazione 
High-Res Structures presenta un profilo di resilienza molto buono tramite 
l’applicazione di entrambi i modelli. L’azienda ha un orientamento che le consente 
di identificare i problemi e pianificare anticipatamente la loro risoluzione. La 
presenza di una leadership solida e di una gestione dei processi decisionali 
ottimale garantisce flessibilità di fronte ad eventuali crisi. 
 
I piani preventivi per la gestione dei rischi risultano più che adeguati, con un buon 
livello di preparazione che non tracima in una rigidità eccessiva che inficierebbe 
la capacità di adattamento dell’azienda. La consapevolezza di come tali piani 
possano essere fallibili e di come sia richiesta flessibilità in base alla situazioni è 
alta. 
 
Possibili punti di miglioramento, segnalati da entrambi i modelli, si trovano nella 
gestione della rete di stakeholder esterni dell’azienda e nella capacità di 
approcciarsi ai problemi creativamente e con uno spirito d’innovazione.  
 
Benchè l’azienda conosca i rischi legati a clienti fornitori e sia attrezzata per 
arginarli, essa è solo parzialmente consapevole di come altri stakeholder 
(comunità, aziende nelle zone limitrofe, etc.) possano giocare ruoli fondamentali 
per la ripresa durante una crisi. Un’interazione più frequente con questi attori del 
tessuto economico aumenterebbe il loro coinvolgimento nell’azienda, 
consentendo l’accesso ad altre forme di supporto in momenti di crisi. 
 
Un sistema che premi e stimoli maggiormente la creatività da parte dei 
collaboratori andrebbe a propria volta ad aumentare la capacità di adattamento 
dell’azienda, in quanto consentirebbe di sfruttare questa risorsa per fronteggiare 
in maniere innovative eventuali problemi legati ad attività che coinvolgono 
direttamente gli operatori.  
Ciò potrebbe essere ottenuto puntando maggiormente su una cultura aziendale 
inclusiva che possa anche migliorare la sensazione di coinvolgimento e 
partecipazione da parte del personale. 
 
Il profilo di resilienza risulta comunque molto equilibrato, come segnalato dai 3 
fattori di McManus, segnalando come l’azienda sia pronta a far fronte sia alla 
variabilità incontrata nelle attività quotidiane sia a eventi imprevisti e 
potenzialmente catastrofici. La capacità di attenzione situazionale 
dell’organizzazione permette, a fronte anche di risorse limitate, di saper captare 
eventuali rischi e vulnerabilità anche da segnali deboli (provenienti sia dall’interno 
che dall’esterno). 
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7.2.4 Results – High-Res Fixtures 
McManus 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di 
Adattamento 
Gestione delle 
Vulnerabilità 
Attenzione 
Situazionale 
7,13 6,42 7,25 
Resilienza Aziendale 
6,93 Discreta 
 
  
6,9 6,6
3,9
6,6
5,8
9,0
7,9 7,7
Elementi della resilienza aziendale
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Stephenson 
 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di Adattamento Capacità di Pianificazione 
7,50 5,35 
Resilienza Aziendale 
6,42 Sufficiente - Discreta 
 
  
8,4 8,3
6,9
8,0
6,7 6,3
7,9 7,5
Elementi della capacità di adattamento
4,5
7,9
6,9
2,2
6,3
Strategie di
pianificazione
Partecipazione alle
esercitazioni
Proattività Capacità e risorse
legate a stakeholder
esterni
Priorità di ripristino
Elementi della capacità di pianificazione
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Valutazione 
High-Res Fixtures presenta un profilo di resilienza tra il discreto e il sufficiente 
tramite l’applicazione di entrambi i modelli. L’ottima disponibilità di risorse interne 
dovuta alla traiettoria di crescita e ai risultati ottenuti negli ultimi anni 
dall’organizzazione, coadiuvata da una buona attenzione all’ambiente economico 
e da processi decisionali efficaci e consapevoli, bilancia alcune debolezze in altri 
elementi della resilienza.  
 
La capacità di adattamento e di comprensione dei trend del settore risulta infatti 
positiva, a fronte di punteggi nettamente inferiori nella capacità di pianificazione 
preventiva e nella gestione di rischi e opportunità derivanti da stakeholder esterni. 
Date le informazioni note sull’azienda, questo è probabilmente dovuto al fatto che 
essa non si è trovata di fronte a nessuna vera e propria crisi: non vi sono mai 
state molteplici vulnerabilità attive in contemporanea. I rischi corsi dall’azienda 
sono sempre rientrati nella sua capacità previsionale e nella capacità di gestire 
la variabilità quotidiana, ma qualora queste venissero a mancare (come nel caso 
di una catastrofe improvvisa o di un rallentamento consistente della crescita) i 
piani per far fronte alle emergenze potrebbero non essere sufficienti a garantire 
una risposta resiliente. 
 
Alcuni elementi da potenziare sono l’identificazione del livello minimo di risorse 
necessario per mantenere l’operatività, la creazione di piani formali per far fronte 
a rischi prevedibili (pur con la consapevolezza che le istruzioni non andrebbero 
seguite pedissequamente, ma con flessibilità adattativa) e un potenziamento 
delle relazioni con gli stakeholder esterni, attori indispensabili per il ripristino 
dell’operatività in seguito ad una crisi.  
 
Secondariamente, stimoli tangibili alla creatività del personale, una 
preoccupazione superiore per il coinvolgimento e la soddisfazione dell’organico 
e una diffusione di informazioni su possibili crisi e la situazione contingente 
dell’azienda costituirebbero altri metodi per incrementare la resilienza 
dell’organizzazione tramite un potenziamento della capacità d’adattamento e un 
miglioramento dell’allineamento del personale alla strategia. 
 
Il profilo di resilienza evidenzia come l’impresa abbia tutti gli strumenti per 
affrontare la situazione corrente, ma suggerisce cautela prima di incorrere in 
ulteriori rischi operativi e non (ad es. acquisizioni, indebitamento, diversificazione 
orizzontale atipica). Come quando un’azienda decide la propria strategia, High-
Res Fixtures prima di incorrere in nuovi rischi potrebbe puntare su un 
potenziamento delle competenze sottese alla resilienza che già possiede 
(capacità decisionale e attenzione all’ambiente economico) o lavorare sulle 
debolezze per portarle ad un livello di performance più elevato. 
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7.2.5 Results – Cri-Rec Structures 
McManus 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di 
Adattamento 
Gestione delle 
Vulnerabilità 
Attenzione 
Situazionale 
7,92 7,41 7,83 
Resilienza Aziendale 
7,72 Più che Discreta 
 
  
7,7
8,4
7,0 7,5 7,2
7,7 8,0 7,7
Elementi della resilienza aziendale
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Stephenson 
 
 
Fattori di Resilienza 
Capacità di Adattamento Capacità di Pianificazione 
7,85 7,04 
Resilienza Aziendale 
7,44 Più che Discreta 
 
  
7,5
8,3
6,3
7,5 7,9
8,3 8,8 7,9
Elementi della capacità di adattamento
8,7
5,4
7,5
5,9
8,1
Strategie di
pianificazione
Partecipazione alle
esercitazioni
Proattività Capacità e risorse
legate a stakeholder
esterni
Priorità di ripristino
Elementi della capacità di pianificazione
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Valutazione 
Cri-Rec Structures presenta un profilo di resilienza più che discreto tramite 
l’applicazione di entrambi i modelli. Spiccano diverse caratteristiche che 
favoriscono sia la capacità di adattamento che la pianificazione preventiva: buoni 
processi decisionali, un’adeguata attenzione alle risorse interne e alla loro 
disponibilità, strategie di pianificazione preventiva strutturate per affrontare i 
rischi più importanti per l’azienda. 
 
Il valore relativo alla gestione delle vulnerabilità è principalmente inficiato dalla 
mancanza di formalizzazione dei piani preventivi, fattore che riduce la 
conoscibilità da parte del personale di come vengano gestiti possibili rischi ed 
emergenze. Questo elemento può essere potenziato rendendo più accessibili 
questi piani ai collaboratori e istituendo dei processi che consentano delle 
esercitazioni che simulino questi rischi e verifichino la capacità di risposta dei 
piani (ad esempio verificando i comportamenti e le soluzioni adottate a seguito di 
una crisi finanziaria o di controversie dovute alla regolamentazione di settore). 
 
Inoltre, la gestione degli stakeholder esterni e un’attiva ricerca di un loro 
coinvolgimento nell’azienda potrebbero costituire ulteriori strumenti per favorire 
una gestione delle vulnerabilità ottimale, in quanto questi attori spesso risultano 
cruciali durante la fase di ripresa di un’azienda in seguito ad una crisi. 
 
Si porta l’attenzione anche sul coinvolgimento del personale: in caso di situazioni 
critiche, avere stakeholder interni motivati e desiderosi di contribuire al successo 
dell’azienda evita l’esacerbarsi dei rischi contingenti e stimola la capacità di 
adattamento. Numerosi esempi in letteratura (come Southwest Airlines) 
confermano il contributo dato dal coinvolgimento e dalla responsabilizzazione 
dell’organico; Cri-Rec Structures potrebbe potenziare questo elemento per 
migliorare ulteriormente il profilo di resilienza. 
 
Pur potendo beneficiare da interventi su questi elementi, il profilo dell’azienda 
suggerisce un’ottima capacità di far fronte alla variabilità a cui è sottoposta 
quotidianaente e misure adeguate per la gestione di eventi a bassa probabilità 
ed alto impatto. Di conseguenza, qualora l’impresa si assumesse ulteriori rischi 
operativi, pur con moderazione, questi non porterebbero ad una crisi, bensì 
costituirebbero opportunità che l’azienda potrebbe catturare. 
 
Nonostante questo, si consiglia di mantenere monitorati gli elementi di resilienza 
evidenziati in quanto la congiuntura negativa nel settore richiede una forte 
capacità di adattamento e pianificazione, e in quanto l’assunzione di nuovi rischi 
spesso impatta negativamente sulle dimensioni analizzate. Un deterioramento su 
più fronti di questi elementi aumenterebbe la probabilità e gli effetti di eventi 
indesiderati sull’azienda. 
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7.3 Interview Backbone 
The interviews only partially followed the proposed scheme, as the flow of the 
conversation was what led most of the discussion. Nevertheless, they constituted the base 
of the various inquiries that were made. The list includes only the questions that the 
researcher thought he would always ask to the interviewees. 
Question (in Italian) Aim of the Question 
La valutazione emersa dal modello è utile e veritiera per 
l'azienda? 
Verifying that the conclusions of the reports were truthful 
and useable for the final considerations and theory testing 
Che limiti ha riscontrato nel questionario? Understanding if all the parts of the questionnaire were 
interpreted correctly 
Dopo la crisi economica del 2009, il suo settore ha subito fasi 
alterne di turbolenze e cali di profittabilità. Come ha vissuto 
questo periodo l'azienda? E' stato un periodo che ha 
sottoposto l'azienda a più rischi o ad una crisi? 
Understanding whether the firm lived the situation as 
business-as-usual or not, and the general feeling regarding 
the period 
Negli anni precedenti reputa che l'azienda avesse lo stesso 
livello di resilienza o sono stati presi dei provvedimenti in 
riferimento alle otto categorie evidenziate? 
Understanding if new factors were developed to balance the 
new risks and threats. Very important for Cri-Rec case studies 
(to understand the dynamics between risk and protective 
factors) 
In questo periodo vi sono fattori che sono stati più importanti 
per il funzionamento dell'azienda? Altri che non lo sono stati? 
Sarebbero egualmente importanti in caso di ulteriori crisi? 
Test of Q3: differences in the importance of protective factors 
(starting from the case studies reports) 
I fattori più importanti erano tali perché eravate in un 
ambiente turbolento o in crisi o perché effettivamente 
sarebbe sempre opportuno per un'azienda investire in questi 
elementi? 
A different test of Q3, also addressed Q1 and Q2 as it tried to 
understand whether a factor improved the coping range or 
the overall resilience threshold 
La letteratura suggerisce un'intercambiabilità degli elementi 
di resilienza, segnalata dal contributo ai fattori. Ritiene che 
sfruttare alternativamente un elemento o un altro per far 
fronte ad una crisi sia possibile? 
Test for R3, R1.1  
Ritiene che ci siano dei fattori utili per gestire la variabilità 
che l'azienda affronta quotidianamente e fattori più indicati 
per gestire crisi vere e proprie? (Spiegare soglie di resilienza) 
O i fattori sono intercambiabili e migliorare un qualsiasi 
elemento contribuisce in entrambi i casi? 
Test for R1.1 
I fattori generici e contestuali: i contestuali sono solo una 
declinazione dei generici? (Verificare dai commenti 
dell’intervistato se ciò avviene) 
Reminder to check for Q1 and R1.2: contextual and generic 
factors can be split from a theoretical standpoint? 
Come per l'indebitamento, un profilo ottimo di resilienza può 
essere dettato più da una cautela eccessiva verso gli 
investimenti e i rischi che da un buon bilanciamento tra 
questi e i fattori protettivi. E' d'accordo con questa 
affermazione? 
Approach to discuss Q4 
Secondo lei i fattori protettivi dell'azienda potrebbero 
consentire di farsi carico di rischi maggiori, data la situazione 
corrente? 
Approach to discuss Q4 
Una diminuzione di questi fattori renderebbe subito più 
vulnerabile l'azienda? Essi sono posti costantemente sotto 
stress? O solo in momenti critici? 
Discussion of Q4 
Quali si attivano quotidianamente, quali durante le crisi? Understanding which factors were contextual, which generic 
for the firm (and discussing the coping range and resilience 
threshold with the interviewee) 
Ci sono stati dei momenti in cui siete dovuti ricorrere a fattori 
di resilienza che non usate nell'amministrazione ordinaria? 
Cos'è successo? 
Test for R1.1 
Quali fattori hanno avuto un ruolo più importante durante la 
crisi? 
Reminder to test for Q3 
Tutto vissuto come business as usual? Oppure i risultati sono 
tornati ai livelli precenti senza seguire i trend di settore? 
Discussion on H2, understanding whether factors in the 
coping range or constituting static resilience were employed 
in the different situations (business as usual or crisis).  
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Fattori generici hanno gestito la variabilità quotidiana e 
fattori specifici gli eventi inattesi? 
Another reminder to check for R1.1 
La vostra performance sarebbe stata superiore / inferiore in 
questo periodo con / senza questi fattori? 
Alternative questions to test Q4 
Tutti i fattori prottetivi sono stati utili nel periodo o solo 
alcuni?  
Alternative questions to test Q4 
 
